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Abstract 
Medically Unexplained Symptoms (MUS) are bodily symptoms for which no organic cause has been 
identified, and which result in significant levels of psychological distress and functional impairment. 
MUS are thought to be highly prevalent in primary care settings, and have considerable costs to 
society. Despite evidence of overlapping psychological and physical presentations, MUS are not well 
understood or treated in culture that predominantly views the body through the lenses of dualism 
and mechanistic reductionism. An alternative ‘interactive’ view of the body as playing a more 
dynamic role is elaborated through George Kelly’s (1955) Personal Construct Psychology. The author 
draws upon Lin & Payne’s (2014) ‘frozen construing’ theory, and empirical literature on relationships 
between identity and MUS, to suggest that for people with MUS, the symptomatic body is 
distressing because the person is struggling to integrate its meaning with their identity. It is 
hypothesized that embodied processes, that may actually protect the self (and others who share a 
construct system with that person) from events which threaten to dramatically alter how the self is 
construed, are difficult to understand because of their preverbal nature. Hence symptoms, and the 
body itself, are dissociated from the person’s more elaborated verbal self-constructions. Several 
hypotheses relating to this suggestion were tested using a modified form of the repertory grid 
technique that was designed to explore construct systems of both mind and body, for self and 
others. Twenty participants with MUS, recruited from the community, completed the repertory grid 
interviews and measures of depression, anxiety and symptom severity, which were correlated with 
relevant repertory grid indices to test hypotheses. Findings indicated that symptom constructs, 
contrary to expectations, were well integrated into participants’ construct systems. The alleviation 
of psychological distress was significantly associated with increased perceived distance between the 
self in general and the self when symptoms are worst (a relationship which appeared to be 
independent of severity of symptoms), providing evidence of a process of dissociation that protected 
the current self from assimilating the undesirable characteristics that were associated with the 
symptom. The way in which the self when symptoms are worst is construed appeared to influence 
levels of distress, with more predictive power than several other indices. The study also found 
evidence for some participants of hypothesized relationships between desired aspects of the current 
self and symptoms, that would imply that symptom disappearance would actually threaten a 
desirable aspect of how the self is construed. Content analysis of these constructs revealed (as 
predicted) that such desirable aspects of self tended to relate to being responsible and sensitive to 
the needs of others, and were elaborated through bodily constructs in a way that suggested that 
they were not well integrated with the primary ways that these participants made sense of their 
identity. For these particular participants, discrepancies between the ideals that they had for 
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themselves, and how they would like to be seen by others, were associated with increased 
depression. Several participants were identified whose constructions of self and others were 
dominated by constructs relating to both mental and physical strength and weakness. These 
participants appeared to be struggling to find coherent meaning for themselves as the result of 
symptoms, which were regarded as invalidating a pre-symptom construal of themselves as being 
‘strong’. There seemed to be a continuum of being a ‘body for others’ on the one hand, a previously 
‘strong person’ on the other, and a person who is ‘strong for others’ in the middle. Implications for 
clinical practice are discussed. Although the findings of the current study are limited by a small 
sample size, it appears that exploring the meaning of the body in the construction of self helps to 
elaborate the meaning of the body and symptoms in a verbal, expressible form. This process is likely 
to be helpful to those who struggle to find meanings for their symptoms both in their own construct 
systems and in a society that objectifies the body. 
 
1. Introduction 
Medically unexplained symptoms: an overview 
'Medically unexplained symptoms' (MUS) is a term describing persistent bodily complaints which are 
distressing and impair an individual's functioning (Payne & Stott, 2010), and for which tests and 
investigations have not been able to reveal explanatory organic pathology (Chitnis, Dowrick, Byng, et 
al., 2014). Though these physical symptoms are often distinguished from bodily complaints which 
have an identified etiology, they "can be as real and debilitating as any associated with organic 
disease" (Brown, 2013, p. 868).  
The term 'MUS' covers a range of symptoms including functional disturbance of organs or body 
parts, pain, discomfort, or fatigue. People who experience MUS may be frequent attenders in 
primary care settings and present within various specialist branches of secondary-care medicine. 
Many unexplained symptoms are labelled as 'syndromes' or 'disorders' within different specialties, 
rather than being labelled as 'MUS'. 
Overlaps and comorbidity between MUS labels make obtaining precise data difficult (Wyller, 2007). 
However, MUS are considered to be among the most common complaints in UK primary care 
(Kirmayer & Taillefer, 1997; Kroenke, 2003), with at least as many as one third, and perhaps as many 
as half, of symptoms having no organic explanation (Barsky & Borus, 1995; Kroenke & Mangelsdorff, 
1989; Morriss, Dowrick & Salmon, 2007). Given that General Practitioners (GPs) rarely use terms 
such as 'MUS' or related labels, and display considerable reluctance to do so (Dimsdale, Sharma & 
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Sharpe, 2011), the number of primary care patients with MUS may be underestimated (Payne & 
Brooks, 2016). 
People who experience MUS often experience psychological distress, including anxiety and 
depression (Edwards, Stern, Clarke et al., 2010; Payne, 2009; Smith et al., 2005), and at least half of 
patients seeking psychological help in the UK may have MUS (Hague, 2005). However, MUS is not 
always comorbid with psychiatric diagnoses such as anxiety disorders or depression. Research has 
suggested that, contrary to the assumptions of some practitioners, this psychological distress cannot 
be accounted for as a straightforward consequence of experiencing unwanted bodily symptoms, nor 
are physical symptoms simply the unrecognized somatic counterparts of anxiety or depression 
(Hennigson et al., 2003; Kirmayer & Robbins, 1991). 
Known risk factors for MUS include being female, being younger, and being unemployed (Hotopf et 
al., 1999). Histories of childhood abuse and adversity/trauma (e.g. Drossman et al.,1995; Kirmayer & 
Robbins, 1996; Roelofs & Spinhoven, 2007; Spitzer, Barnow, Gau et al., 2008; Waitzkin & Magana, 
1997), past or current family dysfunction (Dwamena, Lyles, Frankel et al., 2009), and avoidant and 
fearful attachments to caregivers (Ciechanowski et al., 2002; Noyes et al., 2003; Stuart & Noyes, 
1999; Spertus et al., 2003; Taylor et al., 2000) are commonly found amongst populations with MUS. 
Studies by Waldinger et al. (2006) and Anderson, Elkit & Brink (2013) have attempted to draw these 
factors together, suggesting that insecure attachment styles may mediate the relationship between 
trauma and adverse life events on the one hand, and the development of persistent physical 
symptoms on the other. 
'A clinical and social predicament' 
The overlap of psychological and physical symptoms, and complex etiological factors found with 
MUS invites an integrated psychological and medical treatment approach (Joint Commissioning 
Panel for Mental Health/JCPMH, 2016). However, in a society whose thinking is characterized by the 
dualistic separation of mind and body, and by implication mental and physical illness, integrated 
treatment pathways for MUS are lacking (JCPMH, 2016). 
Bodily symptoms are usually attributed by patients to physical causes rather than psychosocial 
factors (Nimnuan, Hotopf & Wessely, 2001). When tests are sought and come back negative, such 
patients report feeling that their concerns are not taken seriously, as they receive the message that 
'nothing is wrong' physically from their doctors (Edwards et al., 2010). Needs for emotional support 
are often overlooked within the powerful medical idiom and its focus on physical symptoms, despite 
evidence that patients often wish to discuss such factors (Salmon, Ring, Dowrick & Humphris, 2005). 
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The process of extensive testing to find the cause of the symptom, and prescription of procedures 
such as epidural injections (for pain) to 'rule out' certain diagnoses, may subject patients to 
unnecessarily invasive and potentially tissue-damaging procedures (Salmon et al., 2005). 
Prescription of medications for symptom alleviation, or antidepressants for comorbid psychological 
symptoms (Burton, 2003) may lead to addiction or long-term side-effects that persist after 
discontinuation (Carvahlo et al., 2016), presenting the possibility of further somatic symptoms in 
addition to those which the patient initially presented with.  
Relationships with professionals, usually the patient's General Practitioner (GP), are often strained, 
with feelings of rejection and undermined confidence from patients (Salmon, Peters & Stanley, 
1999), and feelings of frustration, lack of control, inadequacy and negativity towards patients from 
doctors (Hahn et al., 1994; Stone, 2014; Wileman, May & Chew-Graham, 2002). Options available to 
GPs such as reassurance about the non-seriousness of the symptom (Olde-Hartman, Hassink-Franke, 
Lucassen et al., 2009) or attempting to encourage patients to 'reattribute' their symptoms to 
broader psychosocial factors (Gask & Goldberg, 1989) have limited evidence of effectiveness 
(Blanchard & Scharff, 2002; Morriss, Dowrick, Salmon et al., 2007; Sumathipala, 2007; Witthoft & 
Hiller, 2010). It also appears that GPs do not feel adequately trained in such approaches (Yon et al., 
2015), or experience them to be over-simplistic given the complexities of the patients they see 
(Gask, Dowrick, Salmon et al., 2011). 
 
Though this rarely happens (Department of Health, 2014), patients may be referred to psychological 
therapies for support with distress. Due to the dualistic structure of mainstream healthcare, these 
are mostly provided within mental health settings such as Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies (IAPT) services. They are often presented as alternatives when other treatments have 
failed, with the goal of managing symptoms and quality of life rather than trying to remove 
symptoms (Eccleston, Williams & Morley, 2012). Psychological therapies for MUS range from verbal 
forms such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) for altering thoughts and addressing the 
misinterpretation of abnormal body experiences (Rief & Broadbent, 2007); to nonverbal therapies, 
which encourage patients to make connections between psychological and bodily processes which 
may be difficult to verbalize (Payne, 2009). Despite good evidence for the efficacy of both verbal and 
nonverbal forms of psychological therapies (Kroenke, 2009; Payne 2009), a major confounding factor 
in evaluating the real-world effectiveness of psychological approaches is that many of these studies 
include participants who have already accepted a referral to mental health services. This represents 
a small fraction of MUS patients (DH, 2014): according to research by Allen, Woolfolk et al. (2010), 
50-80% of patients may not even attend their first appointments when referred to mental health 
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settings. For many who experience MUS, receiving treatment within a mental health setting is not 
acceptable due to the stigma attached to such services and their own physical explanations for 
symptoms (Raine et al. 2002). Indeed, even if psychological treatments are accepted, there is little 
evidence to show that this leads to a reduction in utilization of healthcare services, which would be 
considered a major outcome of such treatments (Eccleston, Williams & Morley, 2012). 
The costs of MUS to society are considerable for a combination of reasons mentioned above. High 
levels of anxiety about the symptom and high healthcare utilization from patients, costly referrals to 
secondary care for extensive testing (e.g. expensive MRI scans), and ineffective and prolonged 
treatments are all factors adding up to expensive healthcare costs. One estimate by Bermingham et 
al. (2010) suggests that up to £3 million is spent annually on healthcare for working age adults who 
experience MUS.  The additional societal costs from sickness absence and quality of life factors mean 
that MUS may cost the economy up to £14 million per year (Bermingham et al., 2010). It is no 
surprise that, given the cost implications of the current misunderstanding and mistreatment of those 
who experience MUS, Edwards et al. (2010) considered MUS to be 'a clinical and social predicament' 
(p.1). 
Naming the predicament as 'Medically Unexplained Symptoms' 
As mentioned already, 'MUS' does not represent a diagnostic category but a term representing a 
complex of persistent bodily symptoms which are associated with significant distress and 
impairment, and for which medical investigations fail to reveal an organic pathology. 
The term 'MUS' has many limitations. For example, it may be taken to imply that there is no 
physiological component at all relating to symptom experience, which is inaccurate (Brown, 2007). 
As a negative label (i.e. defines symptoms by what they are not), it is generally less acceptable to 
patients than the range of labels used by medical specialties (e.g. 'irritable bowel syndrome') to 
positively classify the presence of certain criteria (Stone et al., 2002). It may also be taken by 
clinicians to mean that 'MUS' can only be used when organic causes have been absolutely ruled out, 
which drives a process of unnecessary and costly testing when it may be more helpful to focus on 
supporting the emotional wellbeing of patients (Creed, 2009; Creed et al, 2010, 2011). 
The term 'MUS' has recently been replaced in the latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual with 
'Somatic Symptoms and Related Disorders' (SSD) (DSM-V, 2013). SSD is diagnosed when there are 
bodily symptoms which are distressing to the individual or result in significant disruption in thoughts, 
feelings or behaviour. Notably, this diagnosis may apply to bodily symptoms with a known 
pathology, as well as to those which have not been explained medically. Although the positive 
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characterization of the distress is well-intentioned, reducing reliance on organic pathology for 
diagnosis appears to have resulted in the over-'psychologization' of criteria (Crane & Patterson, 
2012; Pinching, 2003), bypassing the issue that patients experience their symptoms as being 
inherently bodily. It also appears to invalidate the fact that the lack of explanation, and therefore the 
lack of meaning for symptoms, is an inherent part of the distress experienced. 
In a wider culture which separates mind and body, Western society relies heavily on the idiom of 
'medical explanation' and 'identifying the disease/pathology' when it comes to alleviating bodily 
suffering. When symptoms do not follow this usual 'medical story', patients are threatened with 
invalidation and a lack of meaning for their symptom (Nettleton et al., 2005). The predicament of 
trying (and failing) to find meaning for symptoms, and therefore to legitimize suffering in a society 
which expects illness to correlate to disease, is not merely the patient's predicament, nor one within 
the doctor-patient relationship, but one that percolates throughout wider healthcare and societal 
contexts (Nettleton et al., 2005). To the author, 'SSD' as a construct ignores the gravity of this 
predicament by providing a positive but overly psychological account of patients' suffering. 
'Medically unexplained symptoms' names a predicament that applies not only to the individual 
patient, but is also framed within the assumptions and viewpoints of Western Society that have 
inextricably become a part of the definition of the clinical problem of ‘MUS’. The next section aims 
to make this current, problematic 'clinical epistemology' (Keeney, 1982; O'Hanlon & Wilk, 1987) 
more explicit, and present an alternative way of looking at embodied experience which attempts to 
understand symptom experience as an irreducibly personal phenomenon.  
Clinical Epistemology 
“The question of the integration of the mind/body in action is the most practical of all questions we 
can ask of our civilisation. Until this integration is effected in the only place where it can be carried 
out, in action itself, we shall continue to live in a society in which a soulless and heartless 
materialism is compensated for by a soulful but futile idealism and spiritualism.” (Dewey, 1931, p. 
304) 
 
This section attempts to bring into greater contrast the epistemological foundations upon which the 
predominant (mis)understanding of MUS has been built. As mentioned above, the predominance of 
dualistic thinking in our culture has led in turn to the view that the body is separate to the mind, and 
that bodily symptoms have a physical cause. The idea of body and mind being separate entities has 
been challenged by the biopsychosocial paradigm, which has supposed that the biological, 
psychological and social levels interact with one another causally, and may share overlapping 
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mechanisms (e.g. McWhinney, 1972). However, even if mind and body can be seen to interact 
through overlapping mechanisms, there remains a dualism which is experienced between mind and 
body, and between subject and object, which turns within the wider cog-wheels of positivism and 
realism (Barfield, 1957). 
There is a dominant view that there is 'one true and complete description of the way the world is' 
(Putnam, 1981, p. 49), independent of the distinctions made by perceivers. Reality is pictured as 
consisting of stratified levels of 'types' of phenomena which are all mechanistically connected to one 
another in a single causal nexus, glued together like stratified layers of a coastal shelf or pieces of a 
jigsaw puzzle (Kelly, 1955). This 'objective thinking' (Merleau-Ponty, 1944/1962) has characterized 
attempts by natural sciences to map causal connections between these layers of reality, predicting 
and controlling relationships between measurable 'objects' and phenomena external to the 
perceiver. This paradigm transcends the everyday distinctions and experiences of the perceiver to 
‘discover’ causal mechanisms with explanatory power (Butt, 2004; Strawson, 1963). Objective 
thought transforms the experiencing person into structures and entities within the person, including 
the 'mind' (reified in mechanistic parts of the mind including 'representations', 'processes', 
'cognitions', 'beliefs', 'the superego', etc.) and 'body' (described using concepts belonging to the 
natural sciences), which are thought to represent distinct levels or mechanisms existing in reality. 
Given the successes of prediction and control in the natural sciences, the concepts employed by 
these sciences such as 'matter', 'energy' and 'particles' (notably, none of the things which anyone 
has directly 'experienced') may be regarded as corresponding to 'how the world really is', rather 
than representing constructs which have aided in the process of prediction and control of the world 
around us (Barfield, 1977). The consequence of viewing reality as ultimately physical in nature is that 
the subjective mind, or self-consciousness, is seen to constitute a retracted, isolated sphere or level 
of reality, separate from the 'world out there' in a subject-object divide. Subjective experience is a 
level of reality to be accounted for by the lower level physical phenomena, if it is to be considered 
'real'. 
Contemporary medicine may be seen to adopt such objective thinking in its attempt to transcend 
‘symptoms’ as subjectively experienced by the patient in order to problem-solve the mechanistic 
aspects of ‘illness’ in the body (Obissier, 2006, pp2-4). Symptoms are the tip of reality’s hierarchical 
iceberg, leading to the root cause, the ‘real illness’. Symptoms are regarded as the ‘symptoms of 
disease’, and this ‘of’ becomes very important within the lens of prediction and control – different 
diseases predict different futures (Harre, 1991). Parts of the body, whether pathogen invaders, 
mutated cells or broken bones, are viewed as objects to be controlled (Obissier, 2006, p.4), and 
9 
 
9 
 
because these are regarded as underlying illness experience, the subjective experience of symptoms 
takes second-place in the hierarchy of knowledge. 
This reductionist, mechanistic view of the body resonates through the stories of those who 
experience MUS. If symptoms cannot be reified by finding a disease process, their reality is 
questioned, or otherwise thought to belong to a pathological level that is psychological in nature. 
There may be causal connections between symptoms, but the idea of the reality of the symptom 
being something apart from the experiences of the patient is difficult to shrug off. 
Psychological theorizations about MUS have tended to regard physical symptoms as being 'produced 
by' psychological mechanisms for coping with traumatic experiences (i.e. 'dissociation and 
conversion theories' (Breuer & Freud, 1957; Brown, 2004; Janet, 1907)), or alternatively, have 
suggested that physical symptoms caused by 'actual physical injury' or illness are maintained and 
exacerbated by cognitive processes which either ‘misinterpret’ benign bodily sensations as being 
more severe (Deary et al., 2007), or that having certain cognitions means that the necessary steps 
for managing symptoms are not taken (Hou, Moss-Morris, Moss-Morris, Spence & Hou, 2011; 
Peveler et al., 2011; Spence & Moss-Morris, 2007).  
Notably, the body, described physiologically as an object belonging to the 'physical' realm, plays a 
rather passive role in these accounts, which implicitly reinforce the medical message that ‘nothing is 
really wrong with the body’. Physical symptoms are either produced by psychological processes (the 
pathology), or psychological processes incorrectly interpret the meaning of physical symptoms, so 
that pathology is again heavily characterized as ‘psychological’ or 'subjective' in nature. For the 
person who experiences the symptom in their body, they must accept the psychological 'reality' 
presumed to underlie their symptoms, or otherwise fail to have their experience validated. 
In both psychological and physical medicine, the 'subjective' experience of distressing bodily 
symptoms is accounted for by reference to a description of interacting mechanisms which are 
described in almost exclusively psychological or physical terms. The notion of the 'person' as an 
individual identity with an embodied, idiosyncratic perspective in the world is almost entirely absent 
from these accounts. For the person who has unwelcome and unwanted experiences of their body, 
such dualistic accounts offer little hope of validation of their experiences.  
An alternative viewpoint: an 'interactive' epistemology 
As outlined above, integrating mind and body in terms of 'mechanism' fails to do justice to the 
experiences of the individual person – mostly because it does not appear to shift away from the idea 
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that 'mind' and 'body' are in reality separate phenomena, and in fact more fundamental than the 
person him/herself when it comes to scientific understanding. 
The alternative view on which this project is based is an 'interactive' or 'constructive' epistemology. 
There is no commitment to a single, fixed description of reality to be comprehended entirely outside 
of our interactions with the world. This is not to say that reality is not structured at all independently 
of our explorations, nor that we only know about reality from a removed or indirect perspective – 
rather, the ways in which we explore the world are structured in such a way that highlight certain 
aspects of reality and ignore others. The 'reality' we get is a product of our interaction, configured by 
the structure of the perceiver as well as what is 'afforded' (Gibson, 1979) by the world. The way in 
which the person actively 'participates with' (Barfield, 1957), 'construes' (Kelly, 1955) or 'maps' 
(Wilk, 2013) reality is necessarily selective (Neisser, 1976) and channelized by the 'intentional 
structure' of the perceiver (Kelly, 1955). Reality is 'a creature of inquiry' (Wilk, in Franzetta, 2010, 
p.6), not fixed in nature. 
 The paradigm of objective thought and 'prediction and control' represents just one way of exploring 
the world around us, which pragmatically speaking has yielded meaningful, useful concepts that 
allow us to make sense of the world. However, ‘particles' and 'atoms' are not 'real' within another 
system of meaning – that of everyday perception (Dilthey, 1988). Equally, whilst dualistic 
consideration of 'psychological processes' and 'physical processes' can be meaningful in the sense of 
allowing certain predictions to be made, these are not the only means by which a person's 
experiences can be considered to be meaningful or 'real' - and this is highly important for MUS. 
Personal construct theory and embodied interaction 
Exploring 'things' that are seen to be outside of the perceiver relationship is part and parcel of 
prediction and control explorations. However, examining the structure of the perceiver and their 
idiosyncratic ways of interacting with reality may be more relevant to understanding experiences of 
the world which are more localized to a person, a family system or a culture (Dilthey, 1988; Neisser, 
1978). 'Subject-object' dichotomies are not presumed to be absolute in the interactive paradigm – 
understanding both the characteristics of the person and the characteristics of the environment is 
relevant to understanding the meanings that emerge through continuous interaction (Idhe, 1984; 
Butt, 2004). 
Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955) is one such theory that has attempted to look at the ways in 
which the person actively explores their world in an idiosyncratically structured way. A person may 
explore their world by means of continuously developing 'constructs', which represent bipolar (e.g. 
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selfish----kind) structured courses of action or exploration in the world, and in turn cyclically shape 
the person's experience of the world. 'Constructs' are not here conceived as structures within a 
centralized mind or self, but rather as being like trajectories or courses of action within the world 
(Kelly, 1955; Butt, 2004). This conception is akin to that of 'schemas', which are not only 'plans for 
action', but the skillful, structured executions of those actions and movements (Gallagher, 2005; 
Neisser, 1978). 
Kelly differentiated between 'constructs', which are polarized choices or alternative ways of making 
meaning that are available to the perceiver, and 'concepts', which are unipolar in the sense that 
there is less space for alternatives and choice. In construing myself as 'kind', whether verbally or 
non-verbally, I am acting out in the world that I am 'not selfish'. The fact that alternative 'choices' 
can be conceived (e.g. 'thinks about others before acting' vs. 'selfish') highlights that my meaning of 
'selfish' is more idiosyncratic or subjective to me – this does not mean that it is any more 'inside' or 
'internal' to me, however. One can imagine a very much embodied way in which 'thinks about others 
before acting' and 'being kind' can be manifest in a person's actions, carving different paths of 
experience in the world.  
A 'concept', such as 'yellow', is less of a matter of choice, particularly bipolar choice. The invariances 
in patterns of light and the physiology of human perceptual systems provides a strong sense of 
collective construing of ‘yellow’. However, there are of course gray areas where having shared 
constructs is less about approximating one’s actions to a shared external ‘reality’, and more about 
coordinating our social behavior with others. It would be unusual to speak of ‘construing’ a knife and 
fork as a knife and fork (Wittgenstein, 1953, p.195). However, one could imagine cultures that 
interact differently with these objects, for example regarding them as table decorations rather than 
as tools for eating food. The point here is that it is less about what knives and forks really are in 
these examples, but more about how systems of meaning (‘realities’) emerge that provide structure 
within that local part of reality (Wittgenstein referred to these as ‘forms of life’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
p.8)). 
Participation in such construing processes can be seen to involve the structured actions of the 
embodied person as much as the disembodied meaning-structures such as language. Such embodied 
ways of 'knowing' that come with understanding concepts do not refer to 'factual knowledge' or 
take their meaning from entities external to experience. When I construe knives and forks as eating 
implements, I act in a particular way. Similarly, if one understands tears as an expression of grief 
rather than joy, then one is moved at an essentially embodied level to act in response to this. The 
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entire action is not separate from 'an understanding', as an experiment is separate from the theory 
it is testing (Wittgenstein, 1953, p.58-87). 
The idea that people are 'active' agents, interacting directly with the world in an embodied way is 
important because it means that the person's ways of making meaning in the world are not 
processes belonging to an internal, retracted, centralized mind (Butt, 2004, 2008; Hurley, 2001; Noe, 
2004), but occur through their bodies which move through the world in a structured way. These 
movements are available to others, who can in turn construe me as a person. The body, rather than 
merely being a passive object characterized by a physiological description, is essentially also a part of 
the person, the self. It is both subject and object simultaneously (Merleau-Ponty, 1944/1962): I do 
not only have a body, I am a body in many ways – I have a 'habitus' of embodied dispositions 
(Bourdieu, 1980), my characteristic ways of using my body in certain social situations, that I actively 
use to define myself in relation to others. 
The hierarchical levels of personal constructs and the self 
In the view outlined above, individuals and groups of people can be seen to participate or construe 
the world around them in a way that is on a spectrum between being idiosyncratic and more 
particular to them on the one hand, and more collective on the other. Such similarities and 
differences between ways of construing form the basis of identity, or ‘the self’. Rather than viewing 
the self as being a Cartesian soul-like inner entity, the self is conceived of in PCP as being a 
hierarchically organized system of construing which relates to how the person construes themselves 
as, and is construed by others as, being similar or different to others (Butt, 2008, p61, Fransella & 
Bannister, 2003; Kelly, 1955, p.482). In a world of other persons, having such an identity construct is 
an important process in maintaining social stability (Butt, 2008, p.62). 
A person’s construing of themselves and others, no matter how idiosyncratically channeled, needs 
some level of structure and consistency that is validated through interaction with others. The 
famous experiments in social conformity by Sherif (1935) and Asch (1951) illustrate this need to align 
or coordinate our way of literally ‘seeing the world’ with others. People will actually see the visual 
stimuli in the same way that they have witnessed others doing. Their experiences are not shaped by 
a desire to approximate to a conception of the objective properties of the line, but to find structure 
and shared meaning for their experiences in the interpersonal situation. The sense of discrepancy 
between one’s own construing of the stimuli and those of others can be very distressing in this 
situation.  
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Achieving a consistent and meaningful construction of self in relation to others is more or less 
dependent on different constructs. A 'peripheral' construct may have fewer implications for change 
in terms of how I view myself (e.g. 'not interested in classical music' vs 'interested in classical music'); 
however, a change to a more 'core' construct (e.g. 'caring' vs 'cold') may imply changes to many 
other ways in which I construe myself, and be more threatening to my identity, with implications for 
how I see my relationships with those around me also (If I am 'cold' rather than ‘caring’, then I may 
re-construe times when I have seen myself as 'generous' as being 'calculating'). 
The way the self is construed has also been regarded as varying in levels of awareness (Leitner, 
1999). Some constructs may vary from being pre-verbal in nature to those which are expressed in 
language and which we are more aware of (Guthrie, 1991), and many of the constructs which are 
particularly core to our view of ourselves as people may have never been verbally expressed before 
(Butt, 2008; Leitner, 1999).  It is possible that the body may 'hold' some of our core constructs about 
ourselves as people, those habitual ways of being in the world that are so ingrained that we are not 
aware of them and how they structure our interactions and experience (Mills, 2005; Neimeyer, 
1981).  
Such embodied constructs may implicitly or explicitly relate to verbal constructs of identity. The 
concept of metaphor as a means of relating to the world is relevant here. It has been observed that 
many of the ways in which we understand and express ourselves are metaphorically structured, 
shaped by concrete external 'objects' we encounter in the world and relating to the structured ways 
our bodies respond to one another (Barfield, 1967; Centomo & Del Rizzo, 2016; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980; Mair, 1989). Expressions such as 'I can't stomach that news' (Obissier, 2006), 'my heart is 
breaking' and 'I cannot simply walk away' (Centomo & Del Rizzo, 2016) reflect the person’s 
engagement with the world from an embodied position. They cannot be meaningfully understood 
merely as 'stand-ins' for processes that are discoverable at a reduced, physiological level (Barfield, 
1967). They may perhaps even contrast or contradict some of the ways we verbally narrate 
ourselves (Wilk, 2013). 
Threat to self-construing and symptom formation 
‘My clients taught me that a symptom was an issue one expresses through the act of being his 
present self, not a malignancy that fastens itself upon a man. What they experience as symptoms 
were urgent questions, behaviorally expressed, which had somehow lost the threads that led either 
to answers or to better questions.’ (Kelly, 1955, p. 19) 
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Events which can alter core construing have a quality of ‘threat’ (Kelly 1955). If the self is construed 
as being dislodged from the core constructs (or ‘roles’), the feeling of ‘guilt’ from invalidating one’s 
own self-constructions may result. ‘Anxiety’ (Kelly’s notion, 1955), which occurs when the current 
construct system cannot meaningfully construe events (e.g. one’s own behaviour or body 
experiences), may co-exist with both threat and guilt. Anxiety can be managed by ‘loosening’ one’s 
construct system to allow for re-construction and changes that add meaning, or by contrast, through 
‘constriction’ – withdrawing to a restricted, predictable world where constructs continue to have 
meaning. The person may demonstrate ‘hostility’, which is a way to deny or avoid stimuli which are 
incongruent with self-construing by extorting evidence for one’s constructions (Kelly, 1955; Lester, 
2009). In cases where a reconstruction or assimilation does not seem possible from within a person's 
(or family's) construct system, this may lead to the formation of a symptom or illness which is 
construed as being a 'not self' attached to the person that the person wishes to be rid of (Butt, 2008, 
p.64).  
This latter point may illuminate the physical and mental suffering of those with MUS. Eric Cassell 
defined suffering as “the state of severe distress associated with events that threaten the intactness 
of the person” (Cassell, 1991, p.33). This definition alludes to the fact that it is not 'my body' as an 
object that experiences symptoms, but it is the self, 'me', who experiences symptoms – I feel it in my 
body (Wittgenstein, 1953, p.89-104). 'The symptom' is not here thought of as some metaphysical 
entity waiting to be discovered, nor is 'the self' (Butt, 2008). As Cassell's definition indicates, 
suffering involves a sense of threat to personal integrity. 
As previously mentioned construing processes can have varying degrees of preverbal and verbal 
elaboration, with varying degrees of awareness associated with them. One theory of MUS, building 
upon earlier 'dissociation and conversion' models of MUS, here-called 'frozen construing theory' (Lin 
& Payne, 2014), has proposed that adverse childhood events and relationships common found in 
MUS populations may be construed in embodied, preverbal and non-verbal ways, at low levels of 
awareness. Such events may threaten not only the person's construing system for him/herself and 
others, but it may also threaten the shared construing processes of those around the person 
(Procter, 1981; Dallos & Aldridge, 1987), shutting down opportunities for reconstructing the events 
and their relationship to the person in meaningful ways. When opportunities for collective 
reconstruction are not available, the experience may become traumatic (Verhaeghe & Vanheule, 
2005), in the sense that the embodied person is 'frozen' or 'stuck' (Dallos & Aldridge, 1987) within a 
constraining network of construing. 
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The symptom cannot be readily integrated into the core verbal system without threatening change 
to that system, and therefore remains dissociated whilst 'overshadowing' the person's view of 
him/herself (Berntsen et al., 2003)– carrying a number of negative implications for that person's 
current construal of themselves (Sermpezis, 2007). Notably, a choice of negative construing of the 
self (e.g. 'I am fragile and naïve and at the mercy of others' vs. 'I am strong and responsible for what 
has happens to me') may yet be a preferred one for reducing threat (Sermpezis, 2007), even if it 
leads to an anxious and depressed position (Berntsen, 2001). The re-occurrence of similar 
threatening events at various points in the person's life may precipitate the onset of symptoms (Lin 
& Payne, 2014). 
Symptoms may help to manage threat in an embodied, preverbal manner through processes of 
constriction, hostility or aggression (e.g. Cipolletta & Pruneddu, 2012). Some theorists have 
proposed that the structural properties of the body make it able to alter its function in such a way 
that can shape interactions and managed perceived threats (e.g. Obissier, 2006). Examples include 
'having a thicker skin', 'not being able to digest' certain events, and widening or narrowing of the 
visual field (Cipolletta et al., 2012). These clearly lend themselves to metaphors offering 
opportunities to verbally represent how a symptom has meaning (Bateson, 1972; Centomo & Del 
Rizzo, 2016; Dallos & Aldridge, 1987). 
If these preverbal construing processes are at lower levels of awareness, they may be 'dissociated' 
from the verbal construct systems of the person and those closest to them (Lin & Payne, 2014). 'The 
symptom', representing preverbal ways of managing threats to identity, is construed as being 'other' 
- part of 'the body' as an object that is not-self. Anxiety (using Kelly’s meaning) is likely to be 
experienced as the person cannot meaningfully make sense of symptoms, or assimilate information 
about events that threaten their identity, using their verbally elaborated core construct system. 
As in Kelly's quote above, PCT does not consider symptoms to be passive things happening to a 
passive body (as opposed to a more active mind which handles conflict and produces symptoms in 
the body), but rather as personal processes of meaning-making happening at an embodied, 
preverbal level (Gendlin, 1982). Such processes are 'compromises' or implicit choices (Dallos & 
Aldridge, 1987) for finding meaning when the core construct systems are threatened – compromises 
which involve suffering for the individual (Foulkes & Anthony, 1957). The structure of such embodied 
interaction has a variety of meanings which we are rarely aware of and verbally able to express (e.g. 
Bourdieu, 1980; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Scheflen, 1973). The separation or dissociation of these 
embodied processes, as 'symptoms' of the passive body, from the self as verbally construed may 
actually be supported within a society which encourages us to view 'mind' and 'body' as being 
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separate (Kelly, 1955). When no physical causes are found for symptoms, the personal experience of 
suffering is invalidated, or worse - attributed to 'the mind'. 
2. Literature Review 
The ways in which chronic bodily symptoms impact on a person's identity/sense of self have been 
emphasized as a key factor to understand in conditions with a known medical explanation (e.g. 
Contrada & Ashmore, 1999), with many authors adopting a personal construct perspective when 
undertaking such explorations (e.g. Chiari & Nuzzo, 1987; Cipolletta & Pruneddu, 2012; Lane & 
Viney, 2001, 2006). ‘Identity’ and ‘self’ have also been emphasized as being highly important 
concepts to understand in chronic pain research (e.g. Morley & Eccleston, 2004; Morley, 2010).  
Based on the frozen-construing model discussed above, one might expect the following construing 
characteristics of people who experience MUS: 
-Threat(s) to core-construing of self, including aspects which may not be verbalized or that the 
person is not fully aware of (expressed at an embodied level). 
-Guilt related to perceived loss of former identity, particularly in those who have a rigid pre-
symptom sense of identity. 
-Hostility and constriction in response to invalidation and threats to core construing, which are 
elaborated or carried out by embodied processes including the formation of symptoms. 
- Dissociation of the symptom and the broader body-self from well-elaborated (verbal) core 
construing processes of self and others, which results in anxiety as the symptom cannot be 
meaningfully integrated into construing of self and others. 
To explore the empirical evidence for the above characteristics, a literature search was conducted 
which focused on relationships between MUS and self-construing, with a particular focus on how the 
body enters into construing of self and others. 
 
Literature search strategy 
Key search terms included ‘identity’, ‘body-self’, ‘self-concept’, ‘self-construct’, ‘experience of body’, 
‘bodily experience’, ‘embodied self’, ‘embodiment’ and ‘relationship to body’. Key search terms for 
MUS included ‘medically unexplained symptoms/MUS/unexplained physical symptoms’; ‘chronic 
pain/fibromyalgia/low back pain/persistent pain/facial pain’; ‘CFS/chronic fatigue syndrome/myalgic 
encephalitis’; ‘irritable bowel syndrome (IBS)’, ‘multiple chemical sensitivities’/MCS, ‘contested 
illness(es)’ ‘functional syndrome(s)’ and ‘somatic symptom disorder’/SSD.  
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Excluded terms included ‘cancer’, ‘diabetes’ , and ’multiple sclerosis’, to eliminate papers exploring 
identity for chronic illnesses with known pathology. Papers which included forms of MUS of low 
relevance to primary care populations, e.g. ‘non-epileptic attack disorder’ (NEAD), or populations 
with a primary psychiatric diagnosis (e.g. ‘psychosis’ or ‘borderline personality disorder’) were also 
excluded. With the exception of the review by Yu et al. (2015), the review focused on empirical 
papers using data from multiple participants. 
The following databases were searched: Google Scholar, SCOPUS, Pubmed, Taylor & Francis, APA 
Psychnet and ScienceDirect. Several specialist journals, including Pain, Psychosomatics,  Personal 
Construct Theory & Practice, and Journal of  Constructivist Psychology were also hand-searched. 
Description of literature reviewed 
 
Fifteen qualitative papers and fourteen quantitative papers were reviewed (Appendix A). As noted 
by Morley (2008) in relation to chronic pain, most research into relationships between chronic 
physical symptoms and identity is qualitative. Qualitative papers were selected based on their focus 
on bodily aspects of identity. As only two quantitative papers (Bode et al., 2010; Stuerz et al., 2009), 
focused on embodied aspects of identity, quantitative literature which explored relationships 
between MUS and identity more broadly was included.  
Sample characteristics 
Most participants experienced long-term pain (804), including fibromyalgia (43), chronic low back 
pain (381) and other chronically painful conditions (380). People experiencing multiple chemical 
sensitivity (MCS) made up the second largest research population (n=203), albeit all being recruited 
within a qualitative study by Reed-Gibson et al. (2005). Participants experiencing chronic fatigue 
syndrome (CFS) made up the next largest number of research participants (n=88 from 2 studies), 
followed by tinnitus (n=65 from a single study by Stuerz et al., 2007) and IBS (n=22 from 2 studies). 
Swoboda’s (2006) study included a wide range of MUS in its inclusion criteria. Only two of the 
quantitative studies reviewed included participants who were experiencing symptoms other than 
pain (Benasayag et al., 2004; Stuerz et al., 2007). 
The significantly higher proportion of research into chronic pain as a form of unexplained symptom 
might be accounted for by several factors. In terms of identifying participant samples from 
healthcare populations, research infrastructure is often supported by clinical infrastructure. Of the 
28 empirical studies reviewed, 21 recruited primarily from hospital inpatient/outpatient and 
specialist medicinal clinics. Where there are specialist pathways and clinics for assessing and treating 
18 
 
18 
 
pain, there is generally much less healthcare infrastructure outside of primary care for the range of 
non-pain MUS. Furthermore, whilst certain functional syndromes such as fibromyalgia have clearer 
clinical definitions, this does not apply to all forms of MUS. Therefore, clearly identifying a research 
sample of people experiencing heterogeneous forms of MUS can be problematic when clinical 
conceptions of MUS are constantly shifting – meaning that a single integrated stream of research 
with MUS populations is lacking (Brown, 2007). With the absence of clear diagnostic criteria or 
healthcare structure to engage the range of MUS experienced outside of chronic pain, other MUS 
groups may feel stigmatized by and excluded from those mainstream healthcare services which the 
majority of studies in this review have recruited from. Indeed, most of the studies that recruited 
beyond healthcare settings were recruiting participants experiencing symptoms other than pain 
(Clarke & James, 2003; Reed-Gibson et al., 2005; Stuerz et al., 2005; Swoboda, 2006; Whitehead, 
2006). 
The fact that many participants in the literature reviewed are recruited from outpatient hospital 
clinics raises issues as to whether the findings from the literature review can be generalized to a 
broader population of those experiencing MUS who are not currently engaged in secondary care 
services. There is generally a lack of comprehensive data about the utilization of healthcare services, 
and many of the qualitative papers (for methodological reasons) do not use standardized tools to 
clinically describe participants. It may be that the outpatient hospital samples are more severe in 
terms of psychological and physical problems compared to broader community samples 
experiencing MUS (e.g. Hellstroem, 2001; Miles et al., 2005). 
Although the mean sample size was larger for quantitative studies (mean number = 60) relative to 
qualitative studies (mean number = 26, excluding the study by Reed-Gibson et al., 2005, which did 
not directly interview participants), the generalizability and relevance of the findings of qualitative 
versus quantitative research to the broader MUS population may be confounded by the sampling 
methods used. Notably, the issues in generalization of findings to the broader MUS population are 
not exclusive to the reviewed literature, but reflect broader issues in classification of MUS, and the 
clinical and research infrastructure surrounding MUS. 
Conceptualizations of ‘self’ and ‘identity’ in qualitative and quantitative literature 
‘Self’ and ‘identity’ are considered to represent complex, multifaceted and dynamic constructs 
within and beyond the literature reviewed, and are often used interchangeably. Although not always 
made explicit by some of the authors, different research approaches assumed different conceptions 
of self and identity. 
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‘Content’ versus ‘process’ views of self 
Yu et al. (2015) reviewed conceptualizations of self and identity in quantitative literature on chronic 
pain. The majority of the 54 studies that they reviewed conceptualized self as self-evaluations such 
as ‘self-esteem’ (e.g. Bode et al., 2010), self-descriptions of roles (e.g. Harris et al., 2003) or lists of 
attributes generated by participants (e.g. self-discrepancy theory and methodology: Kindermans et 
al, 2009, 2010; Waters, Keefe & Strauman, 2004; and to some extent repertory grid papers by 
Benasayag et al., 2004; Compan et al., 2011 and Drysdale, 1989). They note that such 
conceptualizations are largely ‘content’ based conceptualizations of self, which they see as reflecting 
a dominant conceptual bias towards viewing ‘self’ and ‘identity’ as being the sum of thoughts, 
beliefs, evaluations, and descriptions that the individual makes about him/herself. They contrast this 
with self-as-context and self-as-process views of the self, which propose that self and identity can be 
detached from the contents of one’s own (introspective) thoughts (e.g. Costa & Gouveia, 2011; 
McHugh & Stewart, 2012). Notably, focus on the self-as-process aspects of self was more common 
within qualitative research, which uses semi-structured interviews to examine the experiences of 
those who experience chronic symptoms, and the processes by which they make sense of their 
experiences from the subjective viewpoint. 
 
Self and others in identity 
Though all studies focused primarily on individual participants’ constructions of their identity, 
several quantitative and qualitative studies explored or emphasized the role of others in 
constructing identity. Some construed identity as being related to having certain ‘social roles’ (e.g. 
Asbring, 2001; Crowe, Whitehead et al., 2010; Harris et al., 2003; Whitehead 2006), whereas other 
papers focused on the contrasts between public and private identities (Smith & Osborn, 2007; Read-
Gibson et al., 2005; Werner, Isakson & Malterud, 2004). Several papers highlighted comparative 
processes where self is positioned in relation to certain individuals and groups (e.g. Smith & Osborn, 
1999), and papers using repertory grid interview methods asked participants to construe themselves 
and others in a way that allows for ‘distances’ between how the self and others are construed to be 
quantified and standardized (Benasayag et al., 2004; Compan et al., 2011; Drysdale, 1989; Large & 
Strong, 1996). Four papers based on self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) asked participants to 
describe and rate various aspects of self (e.g. ought/ideal/feared) from their own perspective but 
also from the perspectives of others who knew them (Kindermans et al., 2009, 2010; Sutherland & 
Morley, 2008; Waters, Keefe & Strauman, 2004). 
Two papers looked at the construction of self within wider cultural discourses or narratives. Two key 
wider cultural lenses for exploration and analysis were gender (Werner et al., 2004) and the ways in 
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which illness more generally is understood by society (Swoboda, 2006). Interestingly, although some 
papers did include information about cultural backgrounds and ethnicities of their participants, this 
was not explored in relationship to identity and MUS. This may be because the populations were 
predominantly white-Caucasian, meaning that cultural differences could not be meaningfully 
explored with the populations involved. Certain minority groups may also be under-represented in 
the healthcare services from which many participants were recruited. It may also reflect the 
‘invisible similarities’ between the researchers and the participants who, sharing common Western 
White cultures, do not see cultural and ethnic status as a differentiating factor in identity. 
Body and Self 
The relationship between the body and self/identity is also conceptualized and explored differently 
across different methodologies. Strikingly, there is a distinct lack of an attempt to explore the role of 
the body for people experiencing MUS in the quantitative literature reviewed. Bode et al. (2010) 
devised a 10-item Likert-scale tool with a two-factor structure of the extent of ‘alienation’ and 
‘harmony’ that the participant feels with their body. They related this measure with a measure of 
self-esteem (Rosenberg self-esteem questionnaire, Rosenberg, 1965) and Illness Cognitions (Illness 
Cognitions Questionnaire, Evers et al., 2001). However, although their sample included participants 
experiencing undiagnosed pain (21.4%), they did not compare scores of this sub-group with the 
wider sample of participants with diagnosed forms of rheumatic pain. The other quantitative paper 
exploring body-identity and chronic symptoms by Stuerz et al. (2009) included a sample of 
participants diagnosed with tinnitus. They used a body-image questionnaire, largely consisting of 
items about how the body is described and evaluated, to compare with clinical outcomes. However, 
the use of generic, standardized questionnaires might not be considered an adequate way to explore 
body-image, nor body-self-identity more broadly (Ben-Tovim & Walker, 1990; Gallagher, 1986). 
Although ‘meta’ themes might be extracted, such as the ‘sense of insecurity about the body’ and 
perceived ‘unattractiveness’ of the body for the tinnitus sample, the lack of idiographic exploration 
may prevent the full extent of the personal meaning of the body from emerging. In other conditions 
with strong overlapping psychological and physical symptoms, such idiographic explorations of 
construing of bodily aspects of self have been fruitful in increasing understanding between 
relationships between the body and the self. For example, with people experiencing eating 
disorders, categorizing the constructs they use revealed a significant tendency to use constructs 
relating to the body (Dada et al., 2017). Another study which asked participants diagnosed with 
anorexia nervosa to construe body parts in relation to the wider body (a procedure called the ‘Body-
Grid’; Weber et al., 2001) found a tendency to dissociate or distance body parts relating to sexuality 
and reproductive function from broader body-self – a finding which had been hypothesized in 
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psychoanalytic theory but not evidenced before empirically. Another condition where exploration of 
construing of the body-self has enhanced undertstanding is that of cancer. For example using the 
Body-Grid method revealed that those experiencing haemotological cancer appeared to construe 
the body in a restricted way, focusing on the functional status of the body organs (e.g. ‘healthy’ 
versus ‘ill’) (Weber et al., 2005). This construing style may protect the person from threats to their 
body’s integrity during a difficult and tissue-damaging treatment process (Turpin, Dallos, Owen & 
Thomas, 2016). 
The dominant qualitative methodologies for exploring relationships between the body and identity 
derived from phenomenological paradigms, such as Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
(Smith et al., 1995) (e.g. Afrell, Biquet & Rudebeck, 2007; Smith & Osborn, 1998, 2006, 2007), or 
Empirical Phenomenological Psychology (EPP) (Giorgi, 1985) (e.g. Hakanson et al., 2008; Hellstroem, 
2001). These paradigms focused on how participants made sense of their experience of their bodies, 
viewing participants as ‘experiential experts’ (Smith & Osborn, 2003) in the approach to interviews, 
and then assigning superordinate labels to the participants’ accounts, attending to processes in 
addition to contents. 
Themes in qualitative and quantitative literature 
Loss of former ‘healthy’ identity and take-over of undesired ‘illness’ identity 
All of the qualitative studies, regardless of MUS type, reported a perceived loss of identity following 
the onset of symptoms. Hellstroem (2001) discusses the struggles of those experiencing chronic pain 
to keep their pre-pain identity “alive” (p.118). A participant in Reed-Gibson et al.’s (2005) study 
described MCS as having “strangled my fun/loving/kind/true self” (p.509), and Whitehead (2006) 
identified a theme of dramatic immediate losses of identity for those experiencing CFS. The current, 
symptomatic identity was generally described in self-denigrating terms (Smith & Osborn, 2007), such 
as “needy” (Reed-Gibson et al., 2005), “crippled” (Osborn & Smith, 1999), and unattractive 
(Hakanson et al., 2008) as the result of symptoms.  
Many studies noted that participants drew a distinction between their former ‘healthy’ selves and 
their current ‘illness’ selves, and that their former self could become an unhelpful reference point 
for recovery (Read-Gibson et al., 2005; Smith & Osborn, 1998; Swoboda, 2006). Large (1985 – full 
text unavailable for review) reported that pain patients construed their idealself as being close to 
that of ‘like an ill person’, suggesting that it was important to be validated as ‘unwell’ initially. A 
distinction was also drawn by many participants between themselves and ‘healthy’ others 
(Hanakson et al., 2008; Smith & Osborn, 1998), a comparison which was associated with feelings of 
envy and negativity towards others (Reed-Gibson et al., 1999; Smith & Osborn, 2007).  
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A study by Harris et al. (2003) attempted to quantify the extent of losses of former identity in 
relation to standardized clinical measures. They conceptualized ‘identity’ as having different self-
representations across different social contexts or ‘roles’ (which in PCT terms might be seen as a 
measure of ‘cognitive complexity’ of self-construing), hypothesizing that someone who perceived 
themselves as having identical attributes across different contexts (i.e. ‘low Self-Concept 
Differentiation’ (SCD) (Diehl, Hastings & Stanton, 2001)) was at increased risk of experiencing 
depression if they lost those attributes due to symptoms. They measured SCD by asking 80 
participants experiencing chronic pain to generate lists of attributes to describe themselves in 4 
different contexts, for both their pre-pain and current self. Subtracting duplicated attributes gave a 
list of unique attributes equivalent to SCD. Although they found no relationship between SCD and 
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II, Beck, 1996), they found that attribute and role-loss 
predicted depression scores, and that these losses appeared to be greatest in the ‘friendship’, 
‘occupational’ and ‘leisure’ domains, and least in the ‘family’ domain. Of course, whether such losses 
occur with the most valued or core aspects of identity is unclear, as interviews did not provide 
information about the relative importance of these attributes for participants. 
Waters et al. (2004) provided an evaluative component by asking participants to compare their 
construction of their current self with that of how they would like to be (‘ideal self’) and the type of 
person they feel they ought to be (‘ought self’). This is based on Higgins’ (1987) Self-Discrepancy 
Theory, which predicts that the greater the distance (‘discrepancy’) between construing of the 
current self and the ideal self, the more likely a person is to experience depression. Discrepancies 
between current self and ought self correlate positively with anxiety according to this theory.  They 
tested the hypotheses with 93 chronic low back pain patients, by asking them to generate lists of 10 
attributes to describe their current/ideal/ought selves, calculating discrepancy scores based on 
relative numbers of attribute matches and mismatches in the lists. They also asked participants to 
generate lists from the perspectives of others who knew them. They found that discrepancies 
between the current self and the ideal self significantly positively correlated with BDI-II scores. 
Interestingly, a greater amount of variance in psychological distress scores on the Symptoms 
Checklist Revised-90 (SCL-R-90) was accounted for by the discrepancies between the current self and 
the ought self when participants were taking the perspectives of others. The authors emphasized the 
importance of others in self-conceptualization (Stryker & Stratham, 1985) based on this finding.  
A flaw with the Waters et al. (2004) study is that the self-discrepancies, though associated with 
depression and psychological distress, were not necessarily attributed by participants to the 
symptom, and could have been present independently of symptoms. However, in addition to 
qualitative papers providing evidence to support that participants attribute changes to the 
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symptom, research based on the concept of ‘enmeshment’, discussed below, suggests that people 
with chronic pain do indeed construe such discrepancies as being contingent upon symptoms. 
Alienation of body and dualism 
The onset of symptoms did not only appear to lead to undesirably construed changes to the self, but 
also appeared to alter the relationship with the body, a theme which has been almost exclusively 
explored using qualitative methods. Many of the negative changes to identity were experienced as 
changes to the body, which was construed as something ‘other’ than the self (Asbring, 2001; Smith 
& Osborn, 2006), and different from the pre-symptom self, which was more likely to be construed as 
the ‘real’ self (Hellstroem, 2001; Smith & Osborn, 2007). The body became cut-off or dissociated 
from the (authentic) self, constituting a dualistic split between mind and body (Miles et al., 2005) 
that appeared to preserve the pre-symptom (‘mental’) identity as ‘entrapped’/ ‘imprisoned’ 
(Hellstroem, 2001, p. 118) within an alien, dysfunctional body (Afrell et al., 2007; Smith & Osborn, 
2006).  
Afrell, Biquet & Rudebeck (2007) suggested from their phenomenological analysis with 20 chronic 
pain participants that the degree of acceptance and awareness of the body is on a continuum, and 
corresponds with the individual’s ability to cope with symptoms. At one end of the continuum, they 
found participants who rejected their body, viewing it as an enemy or trap. They felt out of control 
of their bodies, and spoke pejoratively about their dependency on others. On the other hand, there 
were participants who recognized the need to make important choices to get a richer quality of life 
despite their symptom. Such participants connected the body and self, and reported enhanced self-
awareness through listening to and learning from the body. Between these two poles were 
participants whose relationship with their body was ambivalent, moving between listening to and 
accommodating symptoms, and shutting off the body when it threatened their integrity. As the 
researchers acknowledged, it is uncertain whether the different responses to symptoms reflect 
individual differences between the people in their broader life context, or whether they reflect 
distinct temporal stages in the process of experiencing chronic pain. 
Perhaps in contrast to the above findings where the body is explicitly or verbally construed as 
separate or apart from the self, Lilleas & Von Der Fehr (2011) drew on interview data with 71 
women experiencing chronic pain (Lilleas, 2003) to suggest that these women construed the 
‘natural’ female body as being a body that is supposed to be available for others. They illustrate with 
an in-depth analysis of a single participant from that study the way in which the body is regarded as 
‘a body for others’. They argued for a state of ‘body preparedness for others’ that may be an implicit 
part of the ‘habitus’ of embodied identity for these women. Messages from the body indicating the 
24 
 
24 
 
need for rest and self-care were routinely ignored or resisted, as they did not fit with the habitus or 
body-self-schema for these women. They argue that this is an implicit and gendered way of 
construing the body-self, rather than being transparent and open to awareness. Although the paper 
lacks a large enough sample to provide convincing empirical evidence of such a habitus, the findings 
of Compan et al (2011) and Drysdale (1989) provide evidence of self-constructions of ‘being sensitive 
to others’ and ‘being responsible and hard-working’ which could be taken as the verbal expressions 
of a ‘body for others’ habitus. From a developmental perspective such as the ‘dynamic maturational 
model’ (Crittenden, 2006), this habitus could represent an attachment based organization or 
strategy for ensuring that one is safe from and gets needs met by caregivers (Kozlowska et al., 2013; 
Kozlowska & Williams, 2010). Kasia Kozlowska (2007) has suggested that a subset of MUS may 
reflect exaggerated appeasement behavior, where looking after caregivers and signaling 
vulnerability through somatic rather than verbal communications of distress ensures a level of 
consistency that may otherwise be absent. Such behavioural strategies would be expected to be at 
lower levels of awareness given that they are proposed to develop at a pre-verbal age. 
Enmeshment 
Quantitative research has developed the idea of the ‘entrapped’ self (Asbring, 2001) by looking at 
the extent to which alternative possible selves are construed as being contingent upon symptom 
status, a phenomenon known as ‘enmeshment’ within chronic pain literature (Morley & Pincus, 
2001). Morley, Davies & Barton (2005) used a similar technique to Waters et al (2004), eliciting lists 
of attributes associated with the current, hoped-for, and feared-for selves. However, rather than 
simply examining discrepancies between these lists, they additionally asked participants with chronic 
pain to judge numerically (i) how capable they felt, and (ii) how likely it was that they would be 
characterized by their hoped-for and feared-for attributes with and without their pain. They looked 
at the relative proportion of pain-dependent characteristics for various possible selves as a measure 
of enmeshment. They found a significant positive correlation between increased enmeshment of the 
hoped-for-self with pain and reported symptoms of depression. Enmeshment also had a significant 
negative relationship with acceptance scores on the Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire (CPAQ, 
McCracken, 1998). Current-self versus Hoped-for self-discrepancies did not add any further 
explanatory value to this relationship. Feared-for enmeshment and current-feared-for contingencies 
did not add any further predictive value. These findings were repeated in an extension of the study 
by Sutherland & Morley (2008), who also included items relating to motivational preferences, and 
used the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS, Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) as an additional 
measure of anxiety and as a preferred measure of depression to the BDI-II for physical health 
populations (Morley, Williams & Black, 2002). They also asked participants to distinguish between 
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‘ought’ and ‘wanted’ (ideal) characteristics in their hoped-for-self lists, and asked participants to 
generate descriptions based on the perspective of others as well as from their own perspectives. In 
contrast to their expectations, the hoped-for self as rated from the perspective of others did not 
contain more ‘ought’ characteristics, and the levels of anxiety were not associated with the feared-
for-self. While they found that the hoped-for enmeshment similarly predicted pain-acceptance and 
depression scores, a further finding was that anxiety levels were significantly associated with 
enmeshment level regardless of motivational preferences. 
In terms of theories relating to depression, the additional value of the enmeshment concept over 
and above self-ideal discrepancies can be explained by the following logic: if the difference between 
the self and the ideal self is construed as being contingent upon symptom status, and the symptom 
and/or the body are perceived of as being outside of one’s control, then a sense of ‘helplessness’ 
and ‘hopelessness’ may ensue (Seligman, 1972), creating a sense of stuck-ness characteristic of 
depression. 
Conflicting identities relating to the symptom 
Although the above research suggests that negative attributes are enmeshed with symptoms, 
research using repertory grid technique (Kelly, 1955, 1991) has suggested that desirable/positive 
self-constructions may also be associated with chronic pain (Drysdale, 1989; Compan et al., 2011) 
and irritable bowel syndrome (Benasayag, Feixas, Mearin, Saul & Laso, 2004), albeit on a more 
implicit level that participants themselves may not fully aware of. Compan et al. (2011) conducted a 
study using Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) with 30 women diagnosed with fibromyalgia, matched 
with a control sample of 30 women experiencing non-MUS pain. The RGT is a structured interview in 
which participants are asked to compare themselves and significant others (called ‘Elements’) in 
terms of similarity and difference. Once several bipolar constructs have been elicited this way, the 
participant is then asked to numerically rate each element in turn (plus optional additional elements) 
on a scale in terms of how they see them according to each construct. The result is a ‘grid’ of ratings 
for elements/constructs that can be used to examine relationships between different elements and 
constructs. This can include implicit relationships which are not stated. In Compan et al’s research, 
they supplied the construct ‘in pain-not in pain’ to explore relationships between the symptom and 
the other constructs of participants. They specifically tested to see if there were any ‘Implicative 
Dilemmas’ in the construing of the symptom. An implicative dilemma is found where there is a 
significant correlation (r > 0.35) between the desired pole of a construct on which a person is 
congruent (i.e. the current self and the ideal self are rated similarly on it, marking the opposite pole 
as undesirable) and the undesired pole of a construct on which the person is discrepant  (there is a 
difference between current self and ideal self ratings in terms of the construct). The researchers 
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found when examining the construct systems of fibromyalgia participants versus controls that the 
former group had a higher number of implicative dilemmas, to the extent that it was the single most 
predictive variable (e.g. more so than self-ideal discrepancies) of MUS versus ‘normal’ pain group 
status. When they further analysed the content of the implicative dilemmas using a system to 
classify constructs (Classification System for Personal Constructs, CSPC; Feixas, Geldschlager & 
Neimeyer, 2002), they found that 73.9% of dilemmas related to the supplied symptom-construct, 
which was associated with a congruent ‘moral’ construct (e.g. ‘responsible-irresponsible’, or 
‘hardworking-lazy’) in 43.5% of cases. The significance of this finding was that the reduction of the 
symptom would also threaten an undesirable change to another aspect of the self, most likely in a 
moral attribute. Compan et al’s findings bear resemblance to those of Drysdale’s (1989) repertory 
grid study, where constructs were supplied based on previous work with chronic pain groups rather 
than elicited idiographically. One of the key findings of this study with 15 acute and 18 chronic (>6 
months symptom-duration) low back pain participants was that the symptom-construct was highly 
and significantly correlated with the supplied construct ‘sensitive-insensitive to others’, suggesting 
that the symptom was associated, perhaps on an implicit level, with qualities of tenderness and 
morality. The study by Benasayag et al. (2004) also found an increased number of implicative 
dilemmas with IBS participants compared with healthy controls, particularly for those experiencing 
multiple unexplained physical symptoms. However, they did not specify whether they provided a 
symptom construct for the IBS sample, and did not do a content analysis to find out which congruent 
aspects of the self-construct were associated with the symptom – making it unclear whether the 
dilemmas take on a similar or different form to those in people experiencing chronic pain. 
Studies by Large & Strong (1996) and Werner et al. (2004), both involving participants who 
experience chronic pain, suggest that people who experience MUS may associate a positive self-
identity with their perceived ways of coping with pain. Large & Strong used a repertory grid method 
which looks at standardized distances between how the self is construed compared to various 
others, including someone who is ‘a coper’ and someone who is ‘a hypochondriac’. They noted that 
participants construed themselves as being more like ‘copers’ and as dissimilar to ‘hypochondriacs’ 
based on characteristics including being authentic, having practical mastery of symptoms, not being 
limited by symptoms, and displaying stoicism with symptoms. They suggested therefore that low 
back pain sufferers may derive some self-esteem from their ‘coping’ identity. Werner et al. (2004) 
similarly noted narrative efforts of women experiencing pain to portray the self as having a mentally 
‘strong’ and ‘positive’ attitude in relation to their symptoms (as opposed to ‘whining and 
complaining’). Though both authors interpret these processes as means of maintaining self-esteem 
in the face of losses and stigma, it is quite possible that the ‘strong coper’ identities may be 
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positively enmeshed with symptoms. This is reminiscent of research by Kozlowska et al. into the 
attachment basis of MUS, which has suggested that various MUS may develop from phylogenetic 
‘freeze’ responses (Kozlowska, 2007; Kozlowska et al, 2013). These inhibitory strategies involve a 
decoupling or inhibition of affect in a context where caregivers withdraw their support, and might 
respond disapprovingly to the neediness of their children. Construing oneself as ‘coping’ and ‘strong’ 
may stem from the strategic inhibition internal and external signals of vulnerability and neediness. 
Lilleas & Von Der Fehr’s (2011) formulations about the gender-construed female body and habitus 
may also constitute a form of implicit identity, tied up with ‘a body for others’. Although this may be 
self-sacrificing at one level, with costs to bodily health, if it constitutes a core self-construction, then 
making the necessary changes to better manage symptoms may present more threat to their 
(transpersonal) construct systems than the consequences of maintaining symptoms. 
The role of others 
Several qualitative papers identified dilemmas about how much they let others see them with 
symptoms. There was a sense of shame (Hanakson et al., 2005) and exposure of vulnerabilities 
(Smith & Osborn, 1999) associated with exposure of the self with symptoms. Withdrawing and 
controlling social contact allowed participants to maintain a ‘mask’ or pretence that minimizes 
negatively perceived differences to identity (Asbring, 2001; Miles et al., 2005). If one conceptualizes 
identity as being dependent on the mirrored reactions of others, then isolating oneself may have an 
analogous effect to avoiding looking in the mirror for fear of confirming negative change to the self 
(Hellstroem, 2001). In PCP terms, this strategy may be characterized as ‘constriction’ involving 
avoidance of information that is incongruent with a dominant self-construction. However, this 
strategy, which Miles et al. (2005) termed ‘subversion’, is double-edged, being accompanied by 
feelings of isolation and a fear of being cut-off or abandoned (Smith & Osborn, 1998).  
Quantitative literature has provided further support that the social or interpersonal domain may be 
particularly salient in the self-constructions of those experiencing chronic pain. As mentioned earlier, 
Waters et al. (2004) found that the current-self versus ought-self discrepancies from the perspective 
of others accounted for the most variance in psychological distress scores. Kindermans et al. (2009) 
analyzed the content of discrepant attributes between current self and ideal, and ought and feared-
for selves. Although they experienced some difficulties in achieving reliability in categorizing 
discrepancies (final Cohen’s Kappa 0.62), they found that interpersonal attributes (including 
‘honest’, ‘helpful’, and ‘not selfish’) accounted for the largest number of discrepancies for the 
‘ought’, ‘feared-for’ and ‘ideal’ selves, whereas the ‘ideal’ self was more characterized by physical 
‘wellbeing’ attributes. Though this study did not demonstrate that these discrepancies were 
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associated with symptoms, the overall salience of interpersonal factors suggests that the challenges 
of chronic pain on societal roles (the person they want to be or feel they ought to be in social 
environments) may be as important as those relating to subjective wellbeing. Another study by 
Kindermans et al. (2010) looked at the relationship between discrepancies and levels of avoidance 
(not engaging in activities) and persistence (‘overdoing it’ in certain activities) behaviour in managing 
pain. They found that current-ideal discrepancies from the perspective of others, but not from their 
own perspective, significantly predicted levels of persistence. Current-feared-for congruencies from 
their own and the other perspectives significantly predicted levels of avoidance. Avoidance of 
activities, but not ‘overdoing it’, significantly predicted levels of disability and physical health. These 
findings further emphasize the importance of others’ expectations, which motivate behavior to 
protect social identity in a manner that could be characterized as ‘hostile’ (i.e. ‘overdoing’ social 
activities to maintain public identity at times when the symptom is less intense, and avoiding 
interaction during times when the symptoms are worst). The motivation to protect social identity 
may outweigh the motivation to improve symptoms and individual wellbeing (Miles et al., 2005).   
Participants with chronic pain (Smith & Osborn, 1998), fatigue (Asbring, 2001) and MCS (Reed-
Gibson et al., 2005) spoke about withdrawing from others to avoid having to meet demands and 
expectations from others that are made difficult by their symptom. This may relate to the ‘body for 
others’ theme developed by Lilleas & Von Der Fehr. Swoboda’s (2006) study also noted the 
emergence of a positive identity and desire to be ‘a body for other bodies’ by mentoring, providing 
support and advice to other sufferers. As research with repertory grids suggests, changes imposed 
by the symptom itself, but also the alleviation of symptoms, may threaten how the self is construed 
in relation to others. 
Emergence of alternative identities over time 
In addition to evidence of practical accommodating and ‘working around’ for various symptoms (e.g. 
Read-Gibson et al, 2005), several papers found evidence of a more ‘radical’ re-construction of the 
self (Clarke & James, 2005), involving the emergence of a ‘new’ self (Asbring, 2001; Swoboda, 2006) 
with re-evaluated values and priorities (Whitehead, 2006). Rather than being construed as inferior to 
their pre-symptom self, this new self was regarded as an improvement (Whitehead, 2006), 
particularly with regards to self-respect and the relationship with the body-self (Afrell, Biquet & 
Rudebeck, 2004; Asbring, 2001). Although it was over a short time-period, Vagronsfeld, Morley, 
Peters et al. (2010) found a reduction on measures of self-pain enmeshment between 4 weeks post-
road traffic accident (RTA) and 7 weeks post-RTA, which was associated with a reduction in 
measures of depression and pain severity. Although one might argue that improvements to both 
pain and psychological wellbeing are likely to have occurred regardless of a reduction in 
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enmeshment, the fact that self-ideal discrepancy scores did not change over the identical period 
suggests that the reduction of distress was not simply the result of improvement in how the self was 
construed relative to ideals. Perhaps this indicates that the sense of self and identity was construed 
as more ‘internalized’ to the person rather than being contingent on pain, reducing distress and 
promoting recovery. However, a caveat is that the discrepancy between current-self and ideal-self 
may not have been the relevant measure to compare with enmeshment in the first place, and that it 
may have been a reduction on a different aspect of self-identity (e.g. learning that the feared-for self 
has not been realized over time) that was a factor in relieving distress. The study may however be 
taken to suggest that enmeshment might be a natural response in the early stages of symptom 
experience. 
Summary of research findings 
Both quantitative and qualitative research has supported the idea that MUS are construed as having 
a negative impact on the self, which is construed as a significant change from how the person used 
to be before the onset of symptoms. Findings from qualitative research suggest that symptomatic 
identity may be preserved to some extent by splitting or dissociating the self (or mind) from the 
body, which is characterized as symptomatic, ‘ill’ and ‘other’/non-self. This is made possible by the 
enmeshment of negative characteristics with the symptom. However, this enmeshment can also 
create distress, as identity is seen as being contingent upon an unpredictable body. The role of 
others in validating certain self-constructions means that the social arena is particularly associated 
with threat. Avoidance of/withdrawal from certain social situations that risk exposure of undesired 
identities (‘constriction’), or ‘persistence behaviour’ (‘hostility’) may maintain pre-symptom identity 
in the eyes of others, but also have the consequence of isolation and depression/’guilt’ (where one is 
not acting consistently with one’s core social roles), and exacerbation of symptoms (e.g. through 
‘overdoing it’). 
Whilst symptoms are construed at an explicit level as being associated with undesirable changes to 
the self, research has suggested that the symptom may also be construed as being associated with 
positive qualities such as being a ‘strong coper’ and ‘being sensitive to others’, albeit on a more 
implicit level. These aspects have been suggested to be of an interpersonal nature. One qualitative 
paper argues that these aspects of identity may be ‘carried out’ at an embodied level of ‘habitus’, 
with low levels of awareness (Lilleas & Von Der Fehr, 2011). Symptoms could be representing an 
externalization, or perhaps more aptly, an embodiment, of a conflict where resolving the symptom 
would involve a more radical and ‘nuclear’ change to the construction of the self in relation to 
others, in a similar way to that suggested for agoraphobic symptoms (e.g. Bannister, 1965; Metcalfe, 
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1997). Indeed, coming to terms with symptoms appears to involve a ‘radical’ re-construction of the 
self. This may involve simultaneous re-construction of the former ‘healthy’ self.  
As noted above, the majority of papers are based on findings from homogeneous participant 
samples experiencing chronic pain symptoms, which may not be generalizable to wider MUS. 
However, from a constructivist approach, two people’s experiences of unexplained and chronic pain 
may have no more similarity in their personal meaning than experiences of two symptoms which are 
on the surface differently described (Foulkes & Anthony, 1957, p.66). 
Key areas identified in literature review 
With regards to the characteristics predicted from the frozen-construing model (Lin & Payne, 2014) 
of MUS, the following were evidenced in the literature review: 
-The self-construction was threatened by the presence of MUS  
-The discrepancies between current self and self before symptoms, current self and ideal self, and 
current self and how the self is ideally seen by others were factors in distress (‘guilt’ at dislodgement 
from core roles). 
-Symptoms were implicitly associated with aspects of identity that were construed as desirable, 
aspects which may be construed in a preverbal and embodied manner. 
- Dissociation of the self from the symptom, and of the mind (as ‘real me’) from the body, may be a 
means of managing threats to identity. However, enmeshment of the symptomatic self with 
undesirable characteristics raises psychological distress, because the symptom cannot be 
understood in relation to the current self-construct. 
Gaps identified from the review 
The relationship between the body and the construction of self has yet to be systematically explored 
using a quantitative method. Such a quantitative method would be able to confirm relationships 
between characteristics of the way the body is construed in relation to the self, such as dissociation 
of the symptomatic body and the self, and clinical measures of distress and symptom severity.   
Repertory grid methods have been useful in identifying implicit associations between desirable 
aspects of the current self and MUS, which carries the implication that symptoms may serve to 
stabilize the way the self is construed. Exploring how the body enters into the construction of the 
self using repertory grid methods may reveal whether these congruent and desirable aspects of self 
are elaborated in a preverbal, embodied way.  
 
The current study aims to address the above gaps by exploring the role of the body and symptoms in 
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the construing of self and others using the repertory grid method. It will explore the following 
hypotheses: 
3. Hypotheses: 
1. The level of integration (or dissociation) of the symptom and symptomatic self within the mind-
body construct system 
 
1A: The symptom construct is more likely to be dissociated than other constructs from the core 
construct system for mind-body identity. 
  
Rationale: people with MUS are expected to struggle to understand their symptom using their well 
elaborated verbal construct systems for mind-body identity. 
1B: Increased dis-integration of the symptom from the rest of the construct-system will increase 
levels of anxiety; and conversely, if the symptom is dominant in the construct system – this will 
correlate with depression. 
 
Rationale: With less meaning/understanding of the symptom in relation to constructs for making 
sense of self and others, the person will experience more anxiety as the symptom construct cannot 
be used to make predictions about self and others. However, if the symptom is highly 
intercorrelated with many aspects of mind-body identity (i.e. superordinate), then this 
‘enmeshment’ of the symptom with many facets of identity will likely increase psychological distress, 
as the person construes their identity as being contingent upon symptom-status (including desirable 
and undesirable characteristics). 
 
1C: Increased distance in the construal of the self generally from the self when symptoms are worst 
will have a curvilinear, U-shaped relationship with anxiety and depression symptoms. 
Rationale: If the self in-general is identified with the self when symptoms are at their worst, then this 
will indicate that the person sees their identity as being ‘entrapped’ by symptoms, which would be 
expected to be associated with psychological distress. Increased differences between the construing 
of general self and the self when symptoms are worst should alleviate distress, particularly if 
negatively construed attributes are enmeshed with symptoms. However, if the self when symptoms 
are worst is ‘dissociated’ (i.e. construed as a different person to the self in general), this level of 
dissociation may actually increase distress, as this would threaten the integrity of the self across the 
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temporal dimension (Asbring, 2001). The person with worst symptoms is ‘not me’, which 
presumably may be distressing. 
 
Hypotheses 2: Discrepancies between aspects of self  
2A: The level of depression symptoms will increase with increased distance between how the current-
self and how the ideal-self are construed.  
 
Rationale: self-discrepancy theory would predict a linear relationship between increased self-ideal 
discrepancies and depression symptoms. 
2B: increased distance in how the current-self is construed relative to the pre-symptom self will be 
associated with increased anxiety and depression symptoms, and will relate to increased severity of 
symptoms. 
 
Rationale: one would expect that the distance between the self before symptoms and the current-
self would be related to symptom severity. Increased difference reflecting (mostly undesirable) 
changes to self as the result of symptoms, which would be expected to increase psychological 
distress as the result of a change in identity. 
 
2C: Increased difference between the pre-symptom self and the ideal self will be positively correlated 
with symptoms of depression and anxiety 
 
Rationale: if the person has a chronic sense of being different to their ideals that pre-dates 
symptoms, then these ideals (which may represent high standards for the self) may influence 
psychological distress regardless of discrepancies due to symptom status. 
 
2D: The discrepancy between the current-self and the ideal-self will be greater than the discrepancy 
between the self as seen by others and the self as ideally seen by others. Increased distances between 
the discrepancies may correlate with increased anxiety and depression. 
 
Rationale: If people with MUS attempts to minimize the impact of symptoms on their public identity, 
then one would expect the distance between the seen as self and the ideally seen as self to be 
smaller than the gap between the current-self and the ideal-self. If the difference between the ideals 
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is significant, the task of trying to meet ideals for the self and ideals for being seen by others may 
increase psychological symptoms. 
2E: increased discrepancy between the ideal-self and the self as ideally seen by others correlates with 
increased anxiety and depression symptoms. 
 
Rationale: If there are possible differences or perhaps even conflicts between how the ideal-self and 
the self as ideally seen by others are construed, then this may produce a state of conflict or possible 
guilt about wanting to move away from core social roles.  
Hypotheses 3: Conflicts and implicative dilemmas (IDs)  
 
3A: There will be implicative dilemmas (IDs) where desirable movements towards being physically 
healthier and symptom-free are associated with undesirable changes to the current-self. These 
dilemmas will also be present for movement from the how the self is currently seen by others 
towards the self as ideally seen by others. The number of dilemmas will correlate positively with 
depression, symptom severity and duration of symptoms. 
 
3B: The number of implicative dilemmas will be greater for movement from the seen as seen by 
others to the self as ideally seen by others, compared to the number of implicative dilemmas 
associated with movement from the current-self towards the ideal-self. 
 
Rationale: the literature search identified that the public aspects of self were particularly difficult 
with regards to changes in identity. Associations between symptoms and positive 
relational/interpersonal attributes of the current self have also been identified. Changes to 
symptoms may particularly threaten those positive aspects of self that are interpersonal in nature 
(i.e. positive aspects of self that are ‘seen by others’). 
3C: Implicative Dilemmas will be more likely for constructs that relate to interpersonal qualities, for 
which the ideal-self and the current-self are construed as similar (i.e. current-self construed in a 
desirable way.) 
3D: The current self will be less complex and construed more consistently than the self before 
symptoms. 
 
Rationale: If implicative dilemmas involve a ‘no change’ position in relation to symptoms (Feixas & 
Saul, 2000), then the current-self may be construed as being less complex and in a less contradictory 
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manner than the self before symptoms (demonstrating the stabilizing function of the symptom, 
Feixas & Villegas, 1993). 
 
4. Method 
Design 
A non-experimental, correlational design was selected to explore the hypotheses. The study used a 
modified Repertory Grid (RG) for eliciting physical/bodily constructs in addition to 
personality/psychological constructs (described in detail below), to explore relationships between 
construing of the symptom in relation to the broader body/mind construct system, and relationships 
between characteristics of construing and measures of symptom severity, anxiety and depression. 
Participants 
The study initially sought to recruit participants from the waiting list for an NHS-commissioned 
service for people with MUS. The recruitment pathway involved asking GPs to introduce the study to 
members of the waiting list for group interventions, who had already been screened by the service 
according to a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria. However, due to a lack of recruitment success 
via this pathway and time constraints, the study recruited all participants using public advertising on 
social media sites and support group websites/forums for MUS. The following inclusion and 
exclusion criteria were used: 
Inclusion: 
• Aged between 18 and 65 years 
• Experiencing a physical symptom (e.g. tiredness, headaches, pains, irritable bowels) for 
more than 6 months 
• Tests for the symptom have come back negative, and the symptom is not linked to a 
(malignant) organic pathology; or has been given a ‘diagnosis of exclusion’ 
• English-speaking 
• The symptom causes distress and impacts on everyday functioning 
Exclusion 
• Primary diagnosis of a psychiatric condition (e.g. psychosis, personality disorder, major 
depressive disorder) AND/OR currently being seen in secondary mental healthcare services. 
• Non-English speaking 
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• Current substance misuse disorder 
• Experience of trauma or traumatic bereavement in the past 6 months 
Power calculation for statistical testing 
Power calculations were made to determine the sample size required for demonstrating effect sizes 
with adequate power (AICBT Ltd, 2017). For the correlational analyses, a sample of 28 participants 
would be required for detecting a strong positive correlation (r≤0.5) with desired power (0.8) at the 
95% significance level. However, given the recruitment difficulties and time constraints, as a 
practical compromise the sample size was 20 participants. This gives a 6% increase in alpha-error 
level for detecting a strong correlation at a borderline level of signifance (p<0.10). For the additional 
chi-squared analyses, this increase in alpha-error level was similar at borderline significance level. 
Measures 
Repertory Grid (RG) 
The repertory grid (RG) is a major research tool for exploring a person’s construct system (Kelly, 
1995, 1991). It has been used in research with populations experiencing various mental and physical 
health difficulties (Walker & Winter, 2007), including populations experiencing chronic pain (e.g. 
Compan et al., 2011; Drysdale, 1989; Large & Strong, 1997; Large, 1985a, 1985b; O’Farrell, Tait & 
Aitken, 1993).  
The RG usually involves a procedure for eliciting personal constructs in the form of word pairs, which 
are generated by asking the participant to compare people they know (‘elements’), including 
themselves, in terms of likeness and difference. On a pragmatic level, these word pairs (e.g. ‘selfish-
kind’) approximate to a verbalized form of the bipolar constructs that characterize their personal 
construct system (Butt, 2008). The next part of the procedure involves numerically rating aspects of 
the self and significant others based on the constructs that have been elicited, generating a data 
matrix from which various relationships between the elements and constructs can be quantified. 
The RG method represents a compromise between idiographic and nomothetic methods (Neimeyer, 
2004). It shares the aim of methods such as IPA of trying to see the world from the participant’s 
idiographic perspective, interpreting each individual grid as ‘soft data’ whose meanings can be 
construed by the researcher. However, it can also be used in a nomothetic way to extract general 
patterns of construing across groups. Furthermore, the RG allows for identification of relationships 
between constructs and elements that may not be verbalizable by participants themselves, such as 
the implicit relationships between the pain symptom-construct and congruent moral aspects of 
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identity in Compan et al’s (2011) RG study. In addition to ‘internal’ relationships between elements 
and constructs, the RG can be used to explore the overall structure of a person’s construing: e.g. 
whether their constructs are tightly bound into a single monolithic system, or whether alternative 
constellations of constructs are available for more flexible construing. This has made the RG a useful 
complement to methods that primarily explore the content of personal meaning, such as IPA (e.g. 
Turpin, Dallos, Owen & Thomas, 2016). For embodied constructs which may be verbally difficult to 
describe qualitatively, exploring the structure as well as content of construing is important. 
Adaptation of the RG 
The elicitation procedure was adapted by the researcher, by asking participants to provide 
constructs that were important for construing the physical or embodied aspects of elements. 
Alternative adaptations of the RG, such as the ‘Body-Grid’ (Weber et al., 2001) introduced the 
whole-body, desired-body and selected parts of the body as elements to elicit constructs for, and 
evaluate various aspects of, the body. Body-grids have been applied to populations with overlapping 
physical and psychological presentations, such as cancer (e.g. Weber et al., 2005), in-vitro-
fertilization (IVF) and anorexia nervosa (Borkenhagen, Klapp, Schoeneich & Braehler, 2005). A 
possible extension of the current study using BG design is described in the discussion section. For the 
current study, primary relevance was on exploration of bodily and psychological constructs for self 
and others within a single ‘body-mind’ grid-space. For this reason, whole-person elements were 
selected. 
RG procedure for current study 
Constructs were elicited using the ‘triadic method’ (Kelly, 1955/1991), which involves presenting 
participants with three elements at a time and asking them to specify ‘an important way in which 
two of them are similar and yet different from the third’. When participants provided a word to 
describe the initial difference or likeness (e.g. ‘calm’), the researcher asked the participant to 
describe a person who was the ‘opposite’ of that word (e.g. ‘panicky’) (Epting, Suchman & Nickelson, 
1971). The word-pair was noted down by the researcher as a personal construct (e.g. ‘Calm --- 
Panicky’). Participants were asked to provide ‘an important physical or bodily difference’ and ‘an 
important personality or psychological difference’ for each triad of elements. The order in which 
psychological and physical constructs were asked for was alternated for each triad, and 
counterbalanced across the sample (i.e. 10 participants gave a psychological construct first for the 
first triad, 10 gave the psychological construct second for the first triad). Although research eliciting 
constructs for the body using the BG has found that participants find it easier to provide constructs 
for dyads with body parts, the current research opted for triads, as triadic methods are generally 
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considered to produce construct systems with greater cognitive complexity (Caputi and Reddy, 
1999).  
The following elements were included in the elicitation: 
1. Me (current self) 
2. How I would like to be (ideal self) 
3. Me when my symptom is at its worst  
4. Me before I had the symptom (pre symptom self) 
5. A person I know and like (liked person) 
6. A person I know and do not like (disliked person) 
7- 10. A person who is significant to me x 4 
The element ‘Me (as I am now)’ was included in all of the triads, a technique known as the ‘self-
identification form’ (Kelly, 1955). The rationale for this was that the physical self could be compared 
‘internally’ with other self-related elements, as well as being compared ‘externally’ with non-self 
elements. A total of 6 triads were compared, giving a total of 6 psychological constructs and 6 
bodily/physical constructs. Finally, after comparing the elements, the researcher reminded the 
participant of the symptom they had described (e.g. ‘burning pain in lower back’) and asked them to 
describe a person who was the opposite of a person with that symptom. This provided a 13th 
construct denoted as the ‘symptom construct’. This was done at the end of the triadic elicitations to 
minimize any implied classification of the symptom construct as either physical or psychological. This 
last aspect of the procedure deviates from previous research, which provided the symptom with an 
antonym (e.g. ‘in pain’ – ‘not in pain’) rather than eliciting a symptom construct (e.g. Compan et al, 
2011; Drysdale, 1989). 
Finally, participants were asked to rate a set of elements using a 1 to 7 scale, with each end of the 
scale representing a pole of the construct (e.g. 7= ‘calm’, 1= ‘panicky’). Participants were instructed 
to use the midpoint ‘4’ rating if they were unsure whether the construct applied to the given 
element. The participant rated each element in turn for a given construct, before moving onto the 
next construct in the order that constructs were first elicited. This produced a 13 x 13 grid of ratings 
(see example in Appendix Bi). The following elements were added to those listed above in the rating-
procedure: 
11. My symptom if it were a person 
12. How I think other people see me (self as seen by others) 
13. How I would like other people to see me (self as ideally seen by others) 
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The above elements were not included in the elicitation procedure, as the mixture of self/other 
perspectives within a single triad was thought to be too confusing. The ‘symptom as person’ element 
was deemed to be hypothetical/projective for elicitation and therefore only included at the ratings 
stage. The inclusion of the ‘self as seen’ elements was particularly relevant to exploring hypotheses 
relating to the role of interpersonal constructions of self.  
Grid matrices were analysed using the IDIOGRID computer package (Grice, 2002) and GRIDSTAT 
(Bell, 2004b) to extract the key grid indices. 
Grid measures corresponding to relevant hypotheses: 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) (‘Slater analysis’ in IDIOGRID; Grice, 2002) analyses the 
variance of the grid ratings into components, which represent constellations of constructs which 
correlate highly with one another, but correlate less with constructs on other components. The 
components that account for more variance are considered to be more well-developed sub-systems 
in the person’s construct-system, being used to make more predictions than components with fewer 
constructs. This study replicates Metcalfe’s (1997) method with agoraphobic participants by 
counting the number of times that the symptom construct loads most highly on the largest 
component (Component 1) compared to the next two largest components (Components 2 and 3). If 
the symptom is more likely to load on components 2 and 3 than component 1, relative to what 
would be expected from the loadings of all constructs, then this is evidence that the symptom 
construct is poorly integrated (i.e. dissociated) within the wider construct system (hypothesis 1A). 
Construct Intensity 
To allow for a correlational analysis with psychological distress symptoms and symptom severity 
measures, a continuous variable for integration/dissociation of the symptom construct is required. 
The intensity of the symptom construct is calculated by summing the squared values of correlations 
of the symptom construct with the rest of the constructs, then averaging by total number of 
constructs minus one. This can be correlated with scores on the PHQ-9 and GAD-7, as per Hypothesis 
1B. 
Distances between elements 
The correlations between the ratings of different elements can be calculated as distances between 
elements in the ‘grid-space’, which are standardized according to all other inter-element differences 
within the grid (Grice, 2002). These Standardized Euclidean Distances range between 0 and 2, where 
a distance of 0 indicates that elements are construed as identical, distances ≤0.8 represent similarity, 
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and distances ≥1.2 suggest dissimilarity between elements (Makhlouf-Norris & Norris, 1973). If the 
elements ‘current-self’ and ‘self when symptoms are at their worst’ are construed as dissimilar 
(>1.2), this could be taken as a measure of dissociation, which can be correlated with symptom-
severity and psychological distress (hypothesis 1C). 
According to self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), the distance between the current self and the 
ideal self should correlate positively with depression (hypothesis 2A). The distance between the self 
before symptoms and current self, representing loss of former identity, would also be expected to 
correlate positively with depression measures (hypothesis 2B). If people with MUS show a desire to 
maintain a public identity, one would expect that the discrepancy between self as currently seen by 
others, and self as ideally seen by others, would be less than the distance between current self and 
ideal self (hypothesis 2D). The conflict (distance) between different ideals may increase 
psychological distress (hypothesis 2E).  
Implicative Dilemmas 
An alternative way of measuring conflict in grids is by counting the number of implicative dilemmas 
in the grid (Feixas & Saul, 2005). These are usually considered in terms of dilemmas associated with 
movement towards their ideal self (e.g. reduction in symptoms), but in this research, they will also 
be defined as dilemmas associated with movement towards the self as ideally seen by others. 
Implicative dilemmas are counted when the congruent pole of a construct (current self and ideal self 
are correlated, marking the opposite pole undesirable (Feixas & Saul, 2005)) is highly correlated (r> 
.35) with the discrepant pole (the current self and ideal self are rated on opposite ends of the 
construct, marking the current-self as undesirable). It will be interesting to see if physical 
characteristics in terms of which the self is discrepant from the ideal self’ (e.g. healthy-unhealthy), 
including the symptom construct, are implicitly associated with congruent characteristics in how the 
self is construed and seen by others. In such cases, changes to the body-self and MUS would present 
the person with a dilemma. An increased number of dilemmatic associations would be expected to 
be correlated to measures of depression and anxiety (hypothesis 3A). 
The literature review suggests that the social/interpersonal domain is particularly important for this 
population, so one would expect the number of implicative dilemmas to be greater for movement 
from the self as currently seen to the self as ideally seen by others (hypothesis 3B). To further test 
this hypothesis, constructs were rated using the Classification System for Personal Constructs (CSPC) 
(Feixas, Geldschlager & Neimeyer, 2002)– a coding system for categorizing constructs into one of 6 
categories relating to ‘Moral’, ‘Emotional’, ‘Relational’, ‘Personal’ and ‘Intellectual/Operational, and 
‘Values and interests’. An additional 7th category of ‘physical’ suggested by Dada et al. (2017) could 
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have been used – however, this category was pre-emptively provided in the elicitation. Physical 
constructs were categorized using some of the ‘physical’ categories suggested by Dada et al., 
including ‘body-appearance’, ‘physical malaise’ and ‘attitude towards body’, plus additional 
categories suggested by the data. Where physical constructs were involved in implicative dilemmas, 
or were the constructs associated with the highest percentage of conflicts for that grid, the category 
corresponding to the highest correlating psychological construct was noted (e.g. ‘heavy’ correlating 
with ‘responsibility’). This would allow for embodied constructs to be potentially ‘decoded’ in 
implicative dilemmas (hypothesis 3C). 
Construct and Element Conflict 
Conflict within a grid can be identified by examining the relationship between each element and 
pairs of constructs for inconsistencies in how they are construed (Bell, 2004a), where either (i) ‘an 
element is at the same time similar or close to two constructs which are themselves different or 
distant’; or (ii) ‘An element is similar or close to one construct’s pole and at the same time is 
different to or distant from another construct’s pole, where the two construct poles are similar or 
close’ (Bell, 2009, p. 34). These are called ‘Element-Construct Triangular Inequalities’ (Bell, 2004a) 
and the total distribution of these in grids can be attributed as a percentage to each of the elements 
and constructs in the grid. These conflicts can be seen either as reflecting flexibility or complexity on 
the one hand, or threatening the meaning and internal coherence of construct system on the other.  
One might expect the level of conflict attributed to the current self to be lower than that for the pre-
symptom self, if the symptom reduces inconsistencies in how the self is construed (hypothesis 3D).  
Summary of key grid indices for testing hypotheses: 
Construct system characteristic Grid measure Relevant hypothesis 
Dissociation or integration of 
symptom construct with the 
remainder of the construct system 
1. Principal components 
analysis (PCA). The  
frequency of highest loading on 
component 1/2/3 for symptom-
construct vs. all constructs. 
 
 
2. Symptom construct intensity 
1A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1B 
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Perceived similarity and 
dissimilarity between the self in 
general, and the self when 
symptoms are worst 
Standardized Euclidean 
Distance between current self 
and self when symptoms are 
worst 
1C 
The perceived difference between 
the current self and the ideal self 
 
 
 
Standardized Euclidean 
distance between the Self and 
the Ideal-Self. 
2A 
Perceived change in identity due to 
symptom (i.e. difference between 
current self and self before 
symptoms) 
Standardized Euclidean 
Distance between the current 
self and the self before 
symptoms. 
2B 
Perceived distance between the 
self before symptoms and the ideal 
self 
Standardized Euclidean 
Distance between the pre 
symptom self and the ideal self. 
2C 
Perceived distance between how 
the self is currently seen by others 
compared to how the self is ideally 
seen by others 
Standardized Euclidean 
Distances between the self as 
currently seen by others and 
the self as ideally seen by 
others. 
2D, 2E 
Number of Implicative dilemmas 
associated with movement from 
the current-self towards the ideal 
self 
An implicative dilemma is 
counted when congruent pole 
of a construct (present and 
ideal rated at desirable end of 
construct) is highly correlated 
(r> .35) with the discrepant pole 
of another construct (current 
self is rated at the opposite, 
undesired pole, to the ideal 
self) 
3A, 3B 
Number of Implicative dilemmas 
associated with movement from 
An implicative dilemma is 
counted when congruent pole 
3A, 3B 
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the self as currently seen by others 
to the self as ideally seen by others 
of a construct (self as currently 
seen by others and self as 
ideally seen rated at desirable 
end of construct) is highly 
correlated (r> .35) with the 
discrepant pole of another 
construct (self as currently seen 
by others is rated at the 
opposite, undesired pole, to the 
self as ideally seen) 
Level of conflict in construing of 
current self, versus self before 
symptoms 
Element-construct triangular 
inequalities- percentage of 
conflicts attributed to different 
elements 
3D 
Measure Yourself Medical Outcome Profile 2 (MYMOP-2) 
The MYMOP (Paterson, 1996) (Appendix Bii) is a symptom-focused, patient-generated instrument 
which requires the participant to specify at least one symptom and one valued activity that the 
symptom interferes with. Participants rate the symptom on a seven-point scale (0= ‘as good as it 
could be’; 7= ‘as bad as it could be’).  Questions on general wellbeing and coping strategies are 
similarly scaled. Three scales and an overall score are produced.  The overall profile score will be 
regarded as the single measure of symptom severity in the analysis. This questionnaire tool has been 
used in both clinical and research contexts within primary care settings, with populations with a 
variety of chronic symptoms (e.g. Hill et al., 1999; Payne & Brooks, 2016; Paterson et al., 2000). 
When participants reported experiencing multiple symptoms, the researcher asked participants to 
specify the symptom that ‘bothered them the most, or that they were most motivated to seek 
explanation for and/or relief from’.  
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Scale (GAD-7) 
 The GAD-7 (Spitzer et al., 2006) (Appendix Biii) is a structured 7-item questionnaire tool on self-
reported symptoms of anxiety over the past 2 weeks. It is widely used in outpatient and primary care 
settings as a tool to assess for generalized anxiety disorder (Lowe et al., 2008). It has been used for 
outcomes research with MUS populations (e.g. Payne, 2015; Payne & Brooks, 2016). 
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) 
The PHQ-9 (Appendix Biv)is a structured self-report 9-item questionnaire tool on self-reported 
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symptoms of low mood and depression (based on the 9 DSM-IV criteria for depression) over the past 
2 weeks. Its use has been validated in outpatient and primary care settings (e.g. Kroenke et al, 2001; 
Spitzer, Kroenke, and Williams, 1999) and with MUS populations (Payne & Brooks, 2016). 
Procedure 
The study was advertised on social media sites, and with the permissions of the relevant 
administrators, on forums and support/information websites for various MUS conditions (e.g. 
Fibromyalgia Association Website, IBS network, CFS network). A link was provided to a study website 
from which the participant information sheet (Appendix C) could be downloaded. Potential 
participants were invited to contact the researcher directly to find out more about the study. The 
researcher provided those who expressed an interested in taking part with an information sheet if 
they did not already have one. Following confirmation of interest on behalf of potential participants, 
an interview was arranged at a convenient community location, or over Skype video-conferencing 
computer program. Participants were asked to complete a copy of the written consent form 
(Appendix D) either prior to the interview meeting, or at the start of the interview. 
Face to face interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Four of the interviews took place in 
person, and the remaining fourteen interviews were conducted via Skype. Initial demographic 
information was collected, followed by completion of the MYMOP-2, PHQ-9, GAD-7, and finally the 
repertory grid. 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical approval was sought initially from the University of Hertfordshire, the Health Research 
Authority (HRA), and an NHS Research Ethics Committee (REC) for recruitment involving Primary 
Care surgeries as Participant Identification Centres (PICs). The study received approval to recruit in 
February 2017. Due to a lack of recruitment success, approval was obtained from the University of 
Hertfordshire for recruitment using public advertisements (appendix E). Recruitment via this second 
pathway began in March 2017, and the interviews were conducted between March and May 2017.  
Due to the personal nature of the material discussed, and the way that the repertory grid method 
involves reflecting on and numerically stating the impact of symptoms, the possibility of distress to 
participants during interviews was given consideration in the study protocol. Offering participants to 
pause or discontinue, or alternatively suggesting that they seek further support (e.g. from their GP) 
were options available to the researcher. Another factor considered in the ethical factors was the 
level of physical demands of taking part in interviews lasting up to 90 minutes, for a population who 
experienced various physical symptoms. To make participants as comfortable as possible and avoid 
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exacerbation of symptoms, the researcher was flexible with regards to time and location of 
interviews (e.g. Skype allowed participants to take part in interviews from the comfort of their own 
home), and participants were informed that they could take breaks or discontinue if they began to 
feel physically uncomfortable during interviews. 
Service User Involvement 
A previous service user of an MUS ‘symptoms groups’ intervention provided consultation on the 
study procedure, including the appropriateness of the questionnaire tools for a primary care 
population. They also provided advice on how advertisements and study documents could be 
sensitively worded for a population who may be wary of psychological research.  
 
5. Findings 
Description of participants 
Eighteen women and two men took part in the study. The sample was aged between 25 and 71 
years old (mean age = 46.95). The majority of the sample consisted of people experiencing various 
forms of chronic pain (11), including back pain (2), joint pain (1) and ‘all over body pain’/fibromyalgia 
(8). The remainder of the sample consisted of people who experienced fatigue (5) neurological 
symptoms such as migraines (3) and one participant who was experiencing unexpected loss of 
coordination leading to falls. All participants considered their symptoms to be lacking adequate 
medical explanation, and described having undergone various tests (e.g. scans, blood tests) which 
came back negative. The majority of the sample had received a medical label in the absence of this 
explanation, including ‘chronic fatigue syndrome’ (CFS) and ‘fibromyalgia’. Some of the sample 
mentioned having been diagnosed with anxiety and depression in the past, although none currently 
had a psychiatric diagnosis. 
Figure 1: Pie charts displaying MUS-type and management form 
 
 
 
 
 
Psychological symptoms of anxiety and depression 
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Management preferences 
The majority of participants (12) sought support for their symptom from their GPs. If the contact 
with GPs was infrequent (less than five times per year) then the participant was classified as ‘self-
management’. The number self-managing was four (20% of the sample. Those receiving ‘specialist 
support’ (e.g. specialist or multi-disciplinary outpatient) made up the remainder (20%) of the sample 
(Figure 1, right).  
Figure 2: Pie charts showing employment status and ethnicity of participants. 
 
The majority of the sample (80%) could therefore be regarded as a primary care population. None of 
the sample were receiving psychological treatment (e.g. cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT)) at the 
time of interview, although four of the participants mentioned having received a form of talking 
therapy in the past, for a mixture of reasons including trauma, depressive symptoms relating to the 
symptom, and for psychological support unrelated to symptoms. 
For a summary of clinical variables, see Table 1. All participants had experienced symptoms for over 
6 months. The participant who experienced an MUS of unexpected loss of coordination and balance 
reported experiencing other forms of unexplained physical symptoms prior to the onset of this 
particular MUS. None of the participants scored below a ‘3’ out of 6 on the MYMOP profile score 
(where 0= ‘as good as it can be’ and 6= ‘as bad as it can be’).  The PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores have 
been categorized in terms of normative severity ratings, presented in Figure 3, to give clinical 
relevance to these scores. MYMOP-2 scores do not have normative data available for comparison. 
46 
 
46 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for MUS and psychological symptoms.  
 Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Duration of 
MUS (years) 
9.03 6.50 6.94 1 24 
MYMOP 
profile score 
4.23 4.50 .89 2.33 6.00 
GAD-7 Score 11.05 11.50 4.53 2 5 
PHQ-9 Score 16.45 17.00 5.77 5 29 
 
Figure 3: Pie charts of PHQ-9 and GAD-7 categories 
 
As can be seen from in Figure 3, the sample is characterized by the full range of categories for 
severity of symptoms of anxiety and depression. As mentioned above, despite some participants 
scoring in the moderate-severe or severe ranges, none of the participants were receiving a form of 
psychiatric or psychological treatment at the time of the interview. Several participants described 
experiencing low mood and frequent anxiety about their symptoms. However, they also reported 
that they did not talk about the psychological impact of MUS with healthcare professionals, in case 
this resulted in their physical symptoms being judged as ‘psychosomatic’. The perceived external 
(and possible internal) stigma about mental health and its relationship to physical symptoms may 
Pie chart showing GAD-7 categories Pie chart showing PHQ-9 categories 
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present a considerable barrier to accessing services (this is considered further in the discussion 
section). 
A series of one-way ANOVAs was conducted to examine possible relationships between group 
factors (symptom type, preferred management, employment status) and clinical variables. Except 
for one person who experienced unexplained balance difficulties and had a significantly longer 
duration of MUS than the other symptom types, none of the grouping variables had significant 
between-group effects on PHQ-9, GAD-7, MYMOP or duration of symptom (see Table 2). 
Table 2: descriptive statistics for PHQ-9, GAD-7, MYMOP-2 and duration of symptoms. 
  PHQ-9 GAD-7 MYMOP-2 Duration of 
MUS 
Group 
variable 
 mean Sd Mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Management 
of MUS 
Self 18.50 5.60 9.00 7.59 4.26 .69 7.75 8.85 
GP 15.92 4.49 12.00 5.82 4.22 .74 7.71 5.98 
Specialist 
service 
16.00 3.86 10.25 4.69 4.83 1.11 14.25 7.50 
F-value  .29  .71  .71  1.49  
p-value (sig.)  .51  .75  .75  .25  
Employment Unemployed 18.71 5.28 14.29 3.95 4.71 .91 11.57 7.28 
Part-time 19.00 8.66 9.67 3.79 3.78 .19 7.67 7.37 
Full-time 13.29 4.82 9.57 2.94 4.38 .85 7.71 5.23 
Retired 16.00 5.00 8.33 7.09 4.35 .58 7.50 10.85 
F-value  2.26  1.38  1.21  .44  
p-value (sig.)  .12  .30  .34  .72  
Type of 
symptom 
All-body pain 16.63 6.34 9.25 5.42 4.17 .67 6.75 2.19 
Back pain 19.00 7.07 13.00 7.07 4.34 .47 10.50 5.99 
Joint pain 16.00 7.50 8.00 3.65 4.67 - 4.00 7.78 
Headaches 13.67 5.70 11.00 3.11 4.67 1.53 20.00 4.00 
Fatigue 16.00 5.77 12.80 4.54 4.53 .87 8.20 3.96 
Balance 21.00 - 16.00 -3.67 3.67 - .50 - 
F-value  .29  .75  .33  3.5  
p-value (sig.)  .91  .60  .89  .03  
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Summary of analysis procedures 
A series of parametric and non-parametric correlational analyses were conducted (after removal of 
outliers) to examine relationships between relevant grid indices (see Table 3) and scores on the 
PHQ-9, GAD-7 and MYMOP-2, and duration of symptoms (which was also explored as an 
independent variable). Analyses were conducted as one-tailed where a relationship had been 
predicted a priori. For hypothesized curvilinear relationships between variables, squared-
transformations were used in correlations. Table 4 provides a summary of correlational analyses, 
with borderline significant (p≤.10) and significant (p≤.005) results highlighted. 
Hierarchical regression tests were conducted to further explore the predictive values of significant 
indices in relation to the PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores (Table 8). Only one index correlated significantly 
with MYMOP-2 and symptom-duration measures respectively, so no hierarchical regression analysis 
was necessary for these dependent variables. 
Categorical data, including the component which constructs correlated most highly with (1 to 3), 
type of construct (physical, psychological or MUS), and the content-classification of constructs, was 
analysed using chi-squared tests.  
One-way repeated measures ANOVAs, paired-samples t-tests, or non-parametric equivalents of 
these tests, were conducted to explore differences in element properties, and relevant comparisons 
of discrepancies between elements. 
Table 3: Descriptive data for key grid indices 
Grid index Description Mean (or median 
where specified) 
Standard deviation (or 
Inter-quartile range 
where specified) 
Standard 
Euclidean 
distances 
between 
elements 
(discrepancies) 
current self --- ideal self 1.15 .19 
current self ---- pre symptom self .91 .29 
Pre symptom self --- ideal self .43 .26 
current self --- ideally seen as by others .97 .23 
Seen as by others --- self ideally seen as 
by others 
Mdn .73 IQR .41 
Current self --- self when symptom 
worst 
.77 .25 
Ideal self --- ideally seen as by others  Mdn .28 IQR .46 
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Difference 
between 
element 
distances 
Current self---ideal self distance, minus  
seen as by others--- ideally seen as by 
others distance 
.32 .22 
Symptom 
intensity 
% sum squares of symptom construct .69 .10 
Symptom 
conflict 
% triangular inequality conflicts 
attributed to symptom construct 
8.31 .24 
Element-
Conflict: % 
triangular 
inequality 
conflict 
attributed to 
each element  
Current self 6.92 2.13 
Ideal self 9.25 1.95 
Self when symptoms are worst 10.53 2.06 
Self pre symptoms 7.21 2.95 
Seen as by others 6.34 2.19 
Ideally seen as by others 8.29 2.66 
Difference in 
element 
conflict % 
% conflict attributed to Current self --- % 
conflict attributed to pre symptoms self 
-3.25 39 
Difference in 
percent sum 
squares of grid 
ratings 
between 
elements 
Current self %sumsqares ----  
self pre symptom %sumsquares 
Mdn 34 IQR 79.5 
Correlations of 
psychological 
vs. physical 
constructs with 
symptom 
construct 
Mean correlations between physical 
constructs with symptom construct 
minus mean correlations between 
psychological constructs and symptom 
construct 
.08 .14 
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Table 4: Correlational analyses summary  
  Pearson correlation (r)  
Dependent Variable → 
Independent ↓ 
Relevant 
hypothesis 
PHQ-9 GAD-7 MYMOP-2 Duration of 
MUS (rs) 
Age X -.15 -.10 .06 X 
Intensity of symptom-construct 1B -.36* -.39* .13 .10 
(Intensity of symptom 
construct)2  
1B -.31* -.36* .15 X 
Distance between current self 
and self when symptoms are 
worst 
1C -.48** -.36* .11 .24 
Distance between current self 
and ideal self 
2A .24 .39** .04 .08 
Distance between current self 
and self before symptoms 
2B .08 -.15 .32* .08 
Distance between ideal self 
and self before symptoms 
2C .38* .55** -.09 .05 
Difference between distance 
between current self and ideal 
self, and self as currently seen 
by others and self as ideally 
seen by others 
2D .49** .31* .11 .23 
SelfConflict% minus 
PreSymptomConflict% 
3D .16 .33* -.08 .15 
Spearman’s rank correlation (rs) 
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Distance between self as 
currently seen by others and 
self as ideally seen by others 
2D -.37* -.02 -.28 .30 
Distance between ideal self 
and self as ideally seen by 
others 
2E .48** .32* .12 -.51** 
Duration of symptoms X -.40* -.20 .28 X 
Kendall’s Tau (τ) 
Implicative dilemmas 
associated with movement 
from current self to ideal self 
3A-B -.21 -.20 -.20 .30 
Implicative dilemmas 
associated with movement 
from self as currently seen by 
other to self as ideally seen by 
others 
3A-B .12 .18 -.01 -.11 
* p≤ .10   ** p≤.005 
 
Findings relating to key hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. Measures of integration and dissociation of the symptom construct and 
symptomatic self  
1A: Correlation of symptom construct with principal components 
The table below shows observed and expected values for the number of occasions on which the 
symptom construct, and other constructs, correlated mostly highly with each of the first three 
largest components (ordered in terms of the amount of grid variance they account for). The 
symptom construct was not significantly more likely than other constructs to correlate most highly 
with the second or third components. In fact, the trend was for symptom constructs to load most 
highly on the first component, though this was not significant (see Table 5). The lack of constructs 
loading highly on the third component suggests a lack of possible complexity in participants’ 
construct systems for mind-body identity (Bell, 2004a). 
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Table 5: Observed and expected values for symptom and non-symptom constructs correlating most 
highly with each component, and overall test statistics for chi-squared analysis. 
  Component which construct correlated with most 
highly 
 
Construct-type  Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Total 
Symptom 
Construct 
Observed 
Number 
17 3 0 20 
Expected 
Number 
14.4 4.6 1  
Non-symptom 
constructs 
Observed 
Number 
170 57 13 240 
Expected 
Number 
172.6 55.4 12  
Total  187 60 13 260 
ᵪ₂ (2,20) = 2.21    p = .33  
The integration of the symptom construct might be accounted for by the symptom constructs having 
a significantly higher mean correlation with physical constructs (x ̄= .71) than with psychological 
constructs (x=̄ .62) (t(18)=2.99, p=.01). Another Chi-squared test looking at relative highest-
correlations of constructs categorized as ‘physical’, ‘psychological’ and ‘MUS’ additionally showed 
that the number of physical constructs correlating most highly with the first component was higher 
than expected. The number of psychological constructs loading on the second and third components 
was greater than expected also. However, the overall test value was not significant (ᵪ₂ (4,20)= 6.09, 
p= .19). 
1B: Intensity of the symptom construct within the mind-body construct systemA Jonckheere-Terpstra 
test for ordered alternatives indicated a significant trend of increased median intensity for symptom 
constructs (Mdn=.71, IQR= .11) over physical (Mdn= .68, IQR= .19) and psychological (Mdn = .64, 
IQR= .23) constructs (TJT= 10881, z= 2.042, p= .04). There was a borderline-significant (one-tailed) 
negative correlation between symptom construct intensity (M= .69, SD=.10) and PHQ-9 scores 
(r(19)= -.40, p= .07). A U-shaped relationship between intensity and PHQ-9 did not add significant 
explanatory value over a linear relationship (ΔF= 1.17, p= .29). A borderline-significant negative 
correlation was found with GAD-7 scores (r= -.39, p= .051). A curvilinear relationship between 
symptom intensity and GAD-7 scores was also borderline-significant (r= -.36, p=.054); however, this 
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U-shaped relationship did not add significant predictive value to the linear relationship GAD-7 scores 
and symptom intensity (ΔF= 1.31, p= .29). 
1C: Distance between the current self and the self when symptoms are worst 
The distance between the current self and the self when symptoms are worst was less than 0.6 for 
three participants, indicating that the construed the elements as being similar to one another. One 
of these participants construed these elements as being very similar (0.2). Only one participant 
might be considered to dissociate the self when symptoms are worst from their current self, with a 
distance greater than 1.2 (1.25). After removing the latter participant as an extreme outlier, a 
significant (one-tailed) negative correlation was found between the distance between the current 
self and the self when symptoms are worst (M= .77, SD= .25), and PHQ-9 scores (r(19)= -.48, p=.02) 
(Appendix Fi). A borderline-significant negative correlation was found between the distance 
between the current self and the self when symptoms are worst and GAD-7 scores (r(19)= -.36, p= 
.06) (Appendix Fii). No significant correlation was found between MYMOP score and the distance 
between these two elements (r= .24, p= .47).  
2. Hypotheses relating to distances between elements relating to the self 
2A: Distance between current self and ideal self  
The mean distance between the current self and the ideal self (M=1.15, SD = .19) was close to the 
value of 1.2, indicating that they were generally regarded as being dissimilar. Discrepancies did not 
positively correlate with scores on the PHQ-9 to a significant degree (one-tailed) (r= .24 p= .16). 
However, distances between the current self and the ideal self were significantly positively 
correlated with GAD-7 scores (r(20)= .39, p= .05, one-tailed) (Appendix G).  
2B: Distance between the current self and the self before symptoms 
A borderline-significant positive correlation was found between the distance between the current 
self and the self before symptoms (M= .91, SD = .29) and MYMOP-2 scores (r= .32, p= .08). No 
significant correlations were found between the distance between the current self and the self 
before symptoms and scores on the PHQ-9 (r= .08, p= .36) or GAD-7 (r= -.15, p= .26). 
2C: Distance between self before symptoms and the ideal self 
The distance between the self before symptoms and the ideal self (M= .43, SD= .26) was significantly  
positively correlated with GAD-7 scores (r(20)= .55, p= .01) (Appendix H), and positively correlated 
with PHQ-9 scores at borderline (one-tailed) significance (r(19) = .37, p=.06).  
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2D: The difference between the distance between the current self and the ideal self, minus the 
distance between the self as currently seen by others and the self as ideally seen by others. 
As the differences between the distance between the current self and the ideal self, minus the 
distance between the self as currently seen by others and the self as ideally seen by others, was not 
normally distributed, a Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test was used. The distance between the self as 
currently seen by others and the self as ideally seen by others (Mdn = .73, IQR= .41) was significantly 
lower than the discrepancy between the current self and the ideal self (Mdn= 1.25) (Z= .37, p= 
<.001). 
A one-way within-subjects ANOVA showed significant differences between means for different 
discrepancies between aspects of self (Greenhouse-Geisser correction, F(3, 38.56) = 7.98, p=.001, 
n2= .30). This result was accounted for by the mean distance between the current self and the ideal 
self being significantly greater (M= 1.15) than the mean distance between the current self and the 
self when symptoms are worst (M= .77, SD= .25), the mean distance between the current self and 
the self before symptoms (M= .97, SD= .23) and the distance between the self and the self as seen 
by others (M= .97, SD= .23).  
2E: Distance between the ideal self and the self as ideally seen by others 
The distance between the ideal self and the self as ideally seen by others (M= .32, SD= .22) was 
positively correlated with PHQ-9 scores (r(20)= .53, p= .02) (two-tailed) (Appendix I), and was 
positively correlated with the GAD-7 at borderline (two-tailed) significance (r(20)=.36, p= .07). No 
significant correlation was found for the distance between ideals and MYMOP scores (r(20) = .11, 
p=.66, two-tailed).  
Hypothesis 3: Implicative dilemmas and conflict pertaining to constructs and elements 
Less than half of the sample (n=8) had implicative dilemmas in their grids. Four participants had IDs 
exclusively relating to movement from the self as currently seen by others to the self as ideally seen 
by others. One participant had implicative dilemmas exclusively relating to movement from the 
current-self to the ideal-self. Three participants had both forms of implicative dilemmas in their grids 
(Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Distribution of implicative dilemma types  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3A: Relationship between Implicative dilemmas and outcome measures 
Due to the high number of participants with matched scores of zero, Kendall’s Tau was used to test 
association with clinical variables (Field, 2009; Hull & Jenkins, 1970). No significant relationships 
were found between the number of IDs associated with movement from the current self towards 
the ideal-self and PHQ-9 (τb= -.21, p=.13, one-tailed) or the GAD-7 (τb= -.14, p=.14, one-tailed), and a 
borderline-significant negative relationship was found between number of IDs and MYMOP profile 
scores (τb= -.26 p=.09, two-tailed). With regards to IDs associated with movement from the self as 
currently seen by others to the self as ideally seen by others, no significant (one-tailed) associations 
were found between number of IDs and scores on GAD-7 (τb= .01, p= .49) or MYMOP (τb= .10, p=.29). 
A borderline significant association was found between PHQ-9 score and the number of IDs 
associated with the movement towards the self as ideally seen (τb= .22, p=.09).  As IDs would be 
expected to be associated with chronicity of symptoms, further Kendall’s Tau tests were conducted 
to explore relationships between duration of symptoms and number of IDs. No significant 
relationships were found between number of IDs associated with movement towards the ideal self 
(τb= -.11, p=.27) and duration of MUS. The number of IDs associated with movement towards the 
self as ideally seen by others was positively associated with duration of symptoms at borderline 
(one-tailed) significance (τb= .23, p=.09). 
3B: Number of IDs associated with movement towards the ideal self relative to number of IDs related 
to movement towards the self as ideally seen by others. 
Due to the asymmetry of differences between IDs associated with movement from the current self 
to the ideal self, and IDs between the self as currently seen by others and the self as ideally seen by 
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others, a paired-samples Sign-Test was used to compare the distributions of IDs. The sign-test did 
not find a significant difference between the distribution of the two types of IDs (two-tailed p= 1.00).  
3C: Content analysis of implicative dilemmas: 
Sentence-form descriptions of main IDs for each participant are provided in Appendix J, along with 
metaphorical interpretations of mind-body construct associations made by the author. Each 
construct was allocated to the categories of the Category System for Personal Constructs system 
(CPSC) (Feixas, Geldschlager & Neimeyer, 2002), including physical constructs that correlated highly 
(>0.6) with psychological constructs belonging to a particular CSPC category. The test indicated 
significant differences in CSPC categorization of congruent constructs involved in IDs (i.e. current self 
and either ideal self or self as ideally seen by others are rated as being at the same end of a desirable 
construct-pole) compared to what would be expected from CPSC categorization of all psychological 
constructs (Table 6) (ᵪ₂ (5,20)= 13.305, p=.021, 2-tailed).  The observed number of cases was 
notably greater than expected for congruent constructs classified as ‘moral’ and in particular 
‘relational’ (Figure 6) 
Figure 6: Bar-chart showing distribution of congruent constructs in IDs across CSPC categories 
Using the reverse process described above to physically classify congruent psychological constructs 
in IDs that correlated highly with physical constructs, another chi-squared test of the number of 
observed versus expected number of congruent physical constructs falling under different physical 
categories was conducted. The overall statistic was significant (ᵪ₂ (6, 162)= 20.552, p=.015). Of the 
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15 physically categorised congruent constructs, 3 were related to gender (expected count for this 
category was 0.5). Strength, Age and health function all had more congruent constructs than 
expected (Table 7 and Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Bar chart of different physical categories of ID constructs 
Table 6: Observed versus expected numbers of constructs within different CSPC categorizations for 
congruent constructs (current self and ideal self/self as ideally seen by others are rated as being at 
the same pole of a desirable construct). 
CPSC 
Categorization 
 Congruent ID constructs All psychological constructs 
Moral Observed 3 6 
Expected 0.9 8.1 
Emotional Observed 1 38 
Expected 3.8 35.2 
Relational Observed 10 55 
Expected 6.3 58.7 
Personal Observed 1 14 
Expected 1.5 13.5 
Operational Observed 0 19 
Expected 1.9 17.1 
Values & 
Interests 
Observed 0 6 
Expected 0.7 6.3 
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Table 7: observed versus expected numbers of constructs within different physical categorizations for 
congruent constructs (current self and ideal self/self as ideally seen by others are rated as being at 
the same end of a desirable construct-pole). 
Physical Construct 
Categorization 
 Congruent ID constructs All psychological constructs 
Emotions (in body) Observed 0 7 
Expected 0.6 6.4 
Aesthetic Observed 0 13 
Expected 1.2 11.8 
Weight Observed 0 6 
Expected 0.6 5.4 
Strength Observed 3 24 
Expected 2.5 24.5 
Height Observed 0 5 
Expected 0.5 4.5 
Age Observed 1 4 
Expected 0.5 4.5 
Dynamism/Energy Observed 4 39 
Expected 4 39 
Health function Observed 4 35 
Expected 3.6 35.4 
Attitude towards 
body 
Observed 0 12 
Expected 1.1 10.9 
Gender/Sex Observed 3 2 
Expected 0.5 4.5 
 
Symptom constructs were no more likely to be involved in IDs (either congruently or incongruently) 
than would be expected from distributions of psychological or physical constructs in IDs (ᵪ₂(2, 26)= 
4.95, p= .084). Symptom constructs were rated as incongruent (i.e. a desired movement in symptom 
towards ideals would be dilemmatic) for four of the nine participants with IDs. Of these, two 
participants construed being symptomatic as desirable (indeed their ideal self as seen by others was 
more symptomatic than how they were currently seen), which presented a dilemma in movement 
towards desired physical and psychological changes in how they were seen by others (participants 1 
and 2) that would entail being seen as less symptomatic. Two other participants (3 and 14) appeared 
to wish to be seen as immobile and inactive by others. However, for participant 14, being seen this 
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way was implicitly construed as involving undesirable changes to how she is seen by others, such as 
being seen as attention-seeking, unpleasant, and whingey.   
 
3D: Differences in the percentage of triangular inequality conflicts attributed to the current self 
minus the percentage of triangular inequality conflicts attributed to the self before symptoms. 
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA found significant differences between the percentage conflict 
accounted for by various self-related elements (F(5, 95)= 8.54, p<.001). A paired t-test found that the 
differences between mean percent conflict accounted for by the current self (M= 6.92, SD =2.13) 
and the self before symptoms (M= 7.21, SD= 2.95) was not significant (t(19,2)=.34, p= .74).  
Notably, as can be seen from Figure 8, the mean percent conflict accounted for by the ideal self 
(M=9.25, Sd= 1.95) was considerably greater than that for the current self and the self as seen by 
others (M=6.34, Sd= 2.19), but is close to the percent of conflict accounted for by the self when 
symptoms are worst (M=10.53, SE= 2.06). 
 
Figure 8: Percentage of triangular inequality conflicts attributed to self-related elements. 
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4. Additional explorations 
Hierarchical regression analyses 
Table 8: Summary of hierarchical regression analyses 
Dependent 
Variable 
Block Independent 
Variable 
Pearson r (with 
all IVs) 
ΔR2 ΔF Sig. ΔF 
PHQ-9 1 Distance between 
current self and self 
when symptoms 
are worst 
-.44** .145 4.21 .06 
2 Difference between 
distance between 
current self and 
ideal self, and 
current self as seen 
by others, and ideal 
self as seen by 
others 
.49** .311 5.28 .03 
3 [ideal-self] – 
[ideally-seen-as] 
discrepancy 
.43** .34 4.20 .21 
GAD-7 1 Distance between 
pre symptom self 
and current self 
-.55** .30 7.61 .01 
2 Distance between 
current self and self 
when symptoms 
are worst 
-.36* .16 5.03 .04 
3 Distance between 
current self and 
ideal self 
.39 .00 0.06 .81 
      
Significance level: * p≤ .10   ** p≤.05 
 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to explore the relative predictive value of 
indices correlating with the PHQ-9 and the GAD-7 respectively. For the GAD-7, (i) distance between 
self before symptoms and ideal self (ii) distance between current self and self when symptoms are 
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worst; and (iii) distance between current self and ideal self were entered into separate blocks (Table 
8). This resulted in the distance between the current self and the ideal self no longer adding 
significant predictive value of GAD-7 scores (ΔF=.06, p=.81). A model which included both (ii) and (iii) 
had the highest predictive value of GAD-7 scores (F(2, 19)= 7.17, p<.01) (Figure 9). The variables (i) 
distance between current self and self when symptoms are worst (ii) differences between the 
distance between the current self and the ideal self, and the current self as seen by other and the 
self as ideally seen by others; and (iii) ideal self vs self as ideally seen by others discrepancy, were 
entered into separate blocks for the PHQ-9. With all variables entered, variable (iii) no longer added 
predictive value (ΔF= 4.20, p= .21), whereas variables (i) (ΔF= 4.21, p= .06) and (ii) (ΔF= 5.28, p= .03) 
retained significant predictive value of PHQ-9 score. A combined model of (i) and (ii) was most 
significantly predictive of PHQ-9 score (F(2,19)= 5.28, p=.02) (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 9: dual-axis chart showing linear relationships between GAD-7 scores and (i) distance between 
the current self and the self when symptoms are worst; and (ii) distance between the self before 
symptoms and the ideal self. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dual axis scatter plot of relationship between GAD-7 score and (i) distance between current self 
and self when symptoms are worst; and (ii) distance between ideal self and self before symptoms 
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Figure 10: Dual-axis chart displaying linear relationships between PHQ-9 and (i) distance between 
current self and self when symptoms are worst; and (ii) difference between the distance between the 
current self and the ideal self, minus the distance between the self as currently seen and the self as 
ideally seen by others: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional explorations of constructs 
Physical constructs which either accounted to the highest level of conflict, or were involved in an ID, 
were classified psychologically using the CPSC system according to the psychological construct which 
they correlated most strongly with. The reverse process was used to physically classify any remaining 
psychological constructs that accounted for the triangular conflict percentages, or were involved in 
implicative dilemmas (see Figure 11). 
 
 
 
Dual axis scatter plot of relationship between PHQ-9 score and (i) distance between current self and 
self when symptoms are worst; and (ii) difference between the distance between the current self and 
ideal self, minus the distance between self as currently seen and self as ideally seen by others 
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Figure 11: Mind-body scatter plot of interrelationships between physical and psychological constructs 
that were involved in implicative dilemmas, or had the highest level of % conflict in grids. 
 
Physical categories of strength (weak/strong, powerful, fragility) and dynamism (i.e. energy, ability 
to move) are the broadest physical categories within mind-body space. Strength is interestingly 
associated with moral and personal psychological characteristics. Constructs relating to the 
gendered body are mapped closely with ‘moral’ and ‘relational’ constructs. The broadest 
psychological categories represented in the space are ‘relational’ and ‘emotional’ constructs, which 
seem to relate with a number of constructs of the physical body. 
 
As reported above, congruent constructs involved in IDs were more likely to be classified as 
‘relational’ or ‘moral’ in nature than would be expected based on distributions of all constructs. 
Another chi-squared test revealed that these constructs were also more likely to correlate most 
highly with components 2 and 3 (ᵪ₂(2, 260)= 11.74, p<.01) than other constructs (Table 9)  indicating 
that they were not integrated well within the mind-body construct system. 
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Table 9: Observed versus expected number of ID congruent constructs correlating most highly with 
the three largest components, relative to other constructs not involved in IDs. 
  Component which construct correlated with most 
highly 
Total: 260 
Construct-type  Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Total 
Implicative 
Dilemma (ID) 
congruent 
construct 
Observed  6 6 3 15 
Expected  10.9 3.3 0.8  
Other  Observed  183 52 10 245 
Expected  178.1 54.7 12.3  
 
The researcher noticed that the variants of the physical construct ‘strong-weak’ occurred frequently 
in participants’ grids. As can be seen in Figure 11, ‘strength’ constitutes a broad category for the 
conflicted and dilemmatic aspects of mind-body identity. When it came to the ratings procedure, 
many participants asked for clarification of whether the ‘strong-weak’ construct had been one which 
they had provided as a physical one or a mental one. The researcher reminded them but also asked 
how their ratings might have changed if the ‘strong-weak’ construct had been psychological. All 
participants answering this question said that they viewed themselves ‘mentally strong, but 
physically weak’, so the ratings would have been very different. The researcher noticed that these 
participants frequently used psychological constructs that reflecting the importance of ‘psychological 
strength’, such as ‘determined-lazy’, ‘positive-negative’ and ‘resilient-frail’.  
 
The salience of the ‘strong-weak’ construct within the mind-body system prompted further 
exploration of these constructs.  Constructs were classified as ‘strong-weak’ constructs when they 
were physical constructs relating to strength, and psychological constructs relating to ‘positivity’ or 
‘determination’. Constructs relating to being ‘caring for others’, such as ‘caring-selfish’ and 
‘empathic-insensitive’ and ‘responsible-irresponsible’ were also identified. Comparisons between 
construct groups using the Kruskal-Wallis H test revealed significant differences between the median 
intensity of the ‘sensitivity to others’ constructs (N=25, Mdn= .41), which was lower than intensity of 
‘strong-weak’ (N=36, Mdn= .71) and all other constructs (N=199, Mdn= .68) (χ2(2)= 33.09, p<.001). A 
chi-squared test confirmed that the ‘sensitive to others’ constructs were more likely than expected 
to correlate most highly with components 2 and 3 in PCA (χ2(4, 260)= 38.70, p<.001) (Table 10), 
which is unsurprising given 15/25 of these constructs were involved in IDs.  No between-groups 
differences were found for the percentage of triangular-inequality conflicts (χ2(2)= 3.86, p=.15).  
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Table 10: Observed versus expected numbers of strong-weak and sensitive-to-others constructs 
correlating most highly with the three largest components, relative to other constructs. 
 
  Component which construct correlated with 
most highly 
Total: 260 
Construct-type  Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Total 
Strong-weak Observed  32 4 0  
Expected  26.2 8 1.8 36 
Sensitive to 
others 
Observed  6 17 2  
Expected  18.2 5.6 1.3 25 
Other Observed 151 37 11  
Expected 144.7 44.4 10 199 
 
Sub-groupings within the sample 
Although no overall difference in conflict scores for construct types was found, it appeared that for 
some participants, the strong-weak constructs were particularly conflicted or complex (they 
accounted for the highest percentage of triangular inequality conflicts for three participants, and 
were involved in an ID for another) (Figure 12). There appeared to be an approximate pattern in the 
characteristics of strong-weak and sensitive-to-others constructs that invited sub-grouping of 
participants (Figure 13). A table of self-related element characterizations for the different subgroups 
(according to the single construct correlating most highly with each element) is provided in Appendix 
K, providing further qualitative evidence for these construing patterns. The subgroups were: 
 
1. ‘Sensitive to others’ (n=6): larger proportion of poorly-integrated ‘sensitive to others’ constructs 
over ‘strong-weak’, high percentage conflict for ‘sensitive to others’ constructs. 
 
2. ‘Strong identity’ (n=6): larger proportion of ‘strong-weak’ constructs, which account for increased 
percentage of conflict in grids. ‘Sensitive to others’ constructs integrated and low in percent conflict 
accounted for 
 
3. ‘Mixed’/intermediate group: both ‘strong-weak’ and poorly-integrated ‘sensitive to others’ 
constructs present and with some degree of percentage of triangular inequality conflicts attributed 
to them. 
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Figure 12: scatter plots with interpolation lines, showing intensity and % triangular inequality conflict 
attributed to strong-weak and sensitivity constructs for each subgroup.  
 
Figure 13: number of strong-weak, sensitivity and other constructs for each subgroup 
Construct type 
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A one-way ANOVA found a significant between-subjects effect of subgroup on the percentage of 
conflict attributed to the self when symptoms are worst (F(2,19)= 6.91, p<.01)(Figure 14), and 
borderline-significant between-subjects effect on percentage conflict attributed to the self before 
symptoms (F(2,19)=2.94, p=.08). A borderline-significant between subjects effect was found for 
difference between percent conflict attributed to the current self, minus the conflict attributed to 
the self before symptoms (F(2, 19)= 3.15, p=.069). 
 
Figure 14: Distributions of triangular-inequality conflicts attributed to self when symptoms are worst, 
by subgroup 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explorations of the ‘percent sum squares’, a measure of the amount of variance in grids accounted 
for by each element in the grid (i.e. the salience or amount of meaning that element has in the grid), 
indicated a significant between-subgroups effect in the difference in percent sum squares for the 
current self, minus the percent sum squares for the self before symptoms (Kruskal-Wallis, χ2(2)=6.71, 
p=.035). The ‘strong-weak’ subgroup had lower percent sum squares of the current self relative t to 
the self before symptoms (Mdn diff = -32), and the ‘sensitive’ (Mdn diff = +43) and ‘mixed’ (Mdn diff 
= 34) subgroups showed gains in percent sum squares for the self as the result of symptoms. 
 
 
 
 
Hypothetical subgroup 
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Figure 15: Boxplot of distributions of percent sum of squares for current self minus pre symptom self 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA also found a significant between-subjects effect of subgroup on the difference 
between distance between the self and the ideal self, and the distance between the self as seen by 
others and the self as ideally seen by others (F(2,18) = 5.32, p= .02). The difference was greater for 
the ‘mixed’ subgroup (M= .50, SD = .17) than for the ‘strong-weak’ (M= .26, SD= .17) and ‘sensitive’ 
(M= .24, SD= 1.50) groups (see Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16: Box plot of differences between distance between current self and ideal self, and distance 
between self as seen by others and self as ideally seen by others for each subgroup.  
A Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered alternatives indicated a significant trend of increased median 
number of IDs associated with movement from the self as currently seen by others towards the self 
as ideally seen as by others (sensitive-to-others>mixed>strong-weak) (TJT= 27.5, z= -3.02, p<.01). A 
Hypothetical subgroup 
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test of the same ordered alternatives was not significant for IDs defined by movement from the 
current self towards the ideal self (TJT= 48, z= -1.65, p<.01). it was expected that the distance 
between the ideal self and the self as ideally seen would increase in the order strong-weak < mixed < 
sensitive to others. However, although this trend was found a Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered 
alternatives reported this trend was only borderline-significant (TJT= 41, z= -1.73, p = .08). 
 
Interactive factors between subgroups and variables 
Although the size of each subgroup was too small to conduct meaningful correlational analyses, 
interactions between the grid variables on which the subgroups significantly differed, PHQ-9, GAD-7 
and MYMOP-2 scores were explored on scatter-plots. The following notable features were observed 
that deviated from previously-observed overall effects of variables: 
 
• Increased triangular inequality conflicts associated with the self when symptoms are worst 
had a stronger positive correlation with increased MYMOP profile scores for the strong-weak 
group in particular. Increased conflict for this element seemed to correlate better with 
increased GAD-7 anxiety scores for the sensitive-to-others and mixed groups than for the 
strong-weak group (Appendix L). 
• Increased distance between current-self and self when symptoms are worst was correlated 
with increased GAD-7 anxiety scores for the sensitive group, but decreased GAD-7 anxiety 
scores for the mixed group and the strong-weak groups (Appendix M).  
• With increased difference between the distance between the current self and the ideal self, 
and distances between the self as currently seen and the self as ideally seen by others, GAD-
7 scores increase for the sensitive-to-other and mixed groups in particular (Appendix N). For 
the strong-weak group, increased differences are found with decreasing MYMOP symptom 
scores, whereas the opposite trend is found for the sensitive-to-others group. 
• For the strong-weak and mixed subgroups, increased symptoms are associated with 
reduction in percent sum squares from the self before symptoms to the current self, which is 
positively associated with PHQ-9 scores (Appendix Oi). Conversely, gains in percent sum 
squares from the self before symptoms to the current self are associated with decreased 
PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores for the sensitive-to-others and mixed groups (Appendix Oii).  
• The strong-weak group had a slightly larger Percentage of Variance Accounted for by the 
First Factor (PVAFF) (M=62.11, SD= 16.17) than the sensitive-to-others group (M = 54.10, SD 
= 7.02) and the mixed group (M=53.36, SD = 7.27), but the overall between-subjects effect 
was not significant (F(2,19)= 1.33, p= .29). 
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Table 11: Summary of key findings 
Variable Whole-group findings Subgroup differences 
Constructs Symptom constructs: Tended to be integrated with main 
construct system. Tended to be more correlated with 
physical constructs.  
 
Constructs were found representing ‘sensitivity to 
others’ (being empathic/not-selfish/responsible), 
correlating most highly with less integrated construct 
subsystems. 
 
Constructs were identified representing ‘strong-weak’ 
poles, with psychological (e.g. ‘positive’, ‘determined’) 
and physical (e.g. ‘weak’, ‘frail’) variants – correlating 
most highly with the primary construct component 
‘Strong-weak’ subgroup had an 
increased salience and level of 
conflict/complexity for ‘strong-
weak’ type constructs. 
 
‘Sensitive-to-others’ subgroup had 
less well integrated constructs of a 
relational and moral nature 
(‘sensitive’). 
 
‘Mixed’ subgroup had both strong-
weak and ‘sensitive to other’ 
constructs, with equal amounts of 
construct conflict/complexity. 
Implicative Dilemmas (IDs) IDs were associated with movement from current self 
towards ideal self and also towards self as ideally seen by 
others. 
  
Content analysis of congruent constructs in dilemmas 
showed a high proportion of ‘relational’ and ‘moral’ 
constructs. A congruent physical construct was being 
‘female’. These constructs were likely to be loaded on 
more peripheral construct subsystems than other 
constructs. 
For IDs relating to movement 
towards the ideally-seen-self, the 
trend of number of IDs across 
subgroups was Sensitive-to-
others>mixed>strong-weak 
  
  
  
Element properties The element self when symptoms are worst seemed to 
have particular salience in grids. Percentage of 
triangular-inequality conflicts was higher for this element 
than for other self-related elements.  
  
Percentage conflict associated with 
Self when symptoms are worst 
increased with MYMOP severity for 
the strong-weak group. Increased 
GAD-7 scores were associated with 
increased percent conflict 
attributed to self when symptoms 
are worst for the sensitive-to-other 
and mixed groups. 
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Percent sum squares (salience, or amount of variance in 
grid ratings) of current-self relative to pre-symptom self: 
no overall main effects. 
Reduction in percent sum squares 
for the current self relative to the 
self before symptoms more likely 
for the strong-weak group, 
associated with increased 
symptom-scores and depression 
scores. 
 
Gains in sum squares from self 
before symptoms to current self 
more likely for sensitive-to-other 
and mixed groups - related to 
decreased depression and anxiety 
scores. 
Distances between 
elements 
The distance between the current-self and the self when 
symptoms are worst was a major predictor of depression 
and anxiety scores, correlating negatively with both. 
  
  
 Increased distance between 
current self and self when 
symptoms are worst associated 
with increased GAD-7 anxiety 
scores for the sensitive group, but 
with decreased GAD-7 anxiety 
scores for the mixed group and the 
strong-weak groups.  The distance between the self before symptoms and the 
ideal self was positively correlated with depression 
symptoms. 
Discrepancies between self 
and aspects of self as seen 
by others 
Difference between the distance between the current 
self and the ideal self, and the distance between the self 
as currently seen by others and the self ideally seen by 
others, correlated positively with depression. 
Difference between the two 
decreases with higher symptom 
severity for the strong-weak group, 
but increases with symptom scores 
for the sensitive-to-others group, 
with increased anxiety for the latter 
group. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Integration of symptoms and the symptomatic self in mind-body construct systems 
In the mind-body grid, the construct relating to the symptom was well integrated and possibly 
superordinate (more so than physical and psychological constructs). It also correlated significantly 
more with physical constructs than psychological constructs. Integration of the symptom construct 
correlated negatively with anxiety, which is expected because increased integration means that 
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more predictions can be made about mind-body identity for self and others using the symptom-
construct (Metcalfe, 1997). The author’s hypothesized U-shaped relationship between symptom 
intensity and anxiety was found to be significant. If symptoms are seen to relate to every aspect of 
mind-body identity, then that person will see a great deal of identity as being enmeshed (Morley & 
Pincus, 2001; Morley, 2010) with that symptom. Overall, a linear relationship proved to be better at 
predicting anxiety over the curvilinear model.   
This study also looked at the integration of symptoms within mind-body identity by comparing how 
participants construed themselves generally to how they construed themselves when their 
symptoms were worst. The self when symptoms are worst was a particularly important element in 
grids, and often isolated from other elements, introducing more complexity and challenges to 
coherence of the construct system than any other self-related elements. The discrepancy between 
the self generally, and the self when symptoms are at their worst  was a key factor in predicting 
levels of psychological distress. For the sample as a whole, anxiety and depression symptoms 
decreased with increasing levels of perceived dissimilarity between the self in general and the self 
when symptoms are worst. The fact that this discrepancy did not significantly correlate with 
symptom-severity scores suggests that it is the different ways in which self and self when symptoms 
are worst are constructed that alleviates anxiety and depression, rather than absolute difference 
made by symptoms. If a number of undesirable characteristics are enmeshed with symptoms, 
construing these negative differences as residing more in the self when symptoms are worst than 
the self in general may serve to protect from construing the self as having globally changed in 
undesirable ways (Hellstroem, 2001). Extreme dissociation could be envisaged as being distressing 
also if the self with worst symptoms is considered to be ‘a different person’. However, this form of 
dissociation between self and self when symptoms are worst alleviated anxiety in a linear fashion. 
Discrepancies from ideals 
Many participants saw themselves as being dissimilar from the person who they would like to be, 
which was positively correlated with anxiety rather than depression (as self-discrepancy theory 
would predict, Higgins, 1987). Although participants construed themselves as further from their 
ideal self as the result of MUS, for many participants there was still a discrepancy between the self 
and the ideal self before they began to experience MUS. This latter discrepancy positively correlated 
with anxiety with stronger predictive effect than the discrepancy between the current self and the 
ideal self. This finding would seem to support findings that people with MUS may have high and 
difficult-to-achieve standards for themselves before experiencing symptoms (Ayats, Martin & Soler, 
2006; Compan et al, 2011; Hallberg & Carlsson, 2011), rather than increased distance between self 
and ideals due to MUS being a primary factor relating to psychological distress. 
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As expected, the discrepancy between the current self and the ideal self was greater than the 
discrepancy between the self as seen by others and the self as ideally seen by others. This might be 
taken as evidence of ‘subversion’ (Miles et al., 2005) and processes whereby people try to maintain 
their public identity by avoiding social situations when symptomatic, or by ‘pushing through 
symptoms’ to maintain a public identity (Clarke & James, 2003; Hellstroem, 2001; Kindermans et al., 
2011). Increased difference between these perceived discrepancies was associated with increased 
depression symptoms, even after factoring in additional predictors of depression. The fact that the 
difference in discrepancies had greater explanatory power for depression symptoms than the 
discrepancy between the respective ideals (i.e. ideal self and self as ideally seen by others) suggests 
that increased depression scores may not be related specifically to experiencing guilt about having 
different and possibly conflicting ideals. Rather, it could reflect more of a sense of hopelessness 
about achieving both sets of ideals (whether overlapping or distinct) whilst also experiencing 
symptoms.  
Implicative dilemmas 
The above interpretation of emotional (and physical) burnout from striving to achieve ideals for both 
the self and the self as seen by others relates to the finding that the congruent constructs in 
Implicative Dilemmas were more likely to be classified as being ‘moral’ or ‘relational’ using the 
Classification System for Personal Constructs (Feixas et al., 2002). This repeats findings by Compan et 
al. (2010), Benasayag et al. (2004) and Drysdale (1989), that chronic symptoms can be associated 
with desirable relational qualities involving ‘sensitivity to others’ (Drysdale, 1989) and moral 
characteristics such as being responsible and altruistic (Compan et al., 2010). Movement towards 
having desired physical traits (including symptom reduction) tended to be associated with 
undesirable changes to a current attribute of a moral or relational nature. Further exploration 
revealed that these constructs were more likely to correlate most highly with peripheral 
components than with the largest construct subsystem, indicating that these aspects of identity may 
be poorly elaborated and understood in relation to wider body-mind identity. Constructs relating to 
being female had a positive association with some of the moral and relational aspects of identity, 
but also with less desirable physical traits. This provides some, albeit limited, evidence for Lilleas & 
Von Der Fehr’s (2011) suggestion that the female body may implicitly be associated with constructs 
relating to being available for others, based on research with women with fibromyalgia. The fact that 
the congruent construct correlated most highly with a different component to the symptom 
construct for all participants with dilemmas further suggests that these aspects of identity may not 
be well elaborated and integrated with symptoms (hence they are in conflict) (Fogel, 2013; 
Nakazawa, 2013). The subgroups that experienced dilemmas also tended to increased elaboration of 
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self as a result of experiencing MUS, suggesting that they are elaborating parts of their identity 
through their physical, symptomatic body (these participants typically characterized themselves 
most highly with physical health or symptom-based constructs) (Obissier, 2006; Sommer Anderson 
et al., 2013; Turk & Gatchel, 2013, p.96). This relates closely to the role of ‘embodied’ construing and 
the emergence of metaphors for construing the self through the physical body (Centomo & Del 
Rizzo, 2016). Indeed, for some of the implicative dilemmas, particularly those involving relational 
constructs, the author has interpreted some metaphorical mind-body links in the dilemmas 
presented (Appendix J). 
‘Strong’ and ‘sensitive’ constructs 
As mentioned above, the exploration of IDs revealed positive constructions of the current self as 
‘sensitive to others’ and ‘responsible’. However, the researcher also noted that some participants 
used several highly overlapping constructs associated with physical and mental qualities of strength 
or weakness (e.g. muscular-weak, powerful-passive, optimistic-pessimistic, strong-weak, fragile-
stable). When the associations between the most conflictual physical and psychological constructs 
were mapped out along with constructs involved in implicative dilemmas, the physical category of 
‘strength’ wove together a broad number of psychological and physical aspects of identity, 
confirming the importance of this aspect of identity. These constructs resembled those related to 
being ‘copers’ found with participants experiencing chronic pain (Large & Strong, 1996), or 
narratives of having ‘emotional strength’ and ‘positive attitudes’ (Werner et al., 2004). These latter 
constructs were likely to correlate most highly with the principal construct subsystem for construing 
self and others, but were also the constructs accounting the highest percentage of triangular 
conflicts (i.e. they add complexity and inconsistency which may threaten to invalidate the coherence 
of the overall construct system) for some participants. Exploring the properties and patterns in 
construing of these ‘strength-based’ constructs compared to those relating to ‘sensitivity to others’ 
suggested a possible subgrouping of the participants. 
Subgroup characterisations 
The subgroups were initially classified by the relative properties of constructs relating to strength 
and constructs relating to ‘sensitivity to others’. Although presented here as distinct groups, they 
might be considered as being on more of a continuum between self-constructions based on ‘being 
strong’ on one pole, and self-constructions relating to ‘being there for others’ on the other pole. 
1. Strength based identity 
These participants had relatively higher amounts of constructs relating to physical and mental 
strength or weakness in their grids, and fewer constructs relating to being sensitive to others. These 
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strength-based constructs correlated most highly with the largest principal component, having a 
high degree of correlations with other constructs, suggesting that they are superordinate for these 
participants. They also had the highest level of percentage conflict, suggesting that these constructs 
related to strength are complex and contain inconsistencies. 
The current-self was characterized by such terms as ‘weak’, ‘incapacitated’ and ‘gives up too easily’. 
This contrasts with the pre-symptom self, which is most characterized with constructs such as 
‘resilient’ ‘positive’ and ‘strong’. The ideal-self is characterized similarly to the pre-symptom self. The 
amount of conflict associated with the self when symptoms are worst was associated with 
depression more than anxiety. The valued activities that are affected for this group were typically 
exercising and working. These goals tended to reflect a possible higher level of functioning for this 
group. However, this does not mean that this subgroup were any less distressed by their MUS. 
Most importantly perhaps is the reduction in the elaboration of the current self in these participants’ 
construct systems relative to their pre-symptom selves. Increased loss of meaning of the current 
self, relative to the pre-symptom self is associated with increased depression scores. It seems that 
these participants may be struggling to find meaning for a symptomatic self that is no longer 
construed as ‘strong’, but is not completely ‘weak’ either. The current self also has fewer percentage 
conflicts than the pre-symptom self, which in this case might be interpreted as a loss of complexity 
in how the self is construed. As symptom severity increases, the difference between current self and 
ideal self, and self as seen by others and self as ideally seen by others decreases, perhaps reflecting a 
process whereby both sets of ideals are canalized in meaning. Though not significantly different, the 
amount of variance accounted for by the largest component is slightly larger for this sample, 
perhaps suggesting constriction to a smaller and more predictable set of identity constructs. 
Construing from a simpler, monolithic construct system could be self-protective: whilst the self is 
construed less meaningfully than the pre-symptom self, the constriction which predominantly 
centers on ‘strength’ may prevent further changes and losses in how the self is viewed.  The 
prototypical form of this construing pattern might be construing the current self as ‘mentally strong’ 
but let down by a physically weak body. 
The profile resembles somewhat those of cancer survivors, who tend to construe their bodies using 
cognitively narrow, monolithic set of constructs relating to the functional and mechanical aspects of 
the body, a mechanism which may help during the emotional stress of treatment (Weber et al., 
2005; Turpin et al., 2009). In a similar way to those ‘fighting off’ an invasive terminal illness, these 
participants may construe themselves as being in a battle of wills against MUS. Aetiologically, one 
wonders if triggering events may have been those which threatened to invalidate the self-
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construction of ‘having strength’ (as a whole-person, mind-and-body level), such as serious illnesses, 
or physical injuries or traumas that have less of a relational component. The symptom may act as a 
‘somatic memory’ (Brown, 2006, 2009; Levine, 2010; Van Der Kolk, 2014) associated with such 
trauma, overshadowing the person with the potential possibility of being at the weak pole of the 
polarized strong-weak construct (Sermpezis, 2007).  
Illustrative case example 1: Strength-based identity 
 
This person experienced ‘consuming pain’ all over her body, the contrast pole of which was ‘free’.  
The valued activity that pain most interfered with was painting. This person was involved in full-time 
study at the time of the interview. As an indication of its superordinacy in her construct system, the 
first construct elicited in the interview was strong---weak, but another important construct appeared 
to be determined—gives up too easily. The gives up too easily pole most characterized both the 
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symptom as a person and the self when symptoms are worst. Notably, all people are close to the 
center of the plot of elements in construct space, indicating the relative salience of the disliked 
person but also the elaboration and isolation of the self when symptoms are worst. The current-self, 
though less elaborated than the self when symptoms are worst, is still isolated and seen in 
undesirable terms relative to many of the non-self elements, which occupy a quadrant opposite the 
current self. Notably the self as ideally seen by others is closer to these others (including the liked 
person) than the ideal self. The overall impression is that she wants to be seen as strong and may 
feel that by not being seen to be strong, she is ‘letting the side down’. Notably, there are moral and 
relational constructs of being ‘selfless’ and ‘protecting’, which are dissociated from the primary 
construct component with strong-weak at its core, though these do not form implicative dilemmas. 
An aspect of strength which is particularly interesting is the construct not caring what other people 
think versus cares too much what other people think. It would seem that caring too much what other 
people think is associated with weakness, and the self when symptoms are worst is the only element 
to score the highest rating on the caring too much what other people think pole. The liked person, 
the participant’s mother, is associated with qualities of confidence, which seems to also relate with 
not caring what other people think. ‘Good posture’ invites considerations about how she might have 
been encouraged to ‘stand strong’ and not show weakness. The fact that the self before symptoms 
is construed as identical to the ideal self suggests that she may be enmeshed with her symptom with 
regards to ‘weakness’. The disliked person provides a potentially threatening and invalidating 
element as they are construed as confident and not caring what other people think, just like mum, 
but with a logical, careless and selfish twist. One wonders if the participant was at the receiving end 
of this person’s less desirable form of ‘not caring about others’ in such a way that threatened the 
importance and value of being strong – indeed, the strong-weak construct for the participant 
accounted for the highest percentage of triangular inequality conflicts. Physically, being ‘well-kept’ 
characterises the ideal physical self, versus untidy. Given its position in the grid, this feels like a 
potential exception to the strong-weak ways of seeing themselves, tied in with a desire to be 
creative. Elaborating this aspect of their physical self further may demote the superordinate nature 
of the strong-weak construct system that isolates this participant from others and from their 
symptomatic self. The subgroup bears resemblance to the proposed ‘compulsive self-reliance’ A5-6 
attachment organizations proposed by Kozlowska (2007) and Kozlowska, Foley & Crittenden (2006), 
stemming from the phylogenetic ‘freeze’-response behavior to threatening situations. In a context 
where caregivers are experiencing their own unresolved loss or trauma, and may respond in a 
dismissive or disapproving way to the needs of the child (Adshead & Bluglass, 2001, 2005), the child 
learns to inhibit internal signals of need. Inhibiting needs may involve a preferential construing of 
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the self by the individual and by those around them as being ‘strong’, ‘independent’ and ‘coping’. 
Construing of situations tends to be based on higher order processing of temporally organized 
information rather than affective information relating to the ‘quality’ of information available from 
feeling states (Crittenden, 1995). When vulnerability of both an emotional or physical nature breaks 
through inhibition of negative affect, it may do so in a manner which is very sudden involving sudden 
loss of physical function (Crittenden, 2003). 
Sensitive to others 
This subgroup had relatively more constructs related to being ‘sensitive to others’ in their grids. 
While the number of constructs relating to strength was not lower than the aforementioned 
subgroup, strength-based constructs were not superordinate for this subgroup. In contrast to the 
‘strong’ group, this group had a more elaborated self with symptoms relative to the self before 
symptoms. The increase in elaboration was associated with reduced anxiety and depression for this 
subgroup. The current self was most characterized through symptoms and undesirable physical 
attributes such as ‘stiffness’, ‘in pain’ and ‘overweight’. The ways in which these participants thought 
others perceived them was similar. In contrast, the self before the onset of MUS was characterized 
with words such as ‘reliable’, ‘carefree (irresponsible)’ and ‘responsible’. The desired activities for 
this group interfered with by symptoms include socializing, walking and playing with grandchildren. 
This subgroup was most likely to have implicative dilemmas associated with movement towards the 
self as ideally seen by others. The content of these dilemmas often involved congruent relational 
constructs, and some of the physical constructs involved in dilemmas appeared to elaborate 
relational aspects of self (e.g. being seen as ‘heavy-burdened’, ‘stiff-unreliable’ and ‘weak-
empathic’). The fact that such constructs were part of less elaborated and more peripheral 
subsystems suggests that these aspects of identity are not well understood in terms of the main 
construct system for mind-body identity (Metcalfe, 1997). Therefore, the relationship between the 
MUS and such positive aspects of identity is likely to be something that these participants are not 
fully aware of (Compan et al., 2011; Koch et al., 2013; Leitner, 1999; Lilleas & Von Der Fehr, 2011; 
Nakazawa, 2013). The automaticity of caregiving behavior may suggest that it developed in an 
attachment context (Grillner, 2003; Koswlowska, Foley & Crittenden, 2006; Ledoux, 1998 ). 
Kovlowska (2007) and Kowlowska, Foley & Crittenden (2006) describe a number of attachment 
organizations that are based on ‘appeasement’ behaviours that are a means to signal helplessness 
and vulnerability in a way which will increase consistency of caregiving behavior. These ‘type c’ 
attachment strategies are theorized to be organized around feeling states which are mixed and 
incongruent in the face of unpredictable caregiving behavior, yet serve to provide information about 
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the quality of contextual stimuli (e.g. hot/cold, loud/quiet, calm/chaotic) (Crittenden, 1995). 
Exaggerated nonverbal signals may increase the predictability and acceptability of caregiving 
behavior, yet in a manner which does not provide opportunity contextualization and cognitive 
elaboration of what the needs are (Crittenden, 2006). This may relate to the way in which the 
physical construing of the self appears to provide a concrete, embodied metaphor that elaborates a 
more complex interpersonal situation in the grids explored in the current study. 
Unsurprisingly, this group experienced increased anxiety and depression symptoms when the 
distance between their ideal self and their self as ideally seen by others was increased, which is 
perhaps suggestive of conflict between the ideals these participants have for themselves in contrast 
with the desired interpersonal identities. Increased differences in perceived discrepancies between 
the self and the ideal self on the one hand, and the self as seen by others and the self as ideally seen 
by others on the other hand, also appear to increase symptoms of anxiety and depression for these 
participants. 
Illustrative case example 2: ‘a body for others’ 
 
This participant was aged in her late forties and experienced tiredness for nine years, which she 
described as being wiped out. The contrast pole was energetic for this symptom. She explained that 
she was currently taking parental responsibility for their young granddaughter, as her own daughter 
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was ‘too irresponsible’ to look after them. She mentioned that her own mother, who is the person 
closest to the symptom-as-person element in the grid above, was an alcoholic and was also an 
‘irresponsible’ and ‘neglecting’ mother. In this participant’s grid, the physical constructs are very 
tightly organized into a single component in which they all correlate highly with the symptom. 
Orthogonal to this axis is the component with which the moral/relational constructs irresponsible—
steady and family oriented --- emotionally independent correlate most highly. The self as seen by 
others is more characterized by undesirable physical health attributes, and is undifferentiated on the 
orthogonal relational axis. This is interesting because the participant noted that despite looking after 
her grand-daughter, both her mother and her daughter did not see her as being responsible or 
family oriented. Notably, the liked person is construed as irresponsible but also as wanderlust. 
However, the disliked person is also characterized as irresponsible but also emotionally independent. 
A third component wanderlust---homely best characterizes ideals. Perhaps it is not surprising that 
she had an implicative dilemma of the form I want to be energetic, but if I am seen as energetic, then 
will I also be seen as more emotionally independent and more irresponsible, and I would prefer to be 
seen as responsible and family oriented. The desire to be unlike mum and daughter in one respect, 
by being responsible, appeared to conflict with a more self-centered desire to be ‘busy’ ‘energetic’ 
and literally wandering. Pursuing these values requires physical energy, but some degree of 
independence (which she construed as a physical construct). It seems that this dilemma is currently 
more elaborated in the experience of the physical body being wiped out, slow and loungeing. The 
wanderlust construct that characterizes her ideals is dissociated from the physical health subsystem 
(containing independence), which perhaps helps to manage the conflict between responsibility to 
family and having desires for herself. Validating her responsibilities and sacrifices may help her to 
elaborate alternative choices, as being irresponsible can be construed positively by this person. The 
concept of being ‘tied down’ by responsibility, or perhaps difficulty ‘walking away’ might help to 
elaborate the ‘emotional weight’ of her situation. Reintegration of her values of wanderlust with her 
current self construct (e.g. Smith & Hayes, 2005) could be used to positively fill the potential 
emptiness left in this person’s self-construction if they spend less time being responsible to others 
(Havens, 1993). 
3. Mixed group 
This subgroup might be described as a group which bridges across the strength-based and 
sensitivity-based subgroups described above. The current self was characterized by a mixture of 
emotional and physical constructs that suggested fragility or vulnerability for these groups, such as 
‘scared’, ‘frustrated’, ‘heavy’ and ‘small’ (in a possible subjective sense). The characterization of 
symptom as worst included constructs with a particularly emotional tone: ‘isolated’ ‘frustrated’ 
81 
 
81 
 
‘sad’, ‘lonely’. Several of these participants described MUS as restricting their lifestyles, and valued 
activities that were affected by MUS included ‘outside’ activities such as going shopping, socializing 
and going for walks. However, despite these reported losses and restrictions, this group tended to 
have a more elaborated self through symptoms.  
Whether these symptoms represented embodied constructs is not entirely clear. Two participants in 
this sample had implicative dilemmas: for one participants, being seen to be ‘strong’ and ‘outgoing’ 
carried the undesirable implication of being seen as ‘confident’ – whereas they preferred to be seen 
as ‘shy’. The other participant wanted to be seen as ‘young’ (rather than ‘old), but this carried the 
implication of being seen as ‘innocent’ – whereas they preferred to be seen as ‘knowing’ by others. 
In contrast to the ‘sensitive to others’ group, this group appeared to show a strong reduction in 
anxiety levels as discrepancies between the current self and the self with worst symptoms increased. 
This indicates that there is something particularly undesirable about the symptomatic-self that this 
group may wish to dissociate their current self from. One speculates that this might be emotional 
vulnerability based on the way that the self when symptoms are worst is predominantly 
characterized. In support of this, the increase in anxiety scores was particularly strong for this group 
as the level of inconsistency and conflict (‘threat’) increased for the self when symptoms are worst. 
Even more speculatively, looking at the dilemmas described, it might be hypothesized that this 
group construed themselves as ‘being strong for others’, despite being in touch with their own 
emotional vulnerabilities when experiencing symptoms. Isolation may be a strategy for maintaining 
a public image of strength (constriction).  
Although a comprehensive background of participants’ etiology of MUS was not obtained as part of 
interviews, one wonders whether, rather than experiencing triggering events which may threaten to 
invalidate the physical-self-construct more concretely (as hypothesised for the strength-based 
subgroup), it may be that this group have had a self-construction of emotional strength invalidated 
by injury of a more emotional nature (Nakazawa, 2013; Obissier, 2006).  Indeed, several participants 
in this group explicitly compared the symptom-as-person element to ex-partners, including terms 
such as ‘deceitful’, ‘arrogant/male’ and ‘uncaring’. The desire to ‘be available for others’ might be a 
reason for these participants to refrain from acknowledging these injuries which affect the mind 
(evidenced in the emotional nature of constructs used) as much as the body (Turk & Gatchel, 2013). 
This group may present as a mixture of attachment strategies involving inhibition of one’s own 
negative affect and compulsively compliant and caregiving behavior (A3, A4 and A5 attachment 
types; Koslowska, Foley & Crittenden, 2006, p.94) (see Kozlowska, English & Savage, 2012 for case 
examples). 
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Illustrative case example 3: ‘Strong for others’ 
 
This person in her late 40s reported the onset of knee problems and back pain following a couple of 
traumatic accidents that were separated by several years. She had received cognitive behavioural 
therapy for trauma following the most recent incident. However, a more recent traumatic incident 
had also happened to her daughter (who does not feature in the grid), which had further unsettled 
her already unstable sense of safety in the world. Her symptoms increased her self-elaboration, 
although the current self and the self as seen by others are somewhat isolated from non-self 
elements by their being kneepain, crippled, scared and shy. The symptom was construed as similar to 
the disliked person as being deceitful and selfish. This person perceived strong dissimilarity between 
her current self and her pre-symptom self (dist = 1.22) and also between her current self and her 
ideal self (1.29). The magnitude of the distances indicates that the current self is in fact seen to be a 
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different person to the self before symptoms and the ideal self. The person desired to be more fit, 
healthy, and physically attractive. She also desired to be strong and caring, particularly in the eyes of 
others: She mentioned about supporting her daughter through her trauma and about ‘being strong 
for them’, despite construing themselves as currently being weak. This is reflected in an implicative 
dilemma of the following form: I want to be seen as strong and outgoing, but that would mean being 
seen as more confident, and I want to be seen as shy. Confidence did not have any clear negative 
associations, other than perhaps having some correlation with being male. Perhaps being over-
confident may be dangerous in a world that is not construed as being safe. The derogatory physical 
construal of the self as being unfit and unattractive as a result of her symptoms may reflect physical 
insecurities with the body, which parallel or embody her insecurities about the world more 
generally. Being seen to be physically crippled may be more preferable for her if it is important for 
her to be seen as emotionally strong when helping her daughter to recover from her trauma. The 
symptom interferes with the desired activity of walking the dog. One could conceive how this 
activity may also be undesirable to someone who construes herself psychologically as being scared, 
but who may be unable to express this to others whom she feels protective over. In this case 
example the self-constructions of strength and weakness, and being ‘there for others’, seem to 
coincide within this person’s construction of her physical-self. 
 
Summary/Clinical recommendations 
Assessment and integrated formulation 
Repertory grids that elicit both bodily and psychological constructs could be a potentially powerful 
tool in a clinical or therapeutic context, facilitating both integrated formulation of distress and 
guiding the collaborative reconstructive process that is essential to a sustainable intervention (Kelly, 
1969). 
The salience of times when symptoms are worst 
Even when the background level of daily functioning and overall symptom severity of those 
experiencing MUS appears to contrast with levels of psychological distress in clinical settings, 
clinicians should be careful not to see this as an over-exaggeration of symptoms. Clinicians should be 
mindful that times when symptoms are worst are likely to be ‘landmark’ (Berntsen et al., 2003) 
occasions threatening how people experiencing MUS see themselves.  
 
Managing high standards (implicit and explicit) 
The presence of high standards for oneself may be present before the onset of symptoms. These 
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standards may relate to a social identity of ‘being there for others’ - ideals which may not be 
verbalized or explicit, but acted out instead by those with MUS. Some may have an image of 
themselves as being ‘strong’ that they wish to validate, perhaps at the cost of taking appropriate 
steps to manage symptoms. Being aware of these standards can be important when it comes to the 
process of goal-setting around recovery and management of symptoms. Goals might be set that are 
for ‘overcoming’ symptoms that are unachievable, or may be accepted on a verbal level by 
participants but the changes involved may threaten implicit core self-constructs. 
 
Mourning losses and re-framing strength-weakness poles 
People who were particularly likely to see themselves as being ‘strong’ or ‘determined’ prior to 
symptoms will likely be experiencing a mourning process and a loss of self. Initially, they may 
struggle to construe their identity in terms other than being strong, which will make it difficult to 
accept the symptomatic body that is construed as holding all the weakness. The person’s attempts 
to ‘not be beaten’ by symptoms may be an attempt to maintain a sense of psychological strength, 
but may be excessive and exacerbate symptoms – and ironically threaten to invalidate the person’s 
view of themselves as being ‘weak’. Clinicians using counselling or talking therapies might be 
interested in looking at whether recent events, such as trauma, might have challenged the person’s 
sense of being strong. Appreciative exploration of why the ‘strong’ pole is preferred (especially with 
reference to how the person is seen by others) may open up opportunities for re-construing (or re-
framing) aspects of weakness as ‘self-compassion’, ‘warmth’ and ‘tenderness’ – which may be taboo 
for these people if it made them feel vulnerable. Feedback about how the person attempts to 
embody strength by fighting the effects of physical symptoms (e.g. muscular stiffness, posture, 
activity levels), along with alternative ways to let the body feel more ‘comfortable’ and 
accommodating of symptoms (e.g. guided relaxation) could be explored in non-verbal therapies (e.g. 
‘mirror-time’, Mahoney, 2003)(Mills, 2005).  
 
Prioritising one’s own needs without becoming ‘selfish’ 
Participants who show signs of ‘being a body for others’ may have low self-care priorities. Engaging 
these participants in strategies such as ‘pacing of activities’ may be difficult if patients derive a 
strong sense of identity and self-worth in caring for others. This aspect of their identity may be 
something that they are not fully aware of until it comes under threat from exacerbated symptoms 
that restrict being available for others. The sacrifices made for others may need to be acknowledged, 
otherwise the implicit meaning of symptoms could be invalidated by aggressive attempts to ‘get rid 
of symptoms’, which will actually threaten implicit aspects of core identity and de-stabilize the 
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integrity of the system of relationships surrounding the person (Feixas & Villegas, 1993). Such 
symptom ‘crises’ may provide opportunities for insight and change, making metaphorical 
connections between the messages of the body and relationship habits (e.g. heavy - - - burdened by 
responsibility). The person may need to be encouraged to experiment with the pleasures of taking 
care of one’s own body-self, and to see the value in self-care (where previously value was taken 
from caring for others). However, unlike those who see their pre-symptom selves as ‘strong’, those 
with a disposition to care for others may need to re-construe themselves as ‘stronger’ in asserting 
their right to care for themselves, as opposed to ‘sensitive’ to the needs of others. Reconnecting the 
person with a positive and valued self (Smith & Hayes, 2005) will ensure that they are not left feeling 
empty or lost without a stable sense of identity that comes from being available for others. 
 
Sensitively exploring constructions of vulnerability and providing treatment options 
For those who particularly emphasize managing symptoms independently and wanting to be ‘strong 
for others’, one might wish to (if it feels safe and appropriate) explore further the contributions of 
emotional vulnerability and physical weakness to their meanings of ‘strength’ or ‘weakness’. 
Withdrawal from the social sphere may be spoken about as being for emotional reasons as much as 
physical difficulties. If the person appears to be coping with an emotional injury through trying not 
to show their feelings to others, providing the person with choice about treatment of psychosocial 
difficulties and/or focusing on symptom-management is important, as the person may have 
ambivalences about either option. Gradually encouraging the person to take emotional risks through 
graded exposure to the social world could be important for supporting emotional wellbeing in 
parallel to strategies improving symptom management. 
 
Critical review 
The study piloted the use of a novel repertory grid method for exploring idiosyncratic constructs of 
the body with people experiencing MUS. Exploring mind-body identity within a single integrated 
construct system elaborated some of the ways in which people who experience MUS construct 
meaning through both mind and body as a unity. A possible extension of the current study might be 
to use an identical elicitation method to the one used in the current study, but to include ‘my mind’ 
‘my body’ and ‘me’ (and the ideal variants perhaps) as distinct elements in the rating procedure. 
Measuring the standard Euclidean distances between these aspects of self may provide evidence of 
dualism and dissociation between mind, body and person. It would be particularly interesting to see 
how constructs such as ‘strong-weak’ would be attributed to mind, body and self respectively, for 
those experiencing MUS. The subgroups identified in this study have similarities with different 
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attachment organizations described literature on children with MUS by Kozlowska (2007) and 
Kozlowska, Foley & Crittenden (2006). Further research using a tool to explicitly measure adult 
attachment styles such as the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) rated according to the dynamic 
maturational model (Crittenden, 1999; 2006; Kozlowska, Foley & Crittenden, 2006), alongside 
repertory grids containing bodily and psychological constructs, could be a useful means of 
empirically validating these hypothetical links; adding a developmental ‘depth’ to the organization of 
the construct systems. 
The lack of a control sample for the study presents obvious limitations for the experimental 
identification of key clinical characteristics for MUS. For example, it may be that the construct 
physical or mental strength--weakness is a pervasive construct in Western culture, or perhaps that 
implicative dilemmas involving the body are present in acute or explained chronic illnesses.  The 
correlational nature of the current study may or may not be seen as problematic depending on one’s 
metaphysical position. For the author, the experience of psychological distress is conceived of as 
accompanying imminent and actual changes in construing, guiding us into action. To resort to ideas 
of causation would risk reinstating a dualism where emotions are seen as belonging to mind rather 
than body. 
Although identifying subgroups within the current study allowed for further meaningful explorations 
to emerge, many of these explorations were not statistically tested and the hypothesized 
characteristics of these subgroups need to be validated with larger samples than the current study 
sample. However, at the very least, the increased information gained by dividing the sample into 
subgroups demonstrates the power of the repertory grid as a rich source of idiosyncratic clinical and 
research data. 
The study was unsuccessful in recruiting participants directly from primary care settings. The reasons 
for this are not entirely clear: It is possible that GPs, who were asked to promote the study to their 
patients, may have had reservations about discussing the study with their patients, which is quite 
possible given the evidence that GPs find it difficult to discuss MUS with their patients (Dimsdale, 
Sharma & Sharpe, 2011). Based on consultations from a service-user with MUS, the wording of 
information sheets deliberately avoided using the term ‘MUS’ in case it was unfamiliar and off-
putting to potential participants. However, it still may be the case that the stigma associated with 
psychological research proved to be a barrier to recruitment in this particular setting. Notably, this 
study is not unusual with regards to going beyond mainstream healthcare settings to recruit MUS 
participants. Several papers in the review recruited participants outside of outpatient hospital clinics 
using social media and public recruitment methods. Perhaps such methods are (at least for the time 
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being) the most effective means for recruiting this population. The positive aspect of this 
recruitment method is that the study reached people with MUS who are not engaged in healthcare 
services. As clinical outcomes indicate, all participants were to some extent distressed by their 
symptoms and the impact MUS had on their identities; in addition to MUS affecting their day to day 
functioning. A related criticism concerns to the use of correlate measures of psychological symptoms 
and symptom severity which were selected based upon their frequent use in primary care 
populations, and out of an awareness that the length of questionnaires was an important ethical 
factor for a study population who were susceptible to the physical demands of taking part in the 
study. In contrast to the rich idiographic information yielded by the repertory grid interview, these 
measures provided rather limited amounts of information as correlates to the various grid indices. 
Using more refined tools to measure distress and level of impact of symptoms of daily functioning 
(e.g. the Symptom Checklist 90-Revised (SCL-90-R) (Derogatis, 1994) is recommended for further 
research using the body-mind grids, provided the additional burden to participants can be 
accommodated. 
The majority of the sample were considered to be a primary care population. However, some of the 
sample were not frequent users of primary care services so the study sample may not generalize 
completely to MUS samples who frequently use primary care services. Additionally, although many 
of the sample mentioned that they had not sought psychological support for fear of their symptoms 
being labelled as ‘psychosomatic’, the sampling method is likely to have biased the sample to those 
who are open to taking part in psychological research at least. Indeed, some forums that were 
approached by the author did not wish to advertise the study, stating that their members would not 
like to be involved in psychological research into MUS. One can imagine that a sample who were 
more vigilant about the psychological presentation of MUS might provide different constructs, and 
give more guarded responses to measures relating to anxiety and depression experiences. 
The study aimed to elicit those constructs that described the core embodied aspects of self. 
However, it did so whilst acknowledging a theoretical background that proposed that core embodied 
self-constructs may be at the lower levels of awareness (‘tacit’ or ‘habitual’), and may therefore be 
difficult to verbalize explicitly (Leitner, 1999; Lin & Payne, 2014). Indeed, this presents a considerable 
caveat of using an elicitation method that asks participants to verbalize physical constructs. Some 
participants reported having a ‘strong sense’ of the physical distinctions they were trying to make, 
yet finding it difficult to put words to this. The struggles of participants to ‘language the body’ are 
not likely to be exclusive to the current sample (see Panhoffer & Payne, 2017). Indeed, some studies 
have used alternative ways of identifying embodied constructs. For example, Payne, Lin, Cipolletta & 
Winter (2017) directly observed the ways in which people used their bodies in interpersonal space 
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and used these observations to rate their embodied construing. Although this method provides a 
rich amount of data about embodied construing, it requires detailed analysis of a small number of 
participants, limiting generalizability.  
Putting language to embodied constructs may be difficult, but it could also be viewed as a very 
important process for individuals who struggle to find meaning in MUS. Indeed the connection 
between mind and body may actually be best made through language, particularly when it comes to 
the elaboration of dilemmas about relationships with others. The validation of a person’s identity 
and way of seeing the world necessarily involves participating in a shared language (not necessarily a 
verbal language), where one can express one’s constructions and receive feedback from others. 
Here the ability of metaphorical language to structure understanding of one phenomenon in terms 
of the structure of another allows for new and shareable meaning, allowing a person to 
communicate conflicts and elaborate alternatives outside of the territories of the metaphor (Mair, 
1989; Centomo & Del Rizzo, 2016). Many participants who took part in the current study gave 
feedback that it had been a helpful process to use the constructs and numerical ratings to clarify the 
impact of symptoms on their identity (Fogel, 2013; Gendlin, 1982; Koch et al., 2013; Leitner, 1999). 
Making these links explicit in the presence of the researcher appeared to be a positive process for 
many participants, and was perhaps also a novel experience in a culture where the body is 
frequently reduced to a mere mechanism.  
7. Conclusion 
This study attempted to extend current understanding of the relationship between mind-body 
identity construction and MUS, using a modified form of the repertory grid method that explored 
both bodily constructs and psychological constructs within a single construct system. The study 
hypothesized based on ‘frozen-construing’ theory (Lin & Payne, 2014) and a literature review of 
relevant studies with MUS populations, that aspects of the body-self, including the MUS, would be 
dissociated from the core, verbal construct systems for making sense of self and others. This 
hypothesis did not prove to be correct, as the symptom construct was in fact well integrated and 
perhaps superordinate in the construct systems of most participants. It was hypothesized that the 
symptom would be enmeshed with a number of undesirable characteristics, and therefore that the 
current self with symptoms would be negatively construed; and also, that there would therefore be 
a desire to dissociate the current self from the self when symptoms are worst in order to protect 
identity. The current study provided some evidence of this. The final set of hypotheses suggested 
that the symptom may be implicitly associated with positive aspects of how the self is currently seen 
and seen by others, particularly with regards to those traits that were ‘moral’ and ‘relational’ in 
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nature. It proposed that such self-constructions may be pre-verbal and embodied, hence less well 
elaborated within the construct system. While there was good evidence for this hypothesis for the 
current sample, the researcher found this pattern was more evident in a sub-section of participants. 
For these participants, the way in which the self is seen by others is particularly influential. 
Symptoms and constructions of the body-self appeared to elaborate and embody positive and 
negative aspects of the self in relation to others. Another subgroup seemed to have a superordinate 
construct relating to strength and weakness of both mind and body. This group appeared to be 
struggling to find a current coherent construction of their current mind-body identity using this 
‘strong-weak’ construct sub-system. A third subgroup seemed to be somewhere in between, and 
might be seen as ‘trying to be strong for others’.  
While the study is limited by the sample characteristics, and by limited numbers preventing 
statistically viable comparisons between hypothesized subgroups, it demonstrates that integrating 
body and mind within exploration of an individual’s construct system can provide additional 
understanding for a sample whose experiences are characterized by lack of validation of their 
suffering in a reductionist medical culture; and who struggle for themselves to find meaning for, and 
integration with, their symptomatic bodies. 
Dissemination 
The author intends to write up this research for publication in relevant physical health journals, but 
also to present the methodology used as something of interest to clinicians and researchers using 
Personal Construct Psychology in their approach. The plan is to provide brief face to face 
consultations with willing participants who took part in the study, to test the validity of possible 
mind-body connections interpreted by the author using individual repertory grid data. This 
personalized feedback process will provide opportunities to refine and elaborate further on the 
findings discussed in this thesis prior to publication of results. 
A personal note 
Through the process of producing this research, the author’s own appreciation has grown of the 
necessity of unity between mind, body and the world in feeling connected. Whilst spending large 
amounts of time isolated physically from the world, and dissociated from everything but the 
contents of one’s own thoughts, the desire to return to being a body in relation to the world was 
starkly emphasized. Going beyond ‘functional’ self-care of the body, allowing for moments of 
connection between the self and the world, occurred through the body. Whether in the form of the 
thrilling sensation of air rushing on the skin whilst racing through woodlands on a bicycle, or the 
slightly light-headed, half-intoxicated feeling after a bout of uncontrollable laughter with a partner, 
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these moments of connection are framed in language here on the page, but were inextricably 
embodied moments of connection with others and the world. On the other hand, ‘mindless’ 
activities were also a part of recent months – engaging in trivial tasks to procrastinate from a 
psychologically daunting task was equally a form of disconnection or dissociation from reality – a 
disconnection that recruited the body as an accomplice. Ultimately, one feels fully ‘oneself’ when 
one is metaphorically ‘firing on all cylinders’, a mind-body unity engaged in exploring the world with 
other cherished mind-bodies. I would like to thank all those who I have connected with through this 
thesis, and who I have had the privilege to share its explorations and adventures with. 
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body into identity, 
reliance of body, 
body awareness, 
understanding 
pain) 
(A)’surrendering to 
one’s fate’—trust 
of own ability to 
cope with 
integrated but 
unpredictable 
body.  
(B)’Accepting active 
process of change’ 
making choices to 
get a richer life, see 
causes of pain as 
mind-body linked 
and integrate 
‘wisdom of the 
body’.  
(C)”Hope & 
Resignation” 
ambivalent state, 
oscillating between 
accepting & 
refusing body. 
(D)”Rejecting body” 
integrating body 
impass; body is 
energy or trap; not 
in control life 
unsafe and difficult. 
Integration of 
body a necessary 
step in 
acceptance, 
including body 
awareness and 
reliance, those in 
dialogue with 
body vs. detached. 
-Biographical 
perspective 
lacking- chronicity 
as a factor 
-Population 
positive to physio 
may not be 
representative. 
-Not tied to any 
clinical variables 
e.g. time spent in 
services, outcome 
measures, 
symptom impact 
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5. Smith & 
Osborn 
2007 
N=6 
purposive 
sample – 
pain clinic. 
IPA ‘lived 
experience’; 
how pain 
affects beliefs, 
attitudes, 
feelings about 
self.  
(i)negative impact 
on self – ‘not me’, 
self-denigrating of 
current self; effect 
on self more 
distressing than 
pain itself 
(ii)continuum/traje
ctory -fight to 
retain original +ve 
self, protection 
from ‘erosion of 
self’ 
(iii) public arena 
makes it worse – 
vulnerable to scorn, 
perhaps projected 
standards. 
(iv) directing it at 
others: negativity 
strong and directed 
towards others.  
(v)sense of fate or 
justice ‘what goes 
around comes 
around’ 
Cyclical process: 
pain>negative 
thoughts > 
internal self 
loathing > 
discharge onto 
others > sense of 
fate/justice for 
pain 
Shame – sense of 
self as being an 
object of scorn or 
punishment. 
-limited sample 
size, selected on 
basis of 
characteristics may 
be more severe 
+in-depth look at 
processes of 
comparing self to 
others. 
Smith & 
Osborn, 
2006 
N=6 as 
above 
(2008) 
IPA 
interviews, 
focus of 
relationship 
between self 
concept and 
body 
‘living with body 
separate to self’. 
Painful/dysfunction
al parts places aside 
‘not me’; Some 
parts of body 
fragmented, others 
whole body not just 
parts. 
Small mundane 
phys activities just 
as salient to self as 
profound life 
changes 
Enmeshment – 
seemed to ‘trap’ 
negative aspects 
of the self. 
Contradiction 
between 
embodied pain 
and preferred 
‘bodyless’ self. 
Smaller sample 
size, likely to be 
more severe due 
to setting. & 
demographic. 
Osborn & 
Smith 
1999 
9 women 
low back OP 
clinic, 
recruited 
based on 
‘excessive 
distress and 
disability’ in 
absence of 
organic 
pathology 
IPA  -searching for an 
explanation; 
comparing selves 
others; not being 
believed; 
withdrawing to 
avoid being a 
burden, rejection, 
but fear of isolation 
Comparison 
between ‘ill’ self 
and former 
‘healthy’ self and 
healthy others. 
‘concealed’ versus 
‘open’ self and 
dilemmas around 
revealing pain to 
others. 
+used specific 
assessment criteria 
to screen clinically 
relevant sample  
-may not 
generalize to 
primary care 
population 
Hakanson 
et al., 2008 
9 (2 men) 
IBS gastro 
clinic  
Descriptive 
phenomenolo
gical 
perspective 
(Giorgi, 2000) 
Altered self-image; 
separation from 
body; 
attractiveness lost 
(females) weakness 
Self-distrust 
unreliable body; 
potential for 
shame; body as 
malfunctioning 
-focus on bodily 
experience 
-small sample 
-psychological 
characteristics/ 
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(males); ashamed – 
uncontrollable 
body; distrusting 
body – limited & 
constrained; 
blaming self for 
aggravating 
symptoms. 
object; investment 
of energy into 
solutions 
relevance of 
population not 
stated. 
Reed-
Gibson et 
al., 2005 
MCS: 268 
initially, 203 
at 2 year 
follow up, 
recruited 
through 
newsletter 
soc media; 
physicians’ 
offices 
Open ended 
postal 
questionnaire 
on how sense 
of identity 
changed as 
result of 
having MCS 
member-
checking as 
quality control 
Loss of 
stable/familiar 
personality 
negatively 
perceived – envy of 
‘well people’; loss 
of self-positioning ; 
appearance big 
factor in women, 
emotional 
suppression to 
meet other’s 
expectations, trying 
not to alienate 
others with 
distress; ‘forced 
growth’ having to 
create balance, 
prioritise needs; 
reconsolidation of 
identity – drawing 
upon other aspects 
of identity 
Considerable 
impacts of MCS 
which were not 
known before this 
study 
Use of member 
checking as q 
control 
Large sample size 
to make themes 
more 
generalizable, but 
also makes finding 
a significant impact 
more likely. 
-not in-depth 
interviews for 
exploring 
significant themes, 
identifying who 
was most likely to 
need support. 
Whitehead 
2006 
17 CFS, 10 
from local 
hospital, 3 
from 
support 
groups, 11 
female. 
Longitudinal 
phenomenolo
gical 2.5 years 
Phases 
(i)ubiquitous losses 
– isolation & sep. 
from roles; (ii) 
disabled identity 
part and whole self 
oscillating (iii) new 
sense of 
normal/reconstruct
ion – more valued 
self emerges, 
return to self prior 
to illness not 
sought.  
-possibility of 
more radical 
identity 
reconstruction 
without symptom 
remission 
-inclusion not 
based on medical 
dx 
-longitudinal adv 
that processes of 
change can be 
seen. 
-forms of support 
for participants 
during phases of 
study that may 
have facilitated 
acceptance? 
Lilleas & 
von der 
Fehr, 2011 
Based on 
Lilleas 
(2003) 71 
interviews 
with women 
25-70 years 
chronic pain 
Further 
analysis of 
study data 
showing 
‘natural’ 
female body 
attitude as 
being 
available for 
others, 
Embodied habit ‘to 
be there for others 
and not for selves’ 
‘knowing’ pain but 
not responding to 
body signals; pain 
not taken as a 
warning; ‘body 
preparedness for 
others’ gender-
specific construing.  
Gender specific 
habitual practices 
and actions; 
effectiveness of 
changing 
embodied ‘habit’ 
in talking therapy 
approaches 
emphasized. 
-single case 
analysis, though 
building on sig. 
data 
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regardless of 
age 
Single case 
illustration in 
current paper  
Crowe, 
Whitehead 
et al., 2010 
64 chronic 
low back 
pain; public 
advertiseme
nts 
Thematic 
analysis 
Unpredictability of 
pain; need for 
vigilance; 
externalization/obj
ectification of body; 
described body as if 
not part of their 
subjectivity, but 
rather as 
something external 
or other-than their 
sense of self; 
tensions between 
current and ideal 
selves 
Tensions with 
body and broader 
identity may be 
connected. 
Quality controls 
not reported 
+looked at body 
relationship in 
relation to self. 
Miles et 
al., 2005 
29 chronic 
pain 
outpatient 
clinic, 20 
women. 
Grounded 
theory 
 
 
3 categories of 
constraint because 
of the pain, 
different situations 
bring difference 
challenges to 
identity: ability to 
do things, 
judgements from 
others. Coping with 
constraints: 
assimilation and 
accommodation; 
persisting in pre-
pain activities 
despite constraints; 
subversion (biggest 
subjective impact 
on identity) – 
avoiding/curtailing 
of activities 
because of feeling 
stigmatized by 
judgements of 
others (‘sensitive’) 
rather than pain-
related constraints.  
Body: slower, older, 
gaining weight, 
dualism (body not 
doing what mind 
wants it to do) 
Considerable 
influence of 
others’ 
judgements on 
sense of self. 
-some able to 
normalise changes 
to socially 
accepted changes 
(e.g. ‘growing 
older’) 
-superordinate 
category of ‘living 
a normal life’ 
-people whose 
identity rested on 
physical 
performance and 
body technique 
found it hard to 
adjust to pain  
-‘need for 
research to look at 
relationships to 
body to help 
people find new 
body identities.’ 
No mention of 
quality controls/ 
reliability & validity 
checks 
 
-some sections of 
summary unclear 
what weight of 
evidence was, 
single illustrations 
from source text. 
 
-hospital clinic 
sample who had 
been 
unsuccessfully 
treated - limited 
generalisability. 
 
Hellstroem
, 2001 
21 chronic 
pain 
patients, 
inpatients in 
Self-concept: 
projective 
possible 
selves, 
Higher order 
themes: 
1. 
dualism/separation 
Different selves 
develop over time 
which are 
problematic if 
Importance of 
iterative & social 
factors in  the 
shaping of positive 
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assessment 
hospital 
clinics, 6 
men 
processual self 
– open ended 
interviews 
focussing on 
temporal 
aspects of 
self-
conception . 
Phenomenolo
gical analysis 
of body from self-
concept: body 
described as ‘other’  
2. struggle to 
maintain past 
identity; competent 
and active self 
‘died’ (118).  
3. entrapped: 
‘locked in, a kind of 
prison’ (118).  
4. projected selves: 
self defined by 
others in a way that 
is either developing 
or hampering self-
validation.  
5.temporal factors: 
fear of pain taking 
over identity future 
entirely. 
they contrast too 
much with current 
reality or pain. Self 
appears to lag 
behind body 
changes and 
behavioural 
changes  
possible selves 
needs further 
research 
-small sample.  
OP clinic 
-patients currently 
undergoing 
assessment 4-5 
weeks inpatient 
stay, may not have 
had opportunity to 
integrate pain with 
self in the context 
of uncertainty. 
Clarke & 
James 
2003 
CFS 59, 
18male, 
recruited 
from CFS 
support 
groups. 
Discourse 
Analysis: 
looked at 
ways 
participants 
talked about 
themselves as 
objects to be 
dealt with and 
understood. 
Self as 
fundamentally 
sociological 
concept  
Telephone 
interviews 
open ended. 
 
1.immediate and 
short term loss of 
self. 
2.disaffection & 
isolation socially: 
feel like outsiders, 
isolation, social 
distance. Stigma. 
Stepping away from 
former lives for 
shame/embarrass
ment about 
changes-maintain 
former identity  
3.changed rels with 
‘healthy people’ 
4.new self 
emergence – not 
returning to pre-
fatigue self, 
‘radicalised self’ 
stronger, standing 
up for self, pacing, 
enjoying 
relationships 
-unable to find 
legitimizing 
identity from 
medical discourses 
leading to more 
radical reinvention 
of self. 
-need to ‘include 
consideration of 
body and 
biography in self-
identity and 
expectation’. 
 
Link to wider 
discourses and 
reinvention of self 
not made by 
participants 
themselves. 
 
+looking at 
position of 
subjects in relation 
to wider discourses 
(figure/ground). 
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Quantitative literature reviewed 
 
Authors 
Sample Method Findings Conclusions Critical commentary 
Yu, 
Norton, 
Harrison 
& 
McCracke
n, 2015 
Chronic pain 
studies 
Review of 
quantitative 
studies on 
chronic pain and 
fibromyalgia, 
examining 
various 
conceptions of 
self and attempts 
to measure and 
define identity 
and self-concept 
in chronic pain 
research, 54 
studies reviewed. 
15 separate 
self-related 
variables, 
clustered into 4 
types: 
judgements of 
personal 
value/worth/es
teem (32); role-
based or 
descriptive 
sense of self 
including self-
conflict (8); 
sense of self as 
process, 
detached from 
attributes 
(1) body-
focussed 
measure (Bode 
et al., 2010) 
Broader 
researcher 
assumes rel 
between 
thoughts about 
self as being 
equivalent to 
self, rather than 
focus on self-as-
process.  
-need for clearer 
definition of self 
in research, 
otherwise 
tendency to 
assume self = 
person. 
-words a process 
of describing…. 
Did not notice the 
lack of process self-
conceptions might 
relate to the 
experiential/embod
ied conceptions of 
self that are not 
based in higher 
order cognitive 
process of ‘naming 
attributes’ 
-doing selves, being 
selves, conceptual 
selves, evaluating 
Bode et 
al., 2010 
168 
outpatient 
orthopaedic 
clinic; 36 of 
which 
(21.4%) 
undiagnose
d 
Body-self-unity 
10-item 
questionnaire; 
illness cognitions 
questionnaire; 
functional 
limitations; self-
esteem 
Rosenberg 10-
item; 
correlational 
analysis & 
multiple 
regression 
analysis 
2-factor model 
of body-self 
unity q – 
‘alienation’ & 
‘harmony’; self-
esteem -vely 
correlated with 
‘alienation’ and 
helplessness 
cognitions; self-
esteem +vely 
correlated with 
‘harmony’ and 
‘acceptance’; 
‘alienation’ 
correlated +vely 
with 
‘helplessness’ & 
-ve 
‘acceptance’ 
--multiple 
regression; 
most strongly 
mediated rel. 
with functional 
limitations and 
self-esteem 
-body-self 
strongest 
mediating effect 
on self-esteem 
vs. functional 
limitations 
compared to 
illness cognitions 
-relationship to 
body and self 
highlighted; 
importance relative 
to ‘illness 
cognitions’ (overly 
mental?) 
-not validation 
study with chronic 
vs. acute illness,  
-controlled for level 
of limitation in 
analyses 
- no comparison of 
explained vs 
unexplained illness 
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Compan, 
Feixas et 
al., 2011 
Normal 
controls vs 
30 women 
dx 
fibromyalgia
; 46.47 
years from 
support 
groups; 
controls 
(30) 
experiencin
g pain but 
not Dx 
fibromyalgia 
based on 
quads 
drawing + 
score on 
pain 
program; 
sampled 
from 452 
women 
assessed for 
the study 
Repertory Grid 
10/20 elements 
(no set limit on 
number of 
constructs)  
-SCL-R-90: 
distress; fibro 
impact q; 
VAS/tender 
points 
-Implicative 
Dilemmas with 
classification of 
‘content’ of 
constructs; 
Chi-squared of 
IDs determining 
clinical/normal 
sample 
Clinical sample 
sig more IDs 
than cons; 
relatively higher 
pain levels and 
intensity; self-
ideal disc higher 
in clinical 
sample; ideal-
other 
discrepancy – 
perceived 
inadequacy of 
others; no diffs 
in perceived 
social isolation; 
moral 
constructs tend 
to congruent, 
phys health – 
73.9% of IDs 
pain related – 
congruent 
moral construct 
e.g. 
responsible, 
hardworking vs 
lazy 
-high standards 
for evaluation 
self & others; 
perceived 
adequacy of 
others more 
predictive of 
clinical sample 
than self-ideal 
discrepancy; ID 
most predictive 
variable – type of 
enmeshment not 
captured by self-
ideal disc; similar 
to Drysdale 
‘sensitive to 
others’ – 
responsible vs. 
lazy (moral CSPC; 
disappearance 
may also carry 
threat to moral 
positive identity 
(Asbring +ve 
identities) 
-provided rather 
than elicited 
symptom contrast 
-non-clinical not 
given pain 
construct: no 
dilemmas inherent 
in physical 
symptom? 
-norms vs clinical 
not necessarily 
based on explained 
vs unexplained pain 
– but on fibro Dx 
(i.e. controls may 
have unexplained 
pain) 
-based on an 
analysis of self-ideal 
discrepancies/dilem
mas – the impact of 
other perspectives 
may be more 
relevant to clinical 
outcomes (e.g. 
Kindermans et al, 
2010 research) 
+use of matched 
control sample to 
isolate key clinical 
characteristics 
Benasaya
g, Feixas, 
Mearin, 
Saul & 
Laso, 
2004 
(Reporte
d in 
Feixas & 
Saul, 
2004) 
Multicentre 
dilemma 
project, IBS 
63 non-
clinical 
control vs 
smaller 
group 13 of 
IBS, 7 of 
which met 
criteria for 
anxiety 
disorder, 5 
somatizatio
n disorders  
 Dyadic elicitation 
(did they provide 
a symptom 
construct?) RGT, 
PVAFF (cognitive 
complexity) 
IBS greater 
number of 
constructs esp 
those with 
somatization; 
IBS/somatizatio
n showed lower 
levels of 
differentiation 
(higher PVAFF) 
& high levels of 
polarisation 
(extremity of 
ratings) 
Role of 
IDs/conflict in 
broader chronic 
health conditions 
-control group not 
symptomatic  
-were IDs related to 
symptom 
construct? 
-no content analysis 
for IBS constructs. 
-not statistically 
analysed. 
 
Drysdale 
1989 
Chronic low 
back 15 
acute 18 
chronic, 
hospital 
department
s 
RGT 12 
constructs 
provided from 
previous 
experience in low 
back pain group; 
10 frequently 
used constructs. 
no sig diffs in 
construing pain 
& emotion, 
except acute 
anger 
constructs had 
higher ratings 
used; no sig 
diffs in use of 
constructs 
relating to pain 
Tendency to 
associate pain 
with being 
sensitive towards 
others – 
symptom 
associated with 
quality of 
morality (Cornejo 
et al.); low levels 
of anger 
-provided 
constructs rather 
than elicited them, 
less meaningful 
than elicited 
-anger may not be 
less perceived but 
less 
relevant/convenien
t to participants 
(because it was not 
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& depression; 
highly sig 
pain/no pain 
correlation with 
‘sensitive/insen
sitive to others’ 
 
awareness; with 
time perceive 
less depression & 
seen in less 
undesirable 
terms 
elicited from 
participants 
themselves but 
provided). 
 
Morley, 
Davies, 
Barton, 
2005 
84 
participants 
from pain 
clinics; 33 
male/56 
female 
word fluency 
(FAS) control 
variable for 
possible selves; 
chronic pain 
acceptance q 
(CPAQ); BDI-II 
depression scale; 
-possible selves 
interview: name 
up to 10 
descriptions 
actual/hoped/fea
red-for, future 
selves required 
further elicitation 
methods; each 
characteristic 
rated in terms of 
– efficacy (how 
capable) & 
expectancy (how 
likely) if still in 
pain (hoped for); 
vs. (feared-for) 
how likely 
without pain  
Proportion of 
hoped for self 
that could not 
be achieved 
w/o pain 
predicted BDI 
score (p<.001) 
and lesser 
degree of pain 
acceptance 
(<.002). 
exploratory 
analyses actual-
hoped-for 
discrepancies 
did not add any 
explanatory 
power; nor did 
feared-for self 
enmeshment or 
actual-feared 
discrepancy;  
Enmeshment 
closer 
relationships to 
acceptance than 
self-
discrepancies; 
conditional-
hoped-for self 
explained BDI 
and acceptance 
of pain 
+quantified 
enmeshment/entra
pment found in 
qual research. 
-absence of effect 
of feared-for not 
picked up because 
of using measures 
of depression 
rather than 
anxiety?  
BDI has number of 
somatic items – 
possibly making rel 
stronger than 
perhaps appears. 
Sutherlan
d & 
Morley, 
2008 
82 chronic 
pain, 51f, 
criteria as 
above 2005 
pain clinic,  
Enmeshment 
including HADS 
subscale of 
anxiety as well as 
depression; 
included PSI-ii 
motivational 
preferences 
(sociotropy/auto
nomy) see if 
moderate rel 
with distress. 
Asked for lists for 
self-hoped-for 
and other-hoped 
for & judgements 
of whether words 
represented 
‘wanted’/ideal vs 
‘ought’ 
characteristics 
(a)number of 
characteristics 
Hoped-for-
other self did 
not have sig 
more ‘ought’ 
characteristics; 
discrepancy 
with self 
associated 
more with 
depression (vs 
self-ideal) than 
anxiety; 
enmeshment 
associated with 
higher levels of 
anxiety 
regardless of 
motivational 
preferences; 
feared for self 
not associated 
with anxiety 
measure;  
With highly 
valued 
characteristics, 
greater 
enmeshment 
with pain is 
associated with 
anxiety 
-Did not find 
particular 
influence of 
‘ought’ 
characteristics  
Physical selves 
entrapped, 
comparison to 
former selves 
before symptom 
indicate any pre-
enmeshment to 
body?  
-no analysis of 
content of 
enmeshed 
characteristics. 
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each self; 
(b)proportion of 
enmeshed future 
possible selves; 
(c) proportions 
for ideal vs ought 
(d)magnitude of 
discrepancy poss 
selves 
Multiple 
regression 
analyses 
Vagronsv
eld; 
Morley, 
Peters et 
al., 2010 
Whiplash 
injury pain, 
possible 
neck injury, 
recruited 
within 1 
month of 
RTA; 
Exc. 
Fractures or 
spinal 
dislocations 
34 at follow 
up 24female 
Questionnaires 
assessing self 
discrepancies and 
enmeshment 
with pain; diaries 
21 days recording 
mood, activity 
and concordance 
with ideal vs 
actual levels of 
activity; re-
administration of 
questionnaires 
after 21 days. 
Measures of 
disability, pain, 
pain-
catastrophising 
(Sullivan, 1995), 
depression 
(Centre for 
Epidemiological 
Studies 
Depression Scale 
CESD, Radloff, 
1977) 
Resolution of 
pain associated 
with a 
reduction of 
enmeshment, 
but not to a 
change in self-
discrepancy 
(acceptance of 
new self-aims? 
E.g. not feeling 
that RTA/pain 
have ‘taken 
everything 
away’) 
Reduction in 
enmeshment an 
important 
aspects of 
distress relief. 
Why does 
enmeshment 
resolve for some 
not others? 
Premorbid 
characteristics/fami
ly constructs of 
individuals mirror a 
rigidity of aspects of 
self? 
Stuerz et 
al., 2009 
Tinnitus 
sample 
Groups 
divided into 
mild/mod & 
severe 
based on 
severity 
scores  
Mail 
questionnaires, 
65 >6 months 
tinnitus support 
groups. Tinnitus 
questionnaire 
distress & degree 
of severity; body 
image 
questionnaire; 
BDI-II 
Attractiveness/
self confidence, 
emphasis on 
appearance, 
and vitality and 
body dynamics 
sig lower than 
controls; severe 
group reported 
greater 
insecurity about 
their bodies’; 
sig +ve 
correlation 
between 
severity and 
‘concern’ and 
BDI-II 
Tinnitus 
population may 
have negative 
body-image due 
to symptom 
causing distress 
not specifically 
from symptom 
experience. 
Not clinically 
significant levels of 
psych distress on 
measures used 
(anxiety scale more 
appropriate for 
group with body 
concerns?) 
-which areas of 
body – 
qualitative/explorat
ory approach would 
have yielded spec 
info for this patient 
group. 
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Waters, 
Keefe, 
Strauman
, 2004 
93 patients 
chronic low 
back pain 
(56% 
female); 
outpatient 
clinic 
Self discrepancy 
theory (Higgins, 
1987); Selves 
Questionnaire 
(Strauman, 1990) 
interview – lists 
of up to 10 traits 
actual, ideal, 
ought, ideal-
other and ought-
other. Score 
associations 
between 
attributes. 
Discrepancy score 
from subtracting 
matches – 
mismatches 
(inter-rater 
reliability 
‘excellent’ range 
r=0.95-1.00) 
Measures of 
depression (BDI-
II) and psych 
distress (GSI & 
SCL-R-90) 
Stepwise 
regression 
analyses 
(controlling for 
variables e.g. 
pain severity): 
ought-other 
(20.9%) of 
psych distress 
scores; actual-
ideal 
discrepancies 
14% of variance 
in BDI-II scores 
(mod effect 
size) 
-ought-other 
explained most 
variance in pain 
severity (7.1%, 
small effect 
size). 
-length of time 
in pain not sig 
correlated with 
discrepancies 
 
Ought-other: 
impact of 
perceived 
expectations/de
mands of other 
on psych distress 
and pain severity 
(which way 
around is the 
effect?)  (boom-
bust?) 
-emphasis on 
how much of a 
role others play 
in self-
conceptualisation 
(Stryker & 
Stratham, 1985) 
‘ought’discrepancie
s not given anxiety 
score analyses, 
though clearly 
emphasised as 
important aspect to 
understand further. 
-are discrepancies 
pain-contingent or 
part of a wider 
discrepancy/depres
sion?  
Authors suggest 
pain may provide 
self-esteem 
protecting means of 
attributing to 
personal 
failures/shortcomin
gs (Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987) 
-unlike 
enmeshment 
research not clarify 
extent to which 
discrepancies are 
attributed to 
presence of pain. 
11. 
Harris, 
Morley & 
Barton, 
2003 
90 
participants, 
34 male, dx 
chronic 
benign 
painful 
condition, 
hospital 
pain clinic,  
Self-concept 
differentiation 
(SCID) – generate 
4 roles, 2 
attributes per 
role, across 4 soc 
domains 
(friendship, 
occupation, 
leisure & family) 
for pre-pain and 
presently. 
Compute number 
of roles attributes 
and unique 
attributes – 
unique 
attributes/total 
attributes 
computed as 
measure of self-
complexity (more 
of them, more 
would remain in 
theory even with 
pain)  
-sig. losses in all 
attributes least 
in family 
domain which 
was relatively 
preserved. Role 
loss predictive 
of BDI-II score 
-attribute loss 
explained more 
BDI/HADS 
variance than 
role losses 
multiple 
regression 
analyses. 
-no diffs in self-
differentiation 
over time 
-neither pre-
pain nor 
current SCID 
had sig 
explanatory 
value to either 
BDI-II or HADS 
scores. 
Evidence of role 
loss/attributes 
quantified. 
Attributes seem 
to have stronger 
affect on 
measures used. 
Self-discrepancy 
models construct 
self as attributes 
rather than social 
roles. 
Conceptualisation 
of ‘identity’ based 
on lists of 
roles/attributes – 
reductionist & not 
necessarily 
construct-valid. 
-BDI-II used. 
-did not report on 
whether SCID 
same/different to 
other populations 
(is it standardized?) 
  
Kinderma
ns, 
Chronic low 
back pain 
Self-discrepancies 
& pain-
Hierarchical 
multiple 
Emotional 
distress strongly 
-level of 
measurement of 
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Huijnen, 
Goossens
, Roelofs, 
Verbunt, 
Vlaeyen, 
2010 
with non-
spec injury, 
>3 months, 
18-65, not 
primary 
diagnosis 
psychiatric 
-83 included 
in analyses. 
58 referred 
by 
clinicians, 
25 
responding 
to 
advertiseme
nts; latter 
group 
slightly 
older but no 
other sig. 
diffs. 22-65, 
53% 
employed, 
mean 
symptom 
duration 
9.81 years 
(5 months – 
39 years). 
behaviour. 
Hadrin’s Selves 
Questionnaire 5 
of 
ought/ideal/feare
d from self/other 
perspective. 30 
total attributes. 
Each rate 1-5 
‘currently 
describes me’. 
Ideal/ought- low 
score = greater 
discrepancy; 
feared – low 
score = lower 
congruencies 
-Patterns of 
Activity Measure 
Pain (POAM-P, 
Kone et al., 2007) 
measuring 
‘avoidance’, 
‘overdoing’ & 
‘pacing’ 10 items 
for each. 3 factor 
structure – 
construct valid. 
-Health related 
QoL (RAND-36); 
VAS pain 
intensity;    
regression: 
ideal-own-self 
discrepancies 
did not predict 
depression or 
anxiety, nor did 
ought-other. 
Controlling for 
sociodemograp
hic variables 
feared-for-own 
and feared-for-
other 
congruencies 
predicted 
depression and 
anxiety. 
Multiple 
regressions of 
activity 
patterns – no 
sig main effects 
of self-discs on 
persistence 
-quadratic 
ideal-other U 
shaped rel sig  
predicted 
persistence 
(<.001).  
-both feared-
for-self and 
feared-for-
other sig 
predicted 
avoidance 
behaviour 
related to 
promixity to 
feared-for-self; in 
contrast to 
Waters et al. 
(2004), self-ideal 
not shown to be 
related. 
-feared-for-self 
more salient 
factor in 
behaviour 
-persistence 
behaviour 
motivated by 
others’ 
expectations and 
not by own 
‘oughts’. 
 
self-discrepancies 
might be limited in 
relationship to 
activity patterns – 
Self-discrepancies 
are higher order 
reflective 
constructs.  
-attempts to 
connect 
discrepancies to 
behaviour and 
symptom-
management. 
-could the feared 
for self be 
equivalent to the 
implicit poles of a 
bipolar construct?  
Kinderma
ns, 
Goossens
, Roelofs, 
Huijnen, 
Verbunt, 
Morley, 
Vlaeyen, 
2009 
80 chronic 
low back 
pain (39 
women), OP 
hospital 
clinics, 22-
65, duration 
5 months-
44 years, 
50% 
employed 
Hardin’s selves 
questionnaire 
(HSQ) 10 of each 
attributes 
ideal/feared/oug
ht selves, 5/5 
from self/other 
perspective. 
VAS (intensity), 
BDI-II depression, 
Roland Disability 
Q (RDQ, Roland & 
Morris, 1983). 
Content analysis 
of HSQ attributes, 
up clustering into 
8 categories 
(Kappa= .62). 
Frequencies of 
each cat (No. 
Ranks: 
interpersonal 
(e.g. honest, 
friendly, 
helpful) – 
wellbeing (not 
in pain, healthy, 
active, 
energetic) – 
personal 
attributes (e.g. 
independent, 
hard-working, 
lazy) 
-same pattern 
across 
ideal/feared/ou
ght regardless 
of perspective. 
 
-importance of 
societal role to 
patients with CP 
– the person they 
want/feel 
compelled to be 
and fear to be in 
social 
environment. 
-ideal selves 
place health 
second priority 
- lack of 
correlation 
between content 
and depression 
present because 
discrepancy is 
lower for certain 
attributes? 
-PCP – implicit poles 
may give meaning 
to ambiguous 
physical constructs 
e.g. ‘strong’, ‘lazy’ 
(which may be 
classified as 
interpersonal if 
constrast poles are 
seen) – reliability of 
content categories 
not validated 
external to study, 
nor any comparison 
to a normal 
population on these 
grounds. 
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attributes) 
calculated 
Ought & feared 
sig more 
characterised 
by 
interpersonal 
attributes 
Ideal self sig 
more 
characterised 
by wellbeing 
attributes 
Disability 
related 
exclusively to 
ought/wellbein
g attributes 
-no sig rel. 
between 
content and 
depression 
-challenges to 
interpersonal self 
may be as 
important as the 
health condition 
Large & 
Strong, 
1997 
19 (12 
women) 
chronic low 
back pain 
sufferers 6 
public 
advertiseme
nts. 
Repertory grid 
interviews, 
including 
elements ‘like a 
coper’, ‘like a 
hypochrondriac’ 
and ‘like an ill 
person’, in 
addition to ‘self’ 
and ideal self. 
Supplied 2 
constructs: pain-
free vs in pain, 
and ‘coping with 
pain’ vs ‘not 
coping with pain’.  
Analysis included 
standardized 
distances (Slater, 
1985) between 
various elements, 
and constructs of 
coping. 
Self rated as 
being close to 
‘coping’ 
element, and 
more so for the 
‘how others see 
me’ element, 
far from 
‘hypochondriac’ 
who does not 
cope with 
illness. Content 
of coping 
constructs 
included 
authenticity, 
accepting 
limitations, 
mastery/contro
l of symptoms, 
stoicism, 
emotional 
coping and 
socially not 
being ‘a 
burden’ to 
others. 
-back pain 
patients’ 
construing of 
‘coping’ and of 
being ‘a coper’ 
may be self-
esteem 
preserving. 
Contrasts of 
coping looked 
upon 
derogatorily. 
-supplied constructs 
rather than elicited 
them 
-did not provide 
analysis of content 
of constructs, which 
would have been 
useful for 
categorising 
contents of ‘coping’ 
constructs in a 
reliable way – 
however, systems 
for analyzing 
constructs had not 
been designed at 
the time of the 
study 
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Appendix Bi: Example RG Recording Sheet 
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Appendix Bii: MYMOP-2 
 
MYMOP2 
Participant Code:  
Date: 
  
Demographic info (for research purposes): 
Sex (M/F): 
Employment Status: 
Ethnicity: 
Age: 
 
Choose one or two symptoms (physical or mental) which bother you the most. Write them on the 
lines. Now consider how bad each symptom is, over the last week, and score it by circling your 
chosen number.  
 
SYMPTOM 1: ................   As good as it could be  0   1   2   3   4   5   6  As bad as it could be 
.............................................. 
..............................................  
 
SYMPTOM 2: ................  As good as it could be  0   1   2   3   4   5   6 As bad as it could be 
.............................................. 
..............................................  
 
Now choose one activity (physical, social or mental) that is important to you, and that your problem 
makes difficult or prevents you doing. Score how bad it has been in the last week.  
 
ACTIVITY: .....................  As bad as it could be  0   1   2   3   4   5   6 As bad as it could be  
.............................................. 
..............................................  
 
Lastly how would you rate your general feeling of wellbeing during the last week?  
 
As bad as it could be             0   1   2   3   4   5   6    As good as it could be 
 
 
How long have you had Symptom 1, either all the time or on and off? Please circle:  
 
0 - 4 weeks     4 - 12 weeks     3 months - 1 year     1 - 5 years      over 5 years  
 
 
 
Are you taking any medication FOR THIS PROBLEM ? Please circle: YES/NO  
 
 
 
 
WHAT IS YOUR MAIN FORM OF CURRENT SUPPORT? 
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Appendix Biii: GAD-7 
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Appendix Biv: PHQ-9 
 
PHQ- 9 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of 
the following problems? Not at all 
Several 
days 
1 Little interest or pleasure in doing things 0 1 
2 Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 0 1 
3 Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much 0 1 
4 Feeling tired or having little energy 0 1 
5 Poor appetite or overeating 0 1 
6 
Feeling bad about yourself — or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your 
family down 
0 1 
7 
Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching 
television 
0 1 
8 
Moving or speaking so slowly that other people could have noticed?  Or the opposite 
— being so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than 
usual 
0 1 
9 Thoughts that you would be better off dead or of hurting yourself in some way 0 1 
TOTAL SCORE:  
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Appendic C: participant information sheet 
‘ A  s t u d y  w i t h  p e op l e  e x p e r i e n c i ng  p e r s i s t e n t  b od i l y  s y m p t om s  f or  w h i c h  t e s t s ,  i n v e s t i g a t i on s  a n d  
s c a n s  c o m e  b a c k  n e g a t i v e ’  ( S t u d y  t i t l e )  
Paricipant Information Sheet 
Part 1: Introduction to the study 
Why is this study being done? 
The study is interested in understanding how the body contributes to a person’s view of themselves and 
others, and how this relates to wellbeing. It will explore this for people who have a persisting physical 
symptom for which tests and scans come back negative and effective treatment has been problematic. 
Why am I being asked to take part in this study? 
You have been invited to this study because you have been experiencing a long-term symptom which has one 
or more of the following characteristics: 
-has not been given a medical explanation 
-affects your everyday life 
-nothing that you have tried has provided relief 
-has no medical diagnosis but results in increased stress or you feeling low. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is completely up to you whether or not you decide to take part in this study. Your consent will be sought at 
each step of the process. Agreeing to join the study does not mean that you have to complete it. You are free 
to withdraw at any stage without giving a reason. Your data will be removed from the study. 
You are advised to let your GP know that you are taking part in this study. However, this is not essential and is 
your decision. 
 PLEASE NOTE: this study cannot reimburse any expenses relating to travel or time spent taking part in the 
study. The researcher will be flexible with regards to the location and timing of interviews to make taking part 
as convenient and cost-free as possible for you. 
 Part 2: The research procedure 
What will I be asked to do? 
Once you have read the information and if you are interested in taking part, you can contact the researcher 
directly by post, email or phone to opt-in. The researcher will then arrange with you a convenient time and 
location for the face to face interview. 
At the face to face interview, the researcher will first ask you to complete a written consent form to say that 
you agree to take part in the study and that you are aware of your rights as a research participant. You will be 
asked to provide some information about yourself (e.g. age, sex, ethnicity) to help the research team know 
who is taking part in the study. You will then complete three brief, structured questionnaires with the 
guidance of the researcher. One of the questionnaires will ask you to identify a physical symptom that you 
have sought help for, and ask you to rate the severity and physical, social and emotional impact of this 
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symptom over the past week. The other two questionnaires (9-items and 7-items-long) will ask you to report 
on any symptoms of anxiety and depression that you may have experienced over the past couple of weeks. 
Finally, the researcher will ask you to list some significant people in your life and will write these down on 
cards. They will hand you three cards at a time representing different people (such as myself, how I’d like to 
be, someone I dislike) and ask you to state what you think are important physical and personality differences 
between them. When you give us the name of a word that describes a difference, we will ask you what the 
opposite of that word is to you. We will continue to do this using three different cards at a time and then 
finally ask you to rate each person numerically according to some of the words you came up with. You will not 
be required to write anything down in this part of the study. The Main Researcher will write down all your 
responses. There will not be any audio or video recording of interviews. 
This interview can involve multiple breaks as needed, and can be done across more than one meeting if doing 
it all at once would be too physically demanding. 
When the interview is complete, you will be asked if you would like be contacted for a possible follow-up study 
to the current study (e.g. after you have completed a course at Pathways2Wellbeing). This is not part of the 
current project and is entirely your choice. 
What are potential advantages and disadvantages of taking part? 
Taking part can be an interesting and stimulating experience, encouraging reflection on personal links between 
mind and body at a stage where you may not have had the opportunity to do this.  
The face to face interview is expected to last between an hour and an hour and a half, which may present 
physical demands such as discomfort or tiredness. The researcher will try to make taking part as comfortable as 
possible, such as arranging the interview at a location where you will be comfortable, having breaks, and dividing 
up the interview across several meetings. 
The content of the interviews may be of a personal nature, and there is a possibility that you may find some 
things upsetting to talk about. The researcher will support you during the interviews if you become upset and 
will offer further support through providing information about resources in your community if you wish. You 
may of course withdraw from the study at any point without any consequences and without giving a reason. 
Part 3: Confidentiality and your rights 
Who will know about my taking part in the study? 
Only the research team at the University of Hertfordshire will be aware of your participation. You are 
encouraged to notify your GP if you are taking part. However, this is your choice. 
What will happen to my data? 
All data collected during the interview will be in written form (no audio or video recordings will be made of 
interviews). Your data will be kept securely in a locked storage space on the premises of the University of 
Hertfordshire, where only the research team has access, for up to five years. Any personal responses collected 
during interviews will be identified with participant-codes which we use to ensure that it is linked anonymous 
– meaning that your interview responses cannot be linked to any information that identifies who you are. Your 
contact details and linked-anonymous study data will be stored on password-protected documents, on 
encrypted storage devices located at the University of Hertfordshire or with the researcher. Your data will be 
stored securely for up to 5 years after which time it will destroyed. If, at any point, the research team had 
concerns that the participant or another person were at risk to themselves or others, they may share your 
details with the relevant services, letting you know that they are doing this if appropriate. 
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What if I’m concerned or unhappy about some aspect of the study? 
If you have any concerns about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the Main Researcher, who 
will do their best to respond to any questions or questions. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This research has been reviewed by The University of Hertfordshire, Health and Human Sciences Ethics 
Committee with Delegated Authority (protocol number: LMS/PGR/UH/02724) 
 
WHAT YOU NEED TO DO NOW 
If you would like to participate: 
Please let the researcher know that you would like to take part by doing one of the following: 
emailing the researcher directly at t.sanders@herts.ac.uk 
contacting the researcher by telephone on 07544790897 
completing and returning the opt-in slip below to the return address. 
 
If you are interested or unsure but would like to know more 
You can fill in the response form below indicating that you would like to be contacted, or alternatively you can 
make direct contact with the researcher via email or phone (above) with any queries. 
 
If you do not wish to take part in the study at the current time you do not need to do anything. You will not 
be contacted further. 
OPT-IN FORM FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE RESEARCH 
‘A personal-construct study with persons experiencing persistent bodily symptoms for which tests, 
investigations and scans come back negative (MUS)’ (Study title) 
Please complete and return this form in the enclosed stamped and addressed envelope indicating with a tick 
whether you would like to a) take part in the study or alternatively b) if you would like to be contacted to find 
out more information. Thank you for your co-operation. 
 
o I confirm that I am interested in participating in the research study 
o I am unsure as to whether I would like to take part in the research at 
this stage but would like someone to contact me to provide further information. 
 
Name: …………………………………………………………………………. 
Best daytime contact telephone no:………………………………………… 
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I am/am not happy for a message to be left on this number (please delete as appropriate). 
 
Please return completed forms to: Tom Sanders, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, 1F414 Health Research 
Building, College Lane Campus, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, AL10 9AB 
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Appendix D: Consent form 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH 
‘A study with people experiencing persistent bodily symptoms for which tests, investigations and scans come back negative’ (Study title) 
Main Researcher: Tom Sanders, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Please tick or initial boxes 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving reason 
 
I agree to take part in the above study 
 
I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it has been anonymised) in a 
confidential location within University of Hertfordshire for up to 5 years before it is destroyed. 
 
I agree to my linked-anonymised data being used for future research 
 
I understand that my data collected in the study may be looked at by the Main Researcher and 
Research tutor at University of Hertfordshire, from regulatory authorities where it is relevant to my 
taking part in this research. 
 
Name of participant: 
Date: 
Signature: 
 
Name of researcher: 
Date:                
Signature: 
 
 
Protocol number: LMS/PGR/UH/02724 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the University of Hertfordshire, Health and Human Science EDCA 
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Appendix E: letter of ethical approval 
 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SCIENCES ECDA  
 
ETHICS APPROVAL NOTIFICATION  
 
TO Tom Sanders  
 
CC Professor David Winter  
 
FROM Dr Kim Goode, Health and Human Sciences, ECDA Vice Chairman  
 
DATE 02/03/17  
 
Protocol number: LMS/PGR/UH/02724  
 
Title of study: Exploring identity self-constructs with people who experience physical symptoms which 
are medically unexplained  
 
Your application for ethics approval has been accepted and approved by the ECDA for your School 
and includes work undertaken for this study by the named additional workers below:  
 
This approval is valid:  
From: 02/03/17  
To: 30/09/17  
 
Additional workers: no additional workers named  
 
Please note:  
If your research involves invasive procedures you are required to complete and submit an EC7 
Protocol Monitoring Form, and your completed consent paperwork to this ECDA once your 
study is complete.  
 
 
Approval applies specifically to the research study/methodology and timings as detailed in 
your Form EC1. Should you amend any aspect of your research, or wish to apply for an 
extension to your study, you will need your supervisor’s approval and must complete and 
submit form EC2. In cases where the amendments to the original study are deemed to be 
substantial, a new Form EC1 may need to be completed prior to the study being undertaken.  
Should adverse circumstances arise during this study such as physical reaction/harm, 
mental/emotional harm, intrusion of privacy or breach of confidentiality this must be reported 
to the approving Committee immediately. Failure to report adverse circumstance/s would be 
considered misconduct.  
 
Ensure you quote the UH protocol number and the name of the approving Committee on all 
paperwork, including recruitment advertisements/online requests, for this study.  
Students must include this Approval Notification with their submission. 
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Appendix F  
(i) scatter plot of relationship between distance between current self and self when symptoms are worst, and 
PHQ-9 scores 
 
(ii) scatter plot showing relationship between distance between current self and self when symptoms are 
worst, and GAD-7 score 
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Appendix G: Scatter plot showing relationship between distance between current self and ideal self, and GAD-
7 
 
 
Appendix H: Scatter plot showing the relationship between the self before symptoms and the ideal self, and 
scores on the GAD-7 
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Appendix I: Scatter plot showing the relationship between the distance between the ideal self and the self as 
ideally seen by others, and scores on the PHQ-9. 
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Appendix J: Sentence form implicative dilemmas 
Participant 1 (seen-as dilemmas) 
I want to be seen as strong, healthy, fit, and slim, but if I am seen as being these things, then I will be seen as 
being carefree and not in pain. I would prefer people to see me as being burdened and in pain. 
(possible emergent metaphors: this person characterised themselves and themselves as seen by others as 
being ‘overweight’. The weight and health difficulties may be a way of construing being ‘burdened’ as opposed 
to ‘carefree’ people, who are ‘happy’ but also ‘selfish’) 
Participant 2 (seen as dilemmas) 
I want to be seen as strong and outgoing, but if I am seen this way by other people, then I will also be seen as 
confident. I prefer to be seen as shy.  
 
Participant 3 (seen-as dilemmas) 
I want to be seen as energetic, sociable and reliable, but if I am seen to be these things, then I will also be seen 
as flexible (P), active and fake. I would prefer to be seen as being stiff and in pain, inactive and having integrity.  
(possible metaphor: there are contrasts between the body’s flexibility and stiffness, and the person’s desire to 
be reliably available for other (desired activity – socialising), an activity which this person might view as 
requiring some level of ‘faking it’ when symptoms are bad.) 
Participant 5 (ideal self and seen-as dilemmas) 
I want to be free, young and energetic, but that would mean being an innocent person, and I want to be (and 
be seen as being) experienced. 
Participant 6 (ideal-self and seen-as dilemmas) 
 
I want to be exercising and healthy, but that would mean being more male, and I would prefer to be (and be 
seen as) female. 
 [this person’s dominant characterisation of themselves as seen by others was female.] 
Participant 8 (ideal-self and seen-as dilemmas) 
 
I want to be energetic and alert, but if that would mean being more emotionally independent  and 
irresponsible, and I prefer to be (and be seen as) steady/responsible and family oriented. 
(this person’s desired activity was hillwalking and the construct wanderlust-homely was the least integrated 
with their construct system. A liked person was construed as being closer to the wanderlust but also 
irresponsible. The person may feel conflicted about feeling responsible versus a more self-centred desire of 
wanting to ‘wander from home’.  
Participant 13 (ideal-self and seen-as dilemmas) 
 
I want to be more muscular and overpowering (less passive), but this would mean being (and being seen as) 
insensitive, and I prefer to be (and be seen as) caring. 
(Emerging metaphors: this person construed themselves as being downtrodden in relation to their symptom of 
‘all over pain/sensitivity’. The symptom was characterised as being overpowering as a person, as was this 
person’s ex-partner. Being caring/sensitive may leave this person feeling vulnerable to being dominated by 
others in interactions.)  
Participant 14 (seen as dilemmas) 
 
I want to be seen as more immobile, weak and poorly by others, but that would mean being seen as more 
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attention-seeking, selfish and unpleasant – and I prefer to be seen as being self-satisfied, generous and 
pleasant. 
[being selfish, unpleasant and arrogant were qualities that correlated highly with the construct pole male of 
the physical construct male-female] 
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Appendix K: Most characterising construct for self-related elements, by subgroup 
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Appendix L: Scatter plot showing relationship between GAD-7 scores and the percentage conflict attributed to 
the self when symptoms are worst, for different subgroups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix M: scatter plot showing relationship between distance between current self and self when 
symptoms are worst, and GAD-7 score, for different subgroups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subgroup: 
Strong-weak 
Mixed 
Sensitive to others 
Subgroup: 
Strong-weak 
Mixed 
Sensitive to others 
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Appendix N: Scatter plot showing relationship between GAD-7 scores and difference between the distance 
between the current self and the ideal self, and the self as currently seen by others and the self as ideally seen 
by others, for different subgroups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix O 
(i) scatter plot showing relationship between change percent sum squares difference from self before 
symptoms to current self, and PHQ-9, for different subgroups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Subgroup: 
Strong-weak 
Mixed 
Sensitive to others 
Subgroup: 
Strong-weak 
Mixed 
Sensitive to others 
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(ii) scatter plot showing relationship between change in percent sum squares from the self before symptoms 
to the current self, and GAD-7 scores, for different subgroups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subgroup: 
Strong-weak 
Mixed 
Sensitive to others 
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Glossary of key terms 
Construing: the active process of exploring and finding meaning the world, as a mind-body unity 
Constructs: usually given as word=pairs, a person’s ‘constructs’ are the bipolar labels that reflect 
choices or alternatives in how they explore and make sense of the world. They are both the 
idiosyncratic ways of acting, and the channels which structure how incoming information is received.  
Construct-system: the hierarchical arrangement of interrelating constructs, which may be split into 
components or subsystems of constructs that relate highly with one another. Individual constructs 
may be more or less integral to the construct system that the person has for their identity in relation 
to other persons. 
Core self-constructs are constructs which are highly correlated to a number of other constructs 
relating to the self. Changes in core construing of self (e.g. selfish --- kind) have more implications for 
how the person construes themselves and how they feel they will be construed by others. Peripheral 
construing of self and others (e.g. prefers marmalade to raspberry jam --- prefers raspberry jam to 
marmalade) may change without as many implications. Core constructs which reflect the core values 
of the person are described as being ‘superordinate’ in the construct system (e.g. altruistic --- 
selfish). These may hierarchically relate to ‘subordinate’ constructs, which are the more concrete 
forms of construing stemming from superordinate constructs (e.g. ‘helps out at charity events---uses 
their time to pursue own interests’) 
Threat: Threat involves the anticipation of imminent changes to one’s construing.  
Anxiety: anxiety is experienced when one’s construct system is no longer adequate at making sense 
of events.  
Guilt: the feeling that accompanies construing oneself as being discrepant from one’s core ‘roles’ or 
constructions. A person who construed themselves as ‘timid’ might feel guilt when they construe 
their behaviour as deviating from this, e.g. shouting at a friend who arrives late to the cinema, 
causing them both miss the start of the film. 
Hostility: Hostility is a means of protecting threatened constructs by seeking out experiences which 
confirm or validate construing. An example might be faking an illness to avoid taking an exam that 
one had not revised for, in order to protect the view of oneself as academically successful as 
opposed to a failure. The construction of self is validated by not being tested 
Constriction is a means of protecting the construct system and alleviating anxiety by withdrawal to a 
more restricted world where one’s constructs have meaning. A person who was conflicted and 
unsure about their identity in romantic relationships may opt for celibacy as a means of having a 
more solid sense of self. 
Aggression is a means of elaborating identity and seeking validation. A man who is unsure of 
whether they were a ‘masculine’ person might spend a lot of time developing their physique at the 
gym to establish themselves as masculine. This example might also involve constriction if the 
person’s ‘masculinity’ had been invalidated on a construct related to masculinity that is orthogonal 
to physical strength (e.g. romantic success). 
Conflict is conceptualised in different ways throughout psychological literature. In PCP, conflict has 
been conceptualised using the ‘implicative dilemmas’ where desired changes in self-construing 
simultaneously imply undesired changes in another areas of self-construing (Feixas & Saul, 2000), 
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and as inconsistencies in how constructs are used (‘triangular inequalities’) (Bell, 2004). Conflict may 
be considered to internally threaten the construct system. However, this may be a positive thing: for 
example, implicative dilemmas protect a person from ‘nuclear’ changes (Feixas & Villegas, 1993) 
(rather like turning the dial on a kaleidoscope shifts the entire pattern of relationships between the 
lines). Inconsistency could also be a sign of complexity, flexibility and inclusiveness in one’s 
construing, if they can be tolerated.  
Habitus: this term refers to reflexive embodied habits that Bourdieu (1980) believed were 
expressions of a social identity and status hierarchies (e.g. class, education, moral beliefs). An 
example might be ‘sitting upright at the table’ rather than ‘slouching’ – a body posture which is 
encouraged in certain social circles more than others. Albert Scheflen (1973) writes about how very 
subtle inflections and body movements are used constantly throughout social interactions, meta-
communicating about the relationship between the participants.  
Enmeshment: the extent to which the various constructs for the self are contingent upon the status 
of the symptom. Enmeshment of self with symptoms has been hypothesised with those who 
experience chronic pain (Pincus & Morley, 2001). 
Dissociation: ‘dissociation’ has been used to denote a psychological process where the person is not 
processing information in the usual way (e.g. Brown, 2013). This has been associated with traumatic 
experiences. The term is used in this study to suggest that one set of constructs, which may be 
verbal in nature, are not helpful for the person in elaborating other aspects of self and others. For 
example, the symptom construct and the body may embody certain preverbal constructs about the 
self. However, the (primarily verbal) construct system that the person has for making sense of 
themselves and others may be ‘dissociated’ in the sense of being disconnected from, or ‘not well 
integrated’ with, these preverbal and embodied constructs (Lin & Payne, 2014; Metcalfe, 1997). 
Rather like with traumas, where the person struggles to make sense of the events from within their 
existing construct system, the person struggles to integrate different aspects of their identity. 
 
 
 
 
